Partial Cooperation in Strategic Decision Situations

We consider a normal form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. These collective actions typically represent a certain number of dimensions in the players’ strategy space. The actions represented by the other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the complete, individual control of the players.
We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are developed for these new equilibrium concepts. We identify conditions on these partial cooperative games under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent.
We apply this game theoretic framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly typically a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium, which vanishes if the cartel of collaborators exploits its leadership position. Our application to international pollution abatement treaties shows that cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium.

Strategic behaviour in choice experiments.

Practitioners of environmental economics sometimes use repeated trinary choice experiment surveys to estimate the value of environmental policies and programs for use in policy evaluation. These surveys have several advantages over simpler forms of non-market valuation: (1) researchers can estimate the marginal value of attributes of the good or service in question, making the results useful for benefits transfer; and (2) because respondents make several choices and choose from choice sets containing three options, efficiency of the willingness to pay estimate is improved over one-shot, binary choice formats. Despite these benefits, such surveys may have incentive properties which cause the resulting value estimates to be biased. This paper presents a theoretical demonstration that subjects often have an incentive to choose the second-best option in a repeated trinary choice survey. The model shows that due to the nature of factorial choice set design, the second-best option in the choice set will often be the status quo option. The paper reports a set of experiments designed to test these theoretical predictions in an induced-value setting. The experimental results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, demonstrating that repeated trinary choice experiment surveys can generate biased value estimates under a wide range of conditions.