In and out of home care decisions: The influence of confirmation bias in developing decision supportive reasoning

The aims of this study were to identify the themes Social Workers regard as important in supporting decisions to remove children from, or return them to, the care of their parents. To further elicit underlying hypotheses that are discernible in interpretation of evidence. A case study, comprising a two-part vignette with a questionnaire, recorded demographic information, child welfare attitudes and risk assessments, using scales derived from standardised instruments, was completed by 202 Social Workers in Northern Ireland. There were two manipulated variables, mother’s attitude to removal and child’s attitude to reunification2 years later. In this paper we use data derived from respondents’ qualitative comments explaining their reasoning for in and out of home care decisions. Some 60.9% of respondent’s chose the parental care option at part one, with 94% choosing to have the child remain in foster care at part two. The manipulated variables were found to have no significant statistical effect. However, three underlying hypotheses were found to underpin decisions; (a)child rescue, (b) kinship defence and (c) a hedged position on calculation of risk subject to further assessment. Reasoning strategies utilised by social workers to support their decision making suggest that they tend to selectively interpret information either positively or negatively to support pre-existing underlying hypotheses. This finding is in keeping with the literature on ‘confirmation bias.’ The research further draws attention to the need to incorporate open questions in quantitative studies, to help guard against surface reading of data, which often does not ‘speak for itself.’

Partial Cooperation in Strategic Decision Situations

We consider a normal form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. These collective actions typically represent a certain number of dimensions in the players’ strategy space. The actions represented by the other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the complete, individual control of the players.
We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are developed for these new equilibrium concepts. We identify conditions on these partial cooperative games under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent.
We apply this game theoretic framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly typically a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium, which vanishes if the cartel of collaborators exploits its leadership position. Our application to international pollution abatement treaties shows that cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium.

Strategic behaviour in choice experiments.

Practitioners of environmental economics sometimes use repeated trinary choice experiment surveys to estimate the value of environmental policies and programs for use in policy evaluation. These surveys have several advantages over simpler forms of non-market valuation: (1) researchers can estimate the marginal value of attributes of the good or service in question, making the results useful for benefits transfer; and (2) because respondents make several choices and choose from choice sets containing three options, efficiency of the willingness to pay estimate is improved over one-shot, binary choice formats. Despite these benefits, such surveys may have incentive properties which cause the resulting value estimates to be biased. This paper presents a theoretical demonstration that subjects often have an incentive to choose the second-best option in a repeated trinary choice survey. The model shows that due to the nature of factorial choice set design, the second-best option in the choice set will often be the status quo option. The paper reports a set of experiments designed to test these theoretical predictions in an induced-value setting. The experimental results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, demonstrating that repeated trinary choice experiment surveys can generate biased value estimates under a wide range of conditions.