"A Note of Caution about the Role of Law in Controlling the Administration in the United Kingdom"

"A Note of Caution about the Role of Law in Controlling the Administration in the United Kingdom"

False-positive PCR results linked to administration of seasonal influenza vaccine

False-positive PCR results usually occur as a consequence of specimen-to-specimen or amplicon-to-specimen contamination within the laboratory. Evidence of contamination at time of specimen collection linked to influenza vaccine administration in the same location as influenza sampling is described. Clinical, circumstantial and laboratory evidence was gathered for each of five cases of influenza-like illness (ILI) with unusual patterns of PCR reactivity for seasonal H1N1, H3N2, H1N1 (2009) and influenza B viruses. Two 2010 trivalent influenza vaccines and environmental swabs of a hospital influenza vaccination room were also tested for influenza RNA. Sequencing of influenza A matrix (M) gene amplicons from the five cases and vaccines was undertaken. Four 2009 general practitioner (GP) specimens were seasonal H1N1, H3N2 and influenza B PCR positive. One 2010 GP specimen was H1N1 (2009), H3N2 and influenza B positive. PCR of 2010 trivalent vaccines showed high loads of detectable influenza A and B RNA. Sequencing of the five specimens and vaccines showed greatest homology with the M gene sequence of Influenza A/Puerto Rico/8/1934 H1N1 virus (used in generation of influenza vaccine strains). Environmental swabs had detectable influenza A and B RNA. RNA detection studies demonstrated vaccine RNA still detectable for at least 66 days. Administration of influenza vaccines and clinical sampling in the same room resulted in the contamination with vaccine strains of surveillance swabs collected from patients with ILI. Vaccine contamination should therefore be considered, particularly where multiple influenza virus RNA PCR positive signals (e.g. H1N1, H3N2 and influenza B) are detected in the same specimen.

Potentiation of triclabendazole action in vivo against a triclabendazole-resistant isolate of Fasciola hepatica following its co-administration with the metabolic inhibitor, ketoconazole

An in vivo study in the laboratory rat model has been carried out to monitor morphological changes in adult Fasciola hepatica over a 4-day period resulting from co-treatment with triclabendazole (TCBZ) and ketoconazole (KTZ), a cytochrome P450 inhibitor. Rats were infected with the triclabendazole-resistant Oberon isolate of F. hepatica, dosed orally with triclabendazole at a dosage of 10mg/kg live weight and ketoconazole at a dosage of 10mg/kg live weight. Flukes were recovered at 24, 48, 72 and 96 h post-treatment (p.t.) and changes to fluke ultrastructure were assessed using transmission electron microscopy (TEM). Results showed an increase in the severity of changes to the fluke ultrastructure with time p.t. Swelling of the basal infolds and the associated mucopolysaccharide masses became more severe with time. Golgi complexes, if present, were greatly reduced in size and number by 96 h p.t., and sub-tegumental flooding was seen from the 72 h time-period onwards. Some sloughing of the tegumental covering over the spines was observed at 96 h p.t. The results demonstrated that the Oberon isolate is more sensitive to TCBZ action in the presence of KTZ than to TCBZ alone, reinforcing the idea that altered drug metabolism is involved in the resistance mechanism. Moreover, they support the concept that TCBZ+inhibitor combinations (aimed at altering drug pharmacokinetics and potentiating the action of TCBZ) could be used in the treatment of TCBZ-R populations of F. hepatica.

Dirty Hands and the Complicity of the Democratic Public

The alleged problem of the dirty hands of politicians has been much discussed since Michael Walzer’s original piece (Walzer 1974). The discussion has concerned the precise nature of the problem or sought to dissolve the apparent paradox. However there has been little discussion of the putative complicity, and thus also dirtying of hands, of a democratic public that authorizes politicians to act in its name. This article outlines the sense in which politicians do get dirty hands and the degree to which a democratic public may also get dirty hands. It separates the questions of secrecy, authorisation, and wrongfulness in order to spell out the extent of public complicity. Finally it addresses the ways in which those who do and those who do not acknowledge the problem of dirty hands erroneously discount or deny the problem of complicity by an appeal to the nature of democracy, a putatively essential need for political openness or to the scope of ideal theory.