Do multinationals really prefer to enter culturally distant countries through greenfields rather than through acquisitions? The role of parent experience and subsidiary autonomy.

Prior research has argued that multinational enterprises (MNEs) prefer to enter culturally distant countries through greenfields rather than through acquisitions, since acquisitions in such countries are costlier to manage. This argument contains two hidden assumptions: (1) the additional costs of acquisitions in culturally distant countries are the same for all MNEs; and (2) such acquisitions have no benefits over their greenfield counterparts. In this paper we relax these two assumptions by arguing that an MNE's preference for greenfields in culturally distant countries depends on its international and host-country experience, and on the level of autonomy it plans to grant the focal subsidiary. Analyzing 171 wholly owned greenfield investments and full acquisitions made by Dutch MNEs in 35 countries, we find that these MNEs prefer to enter culturally distant countries through greenfields, but that this preference is lower when they have little international experience, or plan to grant the focal subsidiary considerable autonomy in marketing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership

Using the example of an unconsented mouth swab I criticise the view that an action of this kind taken in itself is wrongful in respect of its being a violation of autonomy. This is so much inasmuch as autonomy merits respect only with regard to ‘critical life choices’. I consider the view that such an action is nevertheless harmful or risks serious harm. I also respond to two possible suggestions: that the action is of a kind that violates autonomy; and, that the class of such actions violates autonomy. I suggest that the action is wrongful in as much as it is a bodily trespass. I consider, and criticise, two ways of understanding how morally I stand to my own body: as owner and as sovereign. In respect of the latter I consider Arthur Ripstein’s recent defence of a sovereignty principle. Finally I criticise an attempt by Joel Feinberg to explain bodily trespass in terms of personal autonomy.

Respecting autonomy without disclosing information

There is widespread agreement that it would be both morally and legally wrong to treat a competent patient, or to carry out research with a competent participant, without the voluntary consent of that patient or research participant. Furthermore, in medical ethics it is generally taken that that consent must be informed. The most widely given reason for this has been that informed consent is needed to respect the patient’s or research participant’s autonomy. In this article I set out to challenge this claim by considering in detail each of the three most prominent ways in which ‘autonomy’ has been conceptualized in the medical ethics literature. I will argue that whilst these accounts support the claim that consent is needed if the treatment of competent patients, or research on competent individuals, is to respect their autonomy, they do not support the claim that informed consent is needed for this purpose.