Explicit argumentation as a supervisory tool for decision making in child protection cases involving human rights issues

This paper addresses the problems often faced by social workers and their supervisors in decision making where human rights considerations and child protection concerns collide. High profile court cases in the United Kingdom and Europe have consistently called for social workers to convey more clarity when justifying their reasons for interfering with human rights in child protection cases. The themes emerging from these case law decisions imply that social workers need to be better at giving reasons and evidence in more explicit ways to support any actions they propose which cause interference with Convention Rights. Toulmin (1958, 1985) offers a structured approach to argumentation which may have relevance to the supervision of child protection cases when social workers and managers are required to balance these human rights considerations. One of the key challenges in this balancing act is the need for decision makers to feel confident that any interventions resulting in the interference of human rights are both justified and proportionate. Toulmin’s work has already been shown to have relevance for assisting social workers navigate pathways through cases involving competing ethical and moral demands (Osmo and Landau, 2001) and more recently to human rights and decision making in child protection (Duffy et al, 2006). Toulmin’s model takes the practitioner through a series of stages where any argument or proposed recommendation (claim) is subjected to intense critical analysis involving exposition of its strengths and weaknesses. The author therefore proposes that explicit argumentation (Osmo and Landau, 2001) may help supervisors and practitioners towards safer and more confident decision making in child protection cases involving the interference of the human rights of children and parents. In addition to highlighting the broader context of human rights currently permeating child protection decision making, the paper will include case material to practically demonstrate the application of Toulmin’s model of argumentation to the supervision context. In this way the paper adopts a strong practice approach in helping to assist practitioners with the problems and dilemmas they may come up against in decision making in complex cases.

‘Government(ality) By Experts: Human Rights as Governance’

The suggestion that the general economy of power in our societies is becoming a domain of security was made by Michel Foucault in the late 1970s. This paper takes inspiration from Foucault?s work to interpret human rights as technologies of governmentality, which make possible the safe and secure society. I examine, by way of illustration, the site of the European Union and its use of new modes of governance to regulate rights discourse – in particular via the emergence of a new Fundamental Rights Agency. „Governance? in the EU is constructed in an apolitical way, as a departure from traditional legal and juridical methods of governing. I argue, however, that the features of governance represent technologies of government(ality), a new form of both being governed through rights and of governing rights. The governance feature that this article is most interested in is experts. The article aims to show, first and foremost, how rights operate as technologies of governmentality via a new relation to expertise. Second, it considers the significant implications that this reading of rights has for rights as a regulatory and normalising discourse. Finally, it highlights how the overlap between rights and governance discourses can be problematic because (as the EU model illustrates) governance conceals the power relations of governmentality, allowing, for instance, the unproblematic representation of the EU as an international human rights actor

The European Court of Human Rights and Domestic Violence

Domestic violence is an issue that affects vast numbers of women throughout the world. It seems to constitute a clear violation of at least three articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, however it has only been recognised as being a human rights issue relatively recently. Indeed, until 2007 domestic violence had not been directly addressed by the European Court of Human Rights. However, the Court has now addressed the issue in a series of recent cases. This paper discusses what positive obligations states parties to the Convention now have in relation to the issue of domestic violence. It proceeds to discuss the gaps in the Court’s jurisprudence in this area at present and how the case law of the Court may develop in the future.

A Human Rights Perspective on Citizen Participation in the EU's Governance of New Technologies

This article considers the EU’s approach to citizen participation in the governance of new technologies from a human rights perspective. Noting that there is a dearth of insight on the interplay between citizen participation and human rights, the article sketches the essence of its own human rights perspective as being about empowerment. This perspective is brought to bear on EU discourse on citizen participation in the governance of new technologies. Analysis of the discourse—comprising law, citizen participation in EU governance and citizen/science relations, the ‘public understanding of science and technology’, risk and bioethics—reveals a disempowering ‘deficit model’ of citizens in need of education through their participation in governance. The analysis thus suggests that citizen participation in EU governance of new technologies is not truly informed by human rights, but is instead used as a legitimating technique.

The Victim Test under the Human Rights Act 1998 and its Implications for Domestic Violence Cases

The European Court of Human Rights has now clearly established that domestic violence constitutes a human rights issue. However, there are a number of difficulties involved in using the Human Rights Act 1998 in relation to violence against women in the home. One of these obstacles is the restrictive test of standing found in the Act, which is problematic as regards an ‘unseen crime’ such as domestic violence. This article examines this test of standing and the difficulties it poses in the context of violence against women in the home. It then considers alternative models for the standing requirement and assesses whether a change in the test of standing would produce beneficial results as regards the issue of domestic violence.