Dual-task interference: Attentional and neurophysiological influences

Performing two tasks simultaneously often degrades performance of one or both tasks. While this dual-task interference is classically interpreted in terms of shared attentional resources, where two motor tasks are performed simultaneously interactions within primary motor cortex (i.e., activity-dependent coupling) may also be a contributing factor. In the present study TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation) was used to examine the contribution of activity-dependent coupling to dual-task interference during concurrent performance of a bimanual coordination task and a discrete probe reaction time (RT) task involving the foot. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that activity-dependent coupling within the leg corticomotor pathway was greater during dual-task performance than single-task performance, and this was associated with interference on the probe RT task (i.e., increased RT). Experiment 3 revealed that dual-task interference occurred regardless of whether the dual-task involved two motor tasks or a motor and cognitive task, however activity-dependent coupling was present only when a dual motor task was performed. This suggests that activity-dependent coupling is less detrimental to performance than attentional processes operating upstream of the corticomotor system. Finally, while prioritising the RT task reduced, but did not eliminate, dual-task interference the contribution of activity-dependent coupling to dual-task interference was not affected by task prioritisation. This suggests that although activity-dependent coupling may contribute to dual motor-task interference, attentional processes appear to be more important. It also suggests that activity-dependent coupling may not be subject to modulation by attentional processes. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

How many processes underline category-based induction? Effect of conclusion specificity and cognitive ability

Two studies investigated participants' sensitivity to the amount and diversity of the evidence when reasoning inductively about categories. Both showed that participants are more sensitive to characteristics of the evidence for arguments with general rather than specific conclusions. Both showed an association between cognitive ability and sensitivity to these evidence characteristics, particularly when the conclusion category was general. These results suggest that a simple associative process may not be sufficient to capture some key phenomena of category-based induction. They also support the claim that the need to generate a superordinate category is a complicating factor in category-based reasoning and that adults' tendency to generate such categories while reasoning has been overestimated.