Justice, Truth and Oral History: Legislating the Past 'From Below' in Northern Ireland

Drawing on the ‘from below’ perspective which has emerged in transitional justice scholarship and practice
over the past two decades, this article critically examines the dealing with the past debate in Northern
Ireland. The paper begins by offering an outline of the from below perspective in the context of post-conflict
or post-authoritarian societies which are struggling to come to terms with past violence and human rights
abuses. Having provided some of the legal and political background to the most recent efforts to deal with
the past in Northern Ireland, it then critically examines the relevant past-related provisions of the Stormont
House Agreement, namely the institutions which are designed to facilitate ‘justice’, truth recovery and the
establishment of an Oral History Archive. Drawing from the political science and social movement
literature on lobbying and the ways in which interests groups may seek to influence policy, the paper then
explores the efforts of the authors and others to contribute to the broader public debate, including through
drafting and circulating a ‘Model Bill’ on dealing with the past (reproduced elsewhere in this issue) as a
counterweight to the legislation which is required from the British government to implement the Stormont
House Agreement. The authors argue that the combination of technical capacity, grass-roots
credibility and ‘international-savvy’ local solutions offers a framework for praxis from below in other
contexts where activists are struggling to extend ownership of transitional justice beyond political elites.
Keywords: transitional justice; from below; dealing with the past; legislation; truth<br/>recovery; prosecutions; oral history

Lawyers & Truth Recovery Mechanisms: South Africa

Focusing on post-apartheid South Africa, the report explores the role of lawyers in truth recovery mechanisms.

The report was prepared by Dr Rachel Killean and draws on a series of interviews conducted in South Africa (with legal academics, ‘struggle’ lawyers, state lawyers, judges and human rights activists) as part of the wider Lawyers, Conflict and Transition project.

Dr Killean begins with an overview of the various roles the legal profession has played in South Africa, both during the apartheid era and post-transition.

The first half of the report then explores the role of lawyers as professional participants – firstly at the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and secondly in the Marikana Commission of Inquiry.

The report then considers the notion of lawyers as subjects of truth recovery, looking in particular at the Special Legal Hearing on the legal profession as part of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

In the concluding section Killean reflects on the extent to which lawyers influence the procedures and outcomes of truth recovery mechanisms and offers some concrete suggestions as to how the involvement of lawyers in such processes might be more effectively managed.

With regard to lawyers as subjects of truth recovery, she acknowledges the limitations of the South African model but posits that the endeavour must be applauded, not least because it demonstrated that it is possible to scrutinise the role of the legal profession in past conflict, and that it is worth wrestling with the associated challenges.

Historians and their duties

We need to specify what ethical responsibility historians, as historians, owe, and to whom. We should distinguish between natural duties and (non-natural) obligations, and recognize that historians' ethical responsibility is of the latter kind. We can discover this responsibility by using the concept of “accountability”. Historical knowledge is central. Historians' central ethical responsibility is that they ought to tell the objective truth. This is not a duty shared with everybody, for the right to truth varies with the audience. Being a historian is essentially a matter of searching for historical knowledge as part of an obligation voluntarily undertaken to give truth to those who have a right to it. On a democratic understanding, people need and are entitled to an objective understanding of the historical processes in which they live. Factual knowledge and judgments of value are both required, whatever philosophical view we might have of the possibility of a principled distinction between them. Historians owe historical truth not only to the living but to the dead. Historians should judge when that is called for, but they should not distort historical facts. The rejection of postmodernism's moralism does not free historians from moral duties. Historians and moral philosophers alike are able to make dispassionate moral judgments, but those who feel untrained should be educated in moral understanding. We must ensure the moral and social responsibility of historical knowledge. As philosophers of history, we need a rational reconstruction of moral judgments in history to help with this.

'Calling the Judiciary to Account for the Past: Transitional Justice and Judicial Accountability in Nigeria'

Institutional and individual accountability is an important feature of societies in transition from conflict or authoritarian rule. The imperative of accountability has both normative and transformational underpinnings in the context of restoration of the rule of law and democracy. This article argues a case for extending the purview of truth-telling processes to the judiciary in postauthoritarian contexts. The driving force behind the inquiry is the proposition that the judiciary as the third arm of government at all times participates in governance. To contextualize the argument, I focus on judicial governance and accountability within the paradigm of Nigeria’s transition to democracy after decades of authoritarian military rule.

Constructing probabilistic ATMS using extended incidence calculus

This paper discusses the relations between extended incidence calculus and assumption-based truth maintenance systems (ATMSs). We first prove that managing labels for statements (nodes) in an ATMS is equivalent to producing incidence sets of these statements in extended incidence calculus. We then demonstrate that the justification set for a node is functionally equivalent to the implication relation set for the same node in extended incidence calculus. As a consequence, extended incidence calculus can provide justifications for an ATMS, because implication relation sets are discovered by the system automatically. We also show that extended incidence calculus provides a theoretical basis for constructing a probabilistic ATMS by associating proper probability distributions on assumptions. In this way, we can not only produce labels for all nodes in the system, but also calculate the probability of any of such nodes in it. The nogood environments can also be obtained automatically. Therefore, extended incidence calculus and the ATMS are equivalent in carrying out inferences at both the symbolic level and the numerical level. This extends a result due to Laskey and Lehner.

Placing political economy: organising opposition to free trade before the abolition of the Corn Laws

The unfurling of global capitalism – and its attendant effects – has long been fertile intellectual terrain for geographers. But whilst studies of the processes and mechanisms of globalisation undoubtedly assume a talismanic importance in the discipline, geographers, with few exceptions, have left examinations of early economic liberalism to historians. One such critically important episode in the evolution of the liberal economic project was the repeal of the so-called 'Corn Laws' in 1846. Whilst the precise impact of the Manchester-based Anti-Corn Law League (ACLL) continues to be a matter of conjecture, Eric Sheppard has asserted that their particular take on political economy managed to assume a 'truth-like status' and worldwide universality. But the ACLL's campaign represents only one, albeit decisive, stage in the long intellectual and practical struggle between 'protectionists' and the disciples of free trade. Studies of the non-'Manchester' components have tended to focus squarely upon national politics. This paper examines a pivotal attempt in 1838 by Lord Melbourne's Government to experiment with the effective elimination of import duties on fresh fruit. Unlike most agricultural commodities, table fruit was produced in a tightly defined area, thus allowing the Government's experiment to play out, in theory, without national political fallout. Whilst the Government's clandestine actions left little time for a concerted opposition to develop, Kentish fruit growers soon organised. A formidable lobby was forged that drew wide local support yet also evolved beyond the original 'epistemic community'. Whilst the coalition failed in their efforts to reintroduce protective duties, their actions allow us to see how protectionist ideologies and policies were vivified through practices at many different spatial scales and to better understand the complex spatiality of protectionist takes on political economy. Their campaign also changed – at least in the short term – the course of British mercantile policy.

What Did the Lawyers Do During the 'War' ? Neutrality, Conflcit and the Culture of Quietism

Using Northern Ireland as a case study, this paper explores how lawyers responded to the challenges of entrenched discrimination, sustained political violence and an emerging peace process. Drawing upon the literature of the sociology of lawyering, it examines whether lawyers can or should be more than ‘paid technicians’ in such circumstances. It focuses in particular upon a number of ‘critical junctures’ in the legal history of the jurisdiction and uncouples key elements of the local legal culture which contributed to an ethos of quietism. The paper argues that the version of legal professionalism that emerged in Northern Ireland was contingent and socially constructed and, with notable exceptions, obfuscated a collective failure of moral courage. It concludes that facing the truth concerning past silence is fundamental to a properly embedded rule of law and a more grounded notion of what it means to be a lawyer in a conflict.

Per una genealogia della giustizia penale internazionale: ambiguita' e paradossi

This article aims to consider the role for a critical criminology outside the national dimension, highlighting its continuities with studies in the critical tradition which have suggested the need to address State criminality and criminogenic structures more in general, but also suggesting a critique of international criminal law as a governmentality project.It reconstructs the genealogy of the international criminal justice system, following on from Schmitt and other well known authors, but it focuses in specific on its paradoxes, contradictions and ambiguities rather than its purely political effect. The authors argue that critical criminologists should engage with the international dimension of crime and control and approach this venture of a international criminal justice system as the possibility of “telling the truth��� about State atrocities without missing on using strategically the category of human rights and law to bring to the fore minoritarian interests which are
usually denied by power discourses and economic forces.

Women in Ulster, 1600-1800

Some have entertained the belief that early modern Gaelic society conferred substantial rights on women. This could hardly be farther from the truth. In aristocratic Gaelic circles women were used ruthlessly as pawns in political alliances and other manoeuvres. The status of women at the lower levels of society also seems to have been low relative to men. While patriarchal relationships persisted after the Plantation of Ulster, they took new forms. Some women actually benefited in terms of property rights relative to men. Economic change in the eighteenth century, in particular the development of proto-industry, opened up opportunities for poorer women but it is notable that women did not feature at all in the public political sphere before 1800

Just how controversial is evidential holism?

This paper is an examination of evidential holism, a prominent position in epistemology and the philosophy of science which claims that experiments only ever confirm or refute entire theories. The position is historically associated with W.V. Quine, and it is at once both popular and notorious, as well as being largely under-described. But even though there’s no univocal statement of what holism is or what it does, philosophers have nevertheless made substantial assumptions about its content and its truth. Moreover they have drawn controversial and important conclusions from these assumptions. In this paper I distinguish three types of evidential holism and argue that the most oft-cited and controversial thesis is entirely unmotivated. The other two theses are much overlooked, but are well-motivated and free from controversial implications.

The Role of Subjectivity and Knowledge Power Struggles in the Formation of Public Policy

There is a growing incentive for sociologists to demonstrate the use value of their research. Research ‘impact’ is a driver of research funding and a measure of academic standing. Academic debate on this issue has intensified since Burawoy’s (2004) call for a ‘public’ sociology. However the academy is no longer the sole or primary producer of knowledge and empirical sociologists need to contend with the ‘huge swathes’ of social data that now exist (Savage and Burrows, 2007). This article furthers these debates by considering power struggles between competing forms of knowledge. Using a case study, it specifically considers the power struggle between normative and empirical knowledge, and how providers of knowledge assert legitimacy for their truth claims. The article concludes that the idea of ‘impact’ and ‘use-value’ are extremely complex and depends in the policy context on knowledge power struggles, and on how policy makers want to view the world. © The Author(s) 2012

Amnesties in Transition: Punishment, Restoration, and the Governance of Mercy

Despite the much vaunted triumph of human rights, amnesties continue to be a frequently used technique of post-conflict transitional justice. For many critics, they are synonymous with unaccountability and injustice. This article argues that despite the rhetoric, there is no universal duty to prosecute under international law and that issues of selectivity and proportionality present serious challenges to the retributive rationale for punishment in international justice. It contends that many of the assumptions concerning the deterrent effect in the field are also oversold and poorly theorized. It also suggests that appropriately designed restorative amnesties can be both lawful and effective as routes to truth recovery, reconciliation, and a range of other peacemaking goals. Rather than mere instruments of impunity, amnesties should instead be seen as important institutions in the governance of mercy, the reassertion of state sovereignty and, if properly constituted, the return of law to a previously lawless domain.