Integrating Human Rights? Socio-Economic Rights and Budget Analysis

This article explores an opportunity for mutual learning between the fields of human rights law and economic analysis. Specifically it considers how economic techniques might be used to appraise public expenditure in line with international obligations arising from the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR). Our argument is that such tools do have the potential to contribute to this aim, but that embedding them within government budget processes through “human rights mainstreaming” may prove problematic in practice. We therefore suggest, as part of a broader strategy which includes judicial enforcement, that mainstreaming initiatives and budget analysis can be useful as complementary tools for the full realisation of all human rights.

The Victim Test under the Human Rights Act 1998 and its Implications for Domestic Violence Cases

The European Court of Human Rights has now clearly established that domestic violence constitutes a human rights issue. However, there are a number of difficulties involved in using the Human Rights Act 1998 in relation to violence against women in the home. One of these obstacles is the restrictive test of standing found in the Act, which is problematic as regards an ‘unseen crime’ such as domestic violence. This article examines this test of standing and the difficulties it poses in the context of violence against women in the home. It then considers alternative models for the standing requirement and assesses whether a change in the test of standing would produce beneficial results as regards the issue of domestic violence.

Human Dignity and judicial Interpretation of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularizing the use of 'dignity' or 'human dignity' in human rights discourse. This article argues that the use of 'dignity', beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specific, varying significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to significant judicial manipulation. increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its significant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally. highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue that the concept of 'human dignity' plays an important role in the development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication.

Domestic Violence and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States

On 21 July 2011 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued its much awaited decision in the case of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States. In a landmark decision the Commission found the United States of America to be in violation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 1948 due to the failure of the state to protect a victim of domestic violence and her children. This paper analyses the Lenahan decision and its significance for the United States. In particular, the substantial influence of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on the Commission’s reasoning is examined.