Emotions and voting in EU referendums

There is an emerging scholarship on the emotional bases of political opinion and behaviour and, in particular, the contrasting implications of two distinct negative emotions - anger and anxiety. I apply the insights in this literature to the previously unresearched realm of the emotional bases of voting in EU referendums. I hypothesise that anxious voters rely on substantive EU issues and angry voters rely on second-order factors relating to domestic politics (partisanship and satisfaction with government). Focusing on the case of Irish voting in the Fiscal Compact referendum, and using data from a representative sample of voters, I find support for the hypotheses and discuss the implications of the findings for our understanding of the emotional conditionality of EU referendum voting. 

Potentially Voting across the Divide in Deeply Divided Places: Ethnic Catch-All Voting in Consociational Northern Ireland

I elaborate a model of cross-bloc party support in deeply divided places. The model expects that the variation in the level of electoral support that citizens in Community A have for parties in Community B is a function of citizens' evaluations of the relative ability of parties in Community B to represent the interests of all communities. This 'ethnic catch-all' model of cross-bloc party support is tested in the context of consociational Northern Ireland, using data from a representative survey conducted directly after the 2010 Westminster general election. The findings are asymmetric: the model explains Protestant support for nationalist parties but not Catholic support for unionist parties. The findings, and their implications, are discussed.

Defining Democracy: Voting Procedures in Decision-making, Elections and Governance

Book Review: Emerson, Peter, Defining Democracy: Voting Procedures in Decision-making, Elections and
Governance (2nd edn), Springer, London, 2012,

Partial Cooperation in Strategic Decision Situations

We consider a normal form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. These collective actions typically represent a certain number of dimensions in the players’ strategy space. The actions represented by the other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the complete, individual control of the players.
We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are developed for these new equilibrium concepts. We identify conditions on these partial cooperative games under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent.
We apply this game theoretic framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly typically a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium, which vanishes if the cartel of collaborators exploits its leadership position. Our application to international pollution abatement treaties shows that cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium.

Strategic behaviour in choice experiments.

Practitioners of environmental economics sometimes use repeated trinary choice experiment surveys to estimate the value of environmental policies and programs for use in policy evaluation. These surveys have several advantages over simpler forms of non-market valuation: (1) researchers can estimate the marginal value of attributes of the good or service in question, making the results useful for benefits transfer; and (2) because respondents make several choices and choose from choice sets containing three options, efficiency of the willingness to pay estimate is improved over one-shot, binary choice formats. Despite these benefits, such surveys may have incentive properties which cause the resulting value estimates to be biased. This paper presents a theoretical demonstration that subjects often have an incentive to choose the second-best option in a repeated trinary choice survey. The model shows that due to the nature of factorial choice set design, the second-best option in the choice set will often be the status quo option. The paper reports a set of experiments designed to test these theoretical predictions in an induced-value setting. The experimental results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, demonstrating that repeated trinary choice experiment surveys can generate biased value estimates under a wide range of conditions.

Explaining voting behaviour on free votes: Solely a matter of preference?

While studies examining free votes find MPs’ preferences influence their voting behaviour, most studies also show MPs tend to divide along party lines even after the whips have been withdrawn. Recent work offers a possible alternative explanation for this finding: this sustained party cohesion represents the impact of MPs’ party identification similar to party identification effects in the electorate. This argument is tested using a series of free votes on same-sex relations. Even after controlling for preferences using several direct measures, party continues to shape voting behaviour. Although indirect, this provides evidence in favour of the party-asidentification argument.