The Importance of Religious Displays for Belief Acquisition and Secularization

Both the sociology and the cognitive science of religion seek to explain the acquisition of religious beliefs. In this article, I offer an account of the acquisition and distribution of religious beliefs using the findings of both fields. In the process, I seek to illustrate the potential of interdisciplinary dialogue for improving our understanding of religion and its absence. More specifically, I present a prima facie case—based on existing work in the social and cognitive sciences, exploratory online surveys, and participant observation—that witnessing actions attesting to religious claims is one of the most crucial variables determining whether or not an individual will explicitly believe such claims. Further, I argue that the connection between action and belief can help produce an improved account of secularization and non-theism, defined here as the lack of explicit belief in the existence of non-physical agents.

The Science of Religious Beliefs

Why have humans, throughout history and across cultures, shown a strong tendency to believe in the existence of superhuman intentional agents and attached this belief to notions of morality, misfortune, and the creation of the world? The answer emerging from the cognitive science of religion appears to be that explicit beliefs are informed and constrained by the natural and cross-culturally recurrent operation of implicit cognitive systems. Successful god concepts resonate with the expectations of these implicit systems but also have attention-demanding and inferentially-rich properties that allow their integration into various areas of human concern. Theological concepts may deviate from these natural cognitive moorings but require special cultural scaffolding, such as Whitehouse's two Modes of Religiosity, to do so and constitute additions to, rather than replacements of the religious beliefs supported by implicit cognitive systems.

Religious Political Parties and the Limits of Political Liberalism

Political parties have only recently become a subject of investigation in political theory. In this paper I analyse religious political parties in the context of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Rawlsian political liberalism, I argue, overly constrains the scope of democratic political contestation and especially for the kind of contestation channelled by parties. This restriction imposed upon political contestation risks undermining democracy and the development of the kind of democratic ethos that political liberalism cherishes. In this paper I therefore aim to provide a broader and more inclusive understanding of ‘reasonable’ political contestation, able to accommodate those parties (including religious ones) that political liberalism, as customarily understood, would exclude from the democratic realm. More specifically, I first embrace Muirhead and Rosenblum’s (Perspectives on Politics 4: 99–108 2006) idea that parties are ‘bilingual’ links between state and civil society and I draw its normative implications for party politics. Subsequently, I assess whether Rawls’s political liberalism is sufficiently inclusive to allow the presence of parties conveying religious and other comprehensive values. Due to Rawls’s thick conceptions of reasonableness and public reason, I argue, political liberalism risks seriously limiting the number and kinds of comprehensive values which may be channelled by political parties into the public political realm, and this may render it particularly inhospitable to religious political parties. Nevertheless, I claim, Rawls’s theory does offer some scope for reinterpreting the concepts of reasonableness and public reason in a thinner and less restrictive sense and this may render it more inclusive towards religious partisanship.

Dimensions of religious and national identity among Irish adolescents growing up in two jurisdictions

This poster explores the impact of growing up in different socio-political environments in the border areas of the Republic of Ireland (RoI) and Northern Ireland (NI) on adolescents’ evaluations of their religious and national identities. The vast majority of the population of the Republic of Ireland are Catholic and Irish whereas in Northern Ireland, the majority are Protestant and British. 713 adolescents (NI= 415; RoI=298), who categorised their religious identity as Catholic and their nationality as Irish completed the Collective Self – Esteem (CSE) scale (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990) with reference to either their religious (N=350) or national identity (n=363). The overall rating of CSE for the Irish identity was significantly higher than the rating of CSE for the Catholic Identity. This result was modified by a significant interaction - adolescents in the Republic of Ireland rated the CSE of their Irish nationality higher than those in Northern Ireland (20.99 vs. 19.95), whereas adolescents in Northern Ireland rated the CSE of their Catholic religious identity higher than their peers in the Republic of Ireland (19.97 vs 18.87). Further analysis of the CSE subscales revealed differing patterns of relationships according to the scale. The evaluation of the Public Collective Self-Esteem of national and religious identities were significantly higher in the Republic of Ireland than in Northern Ireland, however Private Collective Self-esteem did not differ according to jurisdiction. These findings are discussed in relation to the social context and current theoretical accounts of collective identification processes.

Parental Disputes, Religious Upbringing and Welfare in English Law and the ECHR

This article assesses the position of English law concerning parental disputes about the religious upbringing of children. Despite the strong emphasis on both parents being able to direct their child’s religious upbringing, courts have interpreted the child’s welfare to restrict the exposure of the child to parental religious beliefs or practices in some circumstances: preserving the child’s future choice of religion, the physical integrity of the child, the child’s contact and relationship with both parents, the child’s educational choices, and the child’s relationship with both parents’ religious community. It is suggested that courts should have a wide understanding of welfare and should be wary to prohibit parents teaching their minority beliefs. This article also compares the position of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and suggests that, despite the stronger emphasis by the ECtHR on parental rights, English law is generally not that much at odds with the ECtHR.