Beyond Attribution: Responsibility of Armed Non-State Actors for Reparations in Northern Ireland, Colombia and Uganda

This chapter explores the responsibility of armed non-state actors for reparations to victims. Traditionally international law has focused on the responsibility of the state, and more recently the responsibility of convicted individuals before the International Criminal Court, to provide reparations for international crimes. Yet despite the prevalence of internal armed conflict over the past few decades, there responsibility of armed groups for reparations has been neglected in international law. Although there is a tentative emerging basis for armed groups to provide reparations under international law, such developments have not yet crystallized into hard law. However, when considering the more substantive practice of states in Northern Ireland, Colombia and Uganda, a greater effort can be discerned in ensuring that such organizations are responsible for reparations. This paper finds that not only can armed non-state actors be held collectively responsible for reparations, but due to the growing number of internal armed conflict they can play an important role in ensuring the effectiveness of reparations in remedying victims’ harm. Yet, finding armed groups responsible for reparations is no panacea for accountability, due to the nature of armed conflicts, responsibility may not be distinct, but overlapping and joint, and such groups may face difficulties in meeting their obligations, thus requiring a holistic approach and subsidiary role for the state.

The ‘Public Interest’ Agency of International Organizations? The case of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

This article seeks to outline and explore some of the conditions necessary for International Organizations (IOs) to perform in a public interest fashion through a case study of the Principles of corporate governance formulated by the OECD. Rather than the more commonly documented pathological and dysfunctional behavioural forms of IOs, the case of the Principles, both in their formulation by the OECD, and in their assessment by the World Bank through the ROSC process, represent an episode of IO agency protecting and promoting a wider public interest. In exercising their agency, IO staff, have made the Principles more agreeable to a wider range of interested parties, giving them a general interest orientation, in accordance with a proceduralist definition of public interest. This case should therefore encourage IPE scholars to consider carefully and systematically the sets of circumstances and conditions, which might be required for IO agency to take more socially useful forms. In the final section, three indicators are identified which might be evaluated in future research into the positive public interest agency of IOs across a range of cases.