What is an absolute right? Deciphering absoluteness in the context of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights

The answer to the question of what it means to say that a right is absolute is often taken for granted, yet still sparks doubt and scepticism. This article investigates absoluteness further, bringing rights theory and the judicial approach on an absolute right together. A theoretical framework is set up that addresses two distinct but potentially related parameters of investigation: the first is what I have labelled the ‘applicability’ criterion, which looks at whether and when the applicability of the standard referred to as absolute can be displaced, in other words whether other considerations can justify its infringement; the second parameter, which I have labelled the ‘specification’ criterion, explores the degree to which and bases on which the content of the standard characterised as absolute is specified. This theoretical framework is then used to assess key principles and issues that arise in the Strasbourg Court’s approach to Article 3. It is suggested that this analysis allows us to explore both the distinction and the interplay between the two parameters in the judicial interpretation of the right and that appreciating the significance of this is fundamental to the understanding of and discourse on the concept of an absolute right.

Güler and Öngel v Turkey: Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Strasbourg’s discourse on the justified use of force

This article discusses the discourse on the justified use of force in the Strasbourg Court’s analysis of Article 3. With particular focus on the judgment in Güler and Öngel v Turkey, a case concerning the use of force by State agents against demonstrators, it addresses the question of the implications of such discourse, found in this and other cases, on the absolute nature of Article 3. It offers a perspective which suggests that the discourse on the justified use of force can be reconciled with Article 3’s absolute nature.

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights has begun to refer to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in order to support its reasoning for interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights in a particular way. But the EU Charter does not yet have any special status in that regard, being treated by the Court as on a par with numerous other documents of international law. The Court’s use of the Charter began in connection with arts 8 and 12 of the Convention (the right to a family life and the right to marry) but in subsequent years it has been extended to many other Articles of the Convention. It is in relation to art.6 (the right to a fair trial) that the Charter’s influence has been most noticeable so far, the Court having changed its position on two important aspects of Article 6 partly because of the wording of the EU Charter. But the influence on art.3 (in relation to the rights of asylum seekers), art.7 (in relation to retroactive penal laws), art.9 (in relation to the right to conscientious objection) and art.11 (in relation to rights of trades unions) has also been significant. The potential for the Charter to have greater influence on the Court’s jurisprudence in years to come remains considerable.

The International Protection of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: the Role of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights

This book presents a comprehensive assessment of regional responses to the crisis in the asylum/refugee system and critically examines how different regions tackle the problem. The chapters consider the fundamental challenges which undermine an effective asylum process as well as regional difficulties with the various circumstances surrounding asylum seekers. With contributions on Africa, Europe, Latin America, South Asia and the Middle East, and the Pacific, the collection strives to appreciate what informs each region’s approach to the asylum process and asks if there are issues common to every region and if regions can learn from one another. The book seeks an understanding of the existing legal regime for the protection of asylum seekers and how regional institutions such as human rights commissions and regional courts enforce and adjudicate the law.

Labour Law as Human Rights Law: A Critique of the Use of ‘Dignity’ by Freedland and Kountouris

In their recent book, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations, Mark Freedland and Nicola Kountouris present an ambitious study of the personal scope of (what they would not want to call) ‘employment’ law. The book does this within a broader argument that calls for the reconceptualization of labour law as a whole, and it is this broader argument on which I shall focus in this chapter. Their aim, in urging us to see labour law through the lens of ‘dignity’ is to bring labour law and human rights law into closer alignment than has sometimes been the case in the past. Increasingly, dignity is seen as providing a, sometimes the, foundation of human rights law, particularly in Europe. I shall suggest that whilst the aim of constructing a new set of foundations for labour law is a worthy and increasingly urgent task, the concepts on which Freedland and Kountouris seek to build their project pose significant difficulties. In particular, their espousal of ‘dignity’ presents problems that must be addressed if their reconceptualization is not to prove a blind alley.

Using Comparative Reasoning in Human Rights Adjudication:The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights Compared

This article examines the relationship between the methods that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) use to decide disputes that involve ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ rights claims, and the substantive outcomes that result from the use of these particular methods. It has a limited aim: in attempting to understand the interrelationship between human rights methodology and human rights outcomes, it considers primarily the use of ‘comparative reasoning’ in ‘human’ and ‘fundamental’ rights claims by these courts. It is not primarily concerned with examining the extent to which the use of comparative reasoning is based on an appropriate methodology or whether there is a persuasive normative theory underpinning the use of comparative reasoning. The issues considered in this chapter do some of the groundwork, however, that is necessary in order to address these methodological and normative questions.

The United Kingdom, the United Nations Human Rights Council and the first cycle of the Universal Periodic Review

The introduction of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism as an innovative component of the new Human Rights Council in 2006 has suffered little academic scrutiny. This is partly because it holds as its objective an improvement in human rights situations on the ground, a goal that is difficult to test amongst so many possible causal factors attributable to law reform and policy change, and partly due to the fact that the mechanism has only completed one full cycle of review. This article seeks to remedy this absence of analysis by examining the experience of the United Kingdom during its first review. In doing so, the article first considers the conception of the UPR, before progressing to examine the procedure and recommendations made to the UK by its peers. Finally, the article considers the five year review of the UPR which occurred as a subset of the Human Rights Council Review in 2011 and the resulting changes to the process modalities.

A “Child’s Rights Perspective”: The “Right” of Children and Young People to Participate in Health Care Research

As all human beings are consumers of health care provision across the life span and in receipt of care delivered by accountable health care professionals, all should have the right to be involved in shaping the future of their own health care. Rights-based participation, when applied successfully, has the potential to inform and influence the delivery of child health care, the child’s experience of health care, plus children’s nursing education (Coyne & Gallagher, 2011). The “right” of every child and young person to participate in research that relates to their own health care is also sustained by the author’s lead position as a Senior Lecturer in Higher Education for pre-registration children’s nursing in Northern Ireland and the appreciation of their voice when practicing as a registered children’s nurse and ward sister. The report provides an insight into seminal work on human and child rights; the historical context of children in Western society, and the evolution of children’s nursing amid the child’s right to participate in shaping their own health care.