Rough Waters, Dark Shadows and Cross-Cutting Winds:the impact of European Union enlargement on Turkey’s EU accession negotiations

For a multiplicity of socio-economic, geo-political, strategic and identity-based reasons, Turkey’s progress towards EU membership is often treated as a sui generis case. Yet although Turkey’s accession negotiations with the European Union (EU) are essentially a bilateral – and often stormy – affair, they take place within a wider and dynamic process of enlargement in which not only can the gloomy – sometimes dark – shadows of past and prospective enlargements be clearly detected, but so too can the often chill winds from ongoing, parallel negotiations with other candidates. How the EU negotiates accession and what it expects from candidates has continued to evolve since the EU began drawing up its framework for negotiations with Turkey ten years ago. This paper charts this evolution by first identifying changes in the light of Croatia’s negotiating experience, the ‘lessons learnt’ by the EU in meeting the challenges of Bulgarian and Romanian accession, the EU’s handling of Iceland’s membership bid and accession negotiations, and the revised approach to negotiating accession evident in the more recent frameworks for accession negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia. The paper then explores the extent to which these changes have impacted on the approach the EU has adopted in framing and progressing accession negotiations with Turkey. In doing so, it questions both the consistency with which the EU’s negotiates accession and the extent to which Turkey’s progress towards EU membership is conditioned by the broader dynamics of EU enlargement as opposed to simply the dynamics within EU-Turkey relations and domestic Turkish reform efforts.

Perceptions and reality: Economic voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections

One of the most influential explanations of voting behaviour is based on economic factors: when the economy is doing well, voters reward the incumbent government and when the economy is doing badly, voters punish the incumbent. This reward-punishment model is thought to be particularly appropriate at second order contests such as European Parliament elections. Yet operationalising this economic voting model using citizens' perceptions of economic performance may suffer from endogeneity problems if citizens' perceptions are in fact a function of their party preferences rather than being a cause of their party preferences. Thus, this article models a 'strict' version of economic voting in which they purge citizens' economic perceptions of partisan effects and only use as a predictor of voting that portion of citizens' economic perceptions that is caused by the real world economy. Using data on voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections for 23 European Union electorates, the article finds some, but limited, evidence for economic voting that is dependent on both voter sophistication and clarity of responsibility for the economy within any country. First, only politically sophisticated voters' subjective economic assessments are in fact grounded in economic reality. Second, the portion of subjective economic assessments that is a function of the real world economy is a significant predictor of voting only in single party government contexts where there can be a clear attribution of responsibility. For coalition government contexts, the article finds essentially no impact of the real economy via economic perceptions on vote choice, at least at European Parliament elections.

And We’d Like to Thank…::Romania’s Integration into the European Union, 1989-2007

Conditionality is formally a key determinant of many non-member states’ relations with the EU. It is particularly so for states intent on membership. As the case of Romania shows, the EU’s use of conditionality is far from consistent. Relations can develop and accession take place without the requisite conditions being met. This follows from the use the EU makes of the flexibility evident in its evolving and generally vague definitions of the conditions that need to be met. Hence it was often extraneous factors over which Romania had either limited or no influence that were responsible for key developments in relations. These factors include the geopolitical and strategic interests of the EU and its member states, the actions of the Commission and the agenda-setting and constraining effects of rhetorical commitments and timetables, and the dynamics of the EU’s evolving approach to eastern enlargement.

Comparing Poverty Indicators in an Enlarged European Union

In this article, we explore the extent to which a consideration of welfare regime and socioeconomic differences in poverty levels and patterns can assist us in making an informed assessment of alternative poverty indicators. Poverty in the EU is normally defined in terms of income thresholds at the level of each member state. However, with the enlargement of the EU, such measures have come in for increasing criticism. One set of reservation relates to the limitations imposed by an entirely national frame of reference. An alternative critique focuses on the fact that low income is an unreliable indicator of poverty. In this article, we seek to explore the strength of both arguments by comparing the outcomes associated with ‘at risk of poverty’ and consistent poverty at both national and EU levels. Developing an appropriate assessment of poverty levels in the enlarged EU, particularly in periods of rapid change, is likely to require that we make use of a number of indicators none of which capture the full complexity of cross-national poverty outcomes. However, our analysis suggests that if a choice is to be made between the available indicators, the ‘mixed consistent poverty’ indicator developed in this study is best suited to achieving the stated EU objective of assessing the scale of exclusion from minimally acceptable standards of living in individual countries while also measuring the extent to which the whole population of Europe is sharing in the benefits of high average prosperity.

Income, deprivation and economic stress in the enlarged European Union

At risk of poverty indicators based on relative income measures suggest that within the enlarged EU societies located at quite different points on a continuum of affluence have similar levels of poverty. Substantial differences in levels of income between societies do not in themselves invalidate this approach. However, the relative income approach fails to capture the fact that, if countries are grouped in terms of level of GDP, between economic cluster differences in life-style deprivation are sharper at lower income levels. Support for the argument relating to restricted reference groups is found in relation to the contrast between the twelve most affluent EU countries and all others. The limitations of relative income poverty lines have little to do with the process of enlargement as such. Instead the major problem involves the weak association between income and deprivation in the more affluent countries. However, as a consequence of such difficulties, such indicators do not provide entirely meaningful comparisons of levels of disadvantage across economic clusters. The current analysis, rather than supporting the alternative of a focus on absolute income or an EU wide poverty line, suggests that we should take the argument for adopting a multidimensional approach to the measurement of poverty more seriously.

The European Union and Peacebuilding: The Cross-Border Dimension

The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union in 2012 was a reminder of the role of European integration in peacebuilding after the Second World War. For the 'Founding Fathers' of the European integration project, cross-border-cooperation was an integral element in building Europe's peace. Yet, in a Western Europe largely at peace for generations, peacebuilding as a relevant objective for European integration may be questioned. Moreover, the contribution of cross-border cooperation to conflict amelioration may be challenged on the grounds of its overwhelming economic focus. However, enlargement into Central Eastern Europe highlights once again the necessity of a peacebuilding objective for the European Union because of the multitude of real and potential conflicts encompassed within its expanded policy orbit. Drawing on evidence from selected 'borderscapes', this study examines 25 years of European Union cross-border cooperation as conflict amelioration and assesses its prospects in a political climate that emphasises borders as security barriers.