Intersectionality and the Notion of Disability in EU discrimination law

Defining the characteristics targeted by banning discrimination constitutes a central challenge for EU discrimination law, and defining disability is particular-ly challenging due to the dispute around the very concept of disability. From 2006, the Court of Justice has wrestled with this definition in six judgments, five of which were delivered from 2013. Instead of classifying the case law definition as conforming to a medical or social model of disability, this article analyses the case law with a view to illustrate challenges of defining discrimination grounds generally, demanding that a sufficiently precise and non-exclusive definition of each discrimination ground can be achieved by re-focusing EU discrimination law around the nodes of sex, race and disability. The analysis exposes that the ECJ definition of disability neither complies with the UN CRPD nor adequately responds to intersectionality theory, for example because the definition is exclu-sionary in relation to female experience of disability.

Revisiting intersectionality for EU Anti-Discrimination Law in an economic crisis –a critical legal studies perspective

This article discusses the role of EU anti-discrimination law in challenging EU anti-crisis measures from a critical legal studies perspective. Critical legal scholarship is defined through its challenge of ‘lex’ through the vision of ‘ius’ and its critical links with social movements. EU anti-discrimination law attracts critique for constituting a compartmentalised socio-legal field, which prevents justice for those at intersections of inequalities. By defining as the aim of anti-discrimination law the combat of disadvantage resulting from ascribed otherness around the nodes sex/gender, race/ethnicity, and disability, the article suggests a convincing normative vision suitable to de-compartmentalise the field and adequately address intersectionality. This critical legal perspective on intersectionality differs from its sociological counterparts by omitting class as a category. The article demonstrates that this distinction is necessary for EU anti-discrimination law to maintain its critical edge.