A simple game-theoretic analysis of peering and transit contracting among Internet service providers

The paper presents a simple game-theoretic model of two Internet service providers (ISPs), drawn from a larger set consisting of Tiers-1 and -2 ISPs, who choose between peering and transit agreements. The study focuses on the costs of interconnection taking into account traffic imbalances. The analysis suggests that if the traffic flows and the costs of interconnection are fairly shared, the provider's peer, otherwise they choose transit. Moreover, the joint profits are maximized under the transit arrangement. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Help or hindrance? Supplier involvement and causal ambiguity within inter-organisational NPD teams

Suppliers are increasingly involved in buyer firms’ interorganizational new product development (NPD) teams. Yet the transfer of knowledge within this context may be subject to varying degrees of causal ambiguity, potentially limiting the effect of supplier involvement on performance. We develop a theoretical model exploring the effect of supplier involvement practices on the level of causal ambiguity within interorganizational NPD teams, and the subsequent impact on competitor imitation, new product advantage, and project performance. Our model also serves as a test of the paradox that causal ambiguity both inhibits imitation by competitors, but also adversely affects organisational outcomes. Results from an empirical study of 119 R&D intensive manufacturing firms in the United Kingdom largely support these hypotheses. Results from structural equation modeling show that supplier involvement orientation and long-term commitment lower causal ambiguity within interorganizational NPD teams. In turn, this lower causal ambiguity generates a new product advantage and increases project performance for the buyer firm, but has no significant effect on competitor imitation. Instead, competitor imitation is delayed by the extent to which the firm develops a new product advantage within the market. These results shed light on the causal ambiguity paradox showing that lower causal ambiguity during interorganizational new product development increases both product and project performance, but without reducing barriers to imitation. Product development managers are encouraged to utilize supplier involvement practices to minimise ambiguity in the NPD project, and to target their supplier involvement efforts on solving causally ambiguous technological problems to sustain a competitive advantage.

Developing a simple, rapid method for identifying and monitoring jellyfish aggregations from the air

Within the marine environment, aerial surveys have historically centred on apex predators, such as pinnipeds, cetaceans and sea birds. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the utility of this technique may also extend to subsurface species such as pre-spawning fish stocks and aggregations of jellyfish that occur close to the surface. In light of this, we tested the utility of aerial surveys to provide baseline data for 3 poorly understood scyphozoan jellyfish found throughout British and Irish waters: Rhizostoma octopus, Cyanea capillata and Chrysaora hysoscella. Our principal objectives were to develop a simple sampling protocol to identify and quantify surface aggregations, assess their consistency in space and time, and consider the overall applicability of this technique to the study of gelatinous zooplankton. This approach provided a general understanding of range and relative abundance for each target species, with greatest suitability to the study of R. octopus. For this species it was possible to identify and monitor extensive, temporally consistent and previously undocumented aggregations throughout the Irish Sea, an area spanning thousands of square kilometres. This finding has pronounced implications for ecologists and fisheries managers alike and, moreover, draws attention to the broad utility of aerial surveys for the study of gelatinous aggregations beyond the range of conventional ship-based techniques.

Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game

In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of N actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that such a simple mediated equilibrium cannot improve upon the unmediated N-partition Crawford-Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small.