Realising political equality: the European Court of Human Rights and positive obligations in a democracy'

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) speaks of the importance of an “effective political democracy” in its Preamble, though it is only in Article 3 of Protocol 1 (P1-3) that we find a right to free elections. This paper discusses the role of “positive obligations” under P1-3. This paper outlines the positive obligations in P1-3 focusing on obligations where the state is required to do more than just change the law. This may mean providing resources or facilities, adopting regulatory frameworks or creating new institutions. The paper highlights specific positive obligations that need to be further developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Sometimes these can be developed by analogy with positive obligations recognised in other areas of ECtHR jurisprudence. However, beyond these cases, states should ensure that members of vulnerable and disadvantaged minorities are able to participate in the electoral process and should ensure that dominant political groups cannot abuse their political power to exclude other parties unfairly. This is necessary to realise equal political rights. The second section of this paper sketches some preliminary points about the Strasbourg institutions’ approach to P1-3. After that, the third section identifies circumstances where the ECtHR should apply a more intense scrutiny in P1-3 cases. The fourth, fifth and sixth sections look at positive obligations relating to the right to vote, the right to run for election and the regulation of political parties.

The First Year of the UK's Supreme Court

This article reviews the judgments issued by the UK Supreme Court during the first year of its existence (October 2009 - September 2010) and assesses how the modus operandi of the new court differs from that of its predecessor, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords.

A Human Rights Triumph? Dictatorship-Era Crimes and the Chilean Supreme Court

This article assesses the dramatic shift in Chilean Supreme Court jurisprudence toward accountability for crimes committed during the dictatorship and sets it within the context of judicial reform and political change. Chile's experience has been identified as emblematic of delayed justice, but an examination of key case law identifies the narrow scope and instability of Supreme Court decision-making. The Court has been uncharacteristically assertive in its application of human rights norms yet vulnerable to external influences. The Chilean example underscores the need for political leadership to address past violations in post-conflict societies. Political inertia impeded justice claims and, as a result, change required significant judicial innovation.