The Right to Work in the ECHR

The European Convention on Human Rights does not explicitly protect the right to work; nevertheless the ECHR case law protects aspects of this right. The paper summarises the content of the right to work and then demonstrates how the case law protects aspects of it. Article 8 can be used to protect the right to seek employment, while Articles 6 and 8 can be used to combat unfair dismissal. Other ECHR Articles prohibit discrimination. The paper concludes with some suggestions as to how to develop this trend in the case law. First, Article 8 should be recognised as protecting the negative aspects of the right to work. Second, the relationship between Article 8 and Article 14 needs clarification. Third, there is scope to develop positive obligations in relation to the right to work.

Dignity and religion

This chapter, included in a book examining the relationship between Islam and English Law, considers the role that the idea of 'human dignity' plays in discussions of the relationship between the European Convention on Human Rights and freedom of religion, and the implications this has for future consideration of the place of Shari'a.

Inhuman and Degrading Punishment, Dignity, and the Limits of Retribution

The recent judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Vinter and others v United Kingdom provides a much needed clarification of the parameters of the prohibition on inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as it applies to whole life orders of imprisonment under mandatory life sentences – essentially, life imprisonment without parole. The Grand Chamber’s judgment refines Strasbourg doctrine on life imprisonment and the prospect of release and illuminates key principles concerning inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the ECHR. This article considers the judgment’s profound significance in relation to both human rights and penology.

Crime, Punishment and Article 3 ECHR: Puzzles and Prospects of Applying an Absolute Right in a Penal Context

Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which provides that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, is considered to enshrine an absolute right. Yet it contains an under-explored element: inhuman and degrading punishment. While torture has been the subject of extensive academic commentary, and inhuman and degrading treatment has been examined to some extent, the prohibition of inhuman and degrading punishment has not been explored in significant depth, in spite of its considerable potential to alter the penal landscape.

This paper elucidates the key doctrinal elements of inhuman and degrading punishment ‘and treatment associated with it’, in the words of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It addresses a number of ‘puzzles’ or problems which arise in applying the absolute right enshrined in Article 3 of the ECHR to sentencing and imprisonment, clarifies ECtHR doctrine and highlights some of its key implications. Bringing a theoretically informed understanding to bear on the application of Article 3 of the ECHR in a penal context, the paper provides clarity and coherence to a complex and crucial intersection between human rights and penology.

Dignity and the Challenge to Liberty :Reading Andras Sajo's Constitutional Sentiments

This paper considers debates about the anti-liberal tendencies of the concept of “human dignity”, in particular those conceptions that are “expressivist”. My aim is to examine how far conceptions of dignity are expressivist, and if so what problems the concept of dignity understood in this way poses for liberty. I consider concerns about dignity’s potential illiberality, in particular the potential illiberality of respect-based conceptions of dignity, in the context of Professor András Sajó’s recent writing, illustrating the discussion with examples drawn from recent judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights regarding freedom of speech.

The planning and control of operations involving the use of lethal force

This is an analysis of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on the obligation on States to plan and control the use of potentially lethal force by their police and military personnel. It illustrates the Court's attachment to the strict or careful scrutiny test and suggests how the Court might want to develop its jurisprudence in the future.

Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court

After setting the scene by explaining the constraints which are placed on the Justices of the UK Supreme Court, this book considers how human rights are conceptualized by the Court in general and how in particular the procedural questions thrown up by the Human Rights Act have been dealt with so far. It then examines on a right-by-right basis the Justices' position on all the European Convention rights and some additional international human rights standards incorporated into UK law.

The Effect of Human RIghts on Criminal Evidentiary Processes: Convergence, Divergence or Realignment?

This article examines the contribution which the European Court of Human Rights has made to the development of common evidentiary processes across the common law and civil law systems of criminal procedure in Europe. It is argued that the continuing use of terms such as 'adversarial' and 'inquisitorial' to describe models of criminal proof and procedure has obscured the genuinely transformative nature of the Court's jurisprudence. It is shown that over a number of years the Court has been steadily developing a new model of proof that is better characterised as 'participatory' than as 'adversarial' or 'inquisitorial'. Instead of leading towards a convergence of existing 'adversarial' and 'inquisitorial' models of proof, this is more likely to lead towards a realignment of existing processes of proof which nonetheless allows plenty of scope for diverse application in different institutional and cultural settings.

Removing children from the care of adults with diagnosed mental illnesses - a clash of human rights?

Health and social services providers throughout Europe are increasingly aware of the possibility of litigation from service users arising from the application of a human rights perspective to public service provision. The substantial body of case law that has emerged from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is used regularly as the basis for this litigation at national and European levels. This paper presents an analysis of ECHR cases related to breaches of human rights that occurred when children were taken into care from families in which one or both parents had a diagnosed mental illness. The issues raised by these cases include the following: how to ensure that the right to family life is protected for adults with mental illnesses; how to ensure access and opportunities for parents to continue bonding with children in care; and how to avoid damaging children while giving time for a proper assessment of the care situation.

Human Dignity and judicial Interpretation of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularizing the use of 'dignity' or 'human dignity' in human rights discourse. This article argues that the use of 'dignity', beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specific, varying significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to significant judicial manipulation. increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its significant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally. highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue that the concept of 'human dignity' plays an important role in the development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication.

Courts and Consociations: Human Rights versus Power-sharing

Consociations are power-sharing arrangements, increasingly used to manage ethno-nationalist, ethno-linguistic, and ethno-religious conflicts. Current examples include Belgium, Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Burundi, and Iraq. Despite their growing popularity, they have begun to be challenged before human rights courts as being incompatible with human rights norms, particularly equality and non-discrimination.

Courts and Consociations examines the use of power-sharing agreements, their legitimacy, and their compatibility with human rights law. Key questions include to what extent, if any, consociations conflict with the liberal individualist preferences of international human rights institutions, and to what extent consociational power-sharing may be justified to preserve peace and the integrity of political settlements.

In three critical cases, the European Court of Human Rights has considered equality challenges to important consociational practices, twice in Belgium and then in Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia regarding the constitution established for Bosnia Herzegovina under the Dayton Agreement. The Court's decision in Sejdic and Finci has significantly altered the approach it previously took to judicial review of consociational arrangements in Belgium. This book accounts for this change and assess its implications. The problematic aspects of the current state of law are demonstrated. Future negotiators in places riven by potential or actual bloody ethnic conflicts may now have less flexibility in reaching a workable settlement, which may unintentionally contribute to sustaining such conflicts and make it more likely that negotiators will consider excluding regional and international courts from reviewing these political settlements.

Human Rights in the Courts of Northern Ireland 2009-10

This article surveys and comments on the decisions issued on human rights points by courts in Northern Ireland during the legal year 2009-2010.

Courts and Consociations:How human rights courts may destabilize power-sharing settlements

We consider the use of consociational arrangements to manage ethno-nationalist, ethno-linguistic, and ethno-religious conflicts, and their compatibility with non-discrimination and equality norms. Key questions include to what extent, if any, consociations conflict with the dictates of global justice and the liberal individualist preferences of international human rights institutions, and to what extent consociational power-sharing may be justified to preserve peace and the integrity of political settlements. In three critical cases, the European Court of Human Rights has considered equality challenges to important consociational practices, twice in Belgium and, most recently, in Sejdic and Finci, concerning the constitutional arrangements established for Bosnia Herzegovina under the Dayton Agreement. The Court’s recent decision in Sejdic and Finci has significantly altered the approach it previously took to judicial review of consociational arrangements in the Belgian cases. We seek to account for this change and assess its implications. We identify problematic aspects of the judgment and conclude that, although the Court’s decision indicates one possible trajectory of human rights courts’ reactions to consociations, this would be an unfortunate development because it leaves future negotiators in places riven by potential or manifest bloody ethnic conflicts with considerably less flexibility in reaching a settlement. That in turn may unintentionally contribute to sustaining such conflicts and make it more likely that advisors to negotiators will advise them to exclude regional and international courts from having standing in the management of political settlements.