Common Mistake in Contract Law

English law has long struggled to understand the effect of a fundamental common mistake in contract formation. Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161 recognises that a common mistake which totally undermines a contract renders it void. Solle v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671 recognises a doctrine of 'mistake in equity' under which a serious common mistake in contract formation falling short of totally undermining the contract could give an adversely affected party the right to rescind the contract. This article accepts that the enormous difficulty in differentiating these two kinds of mistake justifies the insistence by the Court of Appeal in The Great Peace [2003] QB 679 that there can be only one doctrine of common mistake. However, the article proceeds to argue that where the risk of the commonly mistaken matter is not allocated by the contract itself a better doctrine would be that the contract is voidable.

Developing outcomes for educational services: a children's rights-based approach

This article provides a rationale for and insight into an explicit children's rights-based approach to the identification of outcomes for proposed educational interventions. It presents a critical reflection on a research project which sought to integrate international children's rights standards into the design of services through a children's rights audit of potential outcomes and the meaningful engagement of children in the research and service design processes. While children are involved increasingly as co-researchers in qualitative studies, it is less common for this to occur in quantitative studies. This article offers some additional insight into children's participation in the interpretation of data from a large-scale baseline survey. The article concludes with an argument that international children's rights law provides not just a legal imperative but also a comprehensive framework with which to assert the case for increased recognition of children as salient stakeholders in all aspects of service design.

Human Dignity and judicial Interpretation of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularizing the use of 'dignity' or 'human dignity' in human rights discourse. This article argues that the use of 'dignity', beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specific, varying significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to significant judicial manipulation. increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its significant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally. highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue that the concept of 'human dignity' plays an important role in the development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication.

Book Review: Critical Perspectives on Human Rights and Disability Law

Book Review