Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,

Evaluation of leukocyte dynamic in mouse retinal circulation with scanning laser ophthalmoloscopy (Video report)

http://bjo.bmj.com/content/suppl/2001/06/20/85.7.DC1 Leukocyte-endothelial cell interactions play an important role in the pathogenesis of various types of retinal vascular diseases, including diabetes, uveitis, and ischemic lesions. Over the last few years, several methods have been devised in which the scanning laser ophthalmoscope (SLO) is used to study leukocyte-endothelial interactions in vivo [1,2]. Previously we reported a noninvasive in vivo leukocyte tracking method using the SLO in rat. In this method, a nontoxic fluorescent agent (6-carboxyfluorescein diacetate, CFDA) was used to label leukocytes in vitro. Leukocyte velocities within the retinal and choroidal circulations were be quantified simultaneously [3]. None of the previous methods has been developed for imaging the murine fundus, mainly due to problems arising from the small size of the mouse eye. However, there are many advantages of using a murine model to study retinal vascular diseases such as enhanced genetic definition, increased range of reagents available for immunological studies and cost reduction. We have developed our SLO method such that we can track leukocytes in the mouse retinal and choroidal circulations.

Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent

We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness.