Accountability and Value for Money: A Framework for Exploring the Relationship in Private Finance Initiative Contracts

There is an implicit assumption in the UK Treasury’s publications on public-private partnerships (PPP) – also more commonly known in the United Kingdom as private finance initiative (PFI) - that accountability and value for money (VFM) are related concepts. While recent academic studies on PPP/PFI (from now on as PFI) have focused on VFM, there is a notable absence of studies exploring the ‘presumed’ relationships between accountability and VFM. Drawing on Dubnick’s (Dubnick and Romzek, 1991, 1993; Dubnick, 1996, 1998, 2003, 2005; Dubnick and Justice, 2002) framework for accountability and PFI literature, we develop a research framework for exploring potential relationships between accountability and VFM in PFI projects by proposing alternative accountability cultures, processes and mechanisms for PFI. The PFI accountability model is then exposed to four criteria - warrantability, tractability, measurability and feasibility. Our preliminary interviews provide us guidance in identifying some of the cultures, processes and mechanisms indicated in our model which should enable future researchers to test not only the UK Government’s claimed relationships between accountability and VFM using more specific PFI empirical data, but also a potential relationship between accountability and performance in general.

The Diffusion of Risks in Public Private Partnership Contracts

Purpose The UK government argues that the benefits of public private partnership (PPP) in delivering public infrastructure stem from: transferring risks to the private sector within a structure in which financiers put their own capital at risk; and, the performance based payment mechanism, reinforced by the due diligence requirements imposed by the lenders financing the projects (HM Treasury, 2010). Prior studies of risk in PPPs have investigated ‘what’ risks are allocated and to ‘whom’, that is to the public or the private sector. The purpose of this study is to examine ‘how’ and ‘why’ PPP risks are diffused by their financiers. Design/methodology/approach This study focuses on the financial structure of PPPs and on their financiers. Empirical evidence comes from interviews conducted with equity and debt financiers. Findings The findings show that the financial structure of the deals generates risk aversion in both debt and equity financiers and that the need to attract affordable finance leads to risk diffusion through a network of companies using various means that include contractual mitigation through insurance, performance support guarantees, interest rate swaps and inflation hedges. Because of the complexity this process generates, both procurers and suppliers need expensive expert advice. The risk aversion and diffusion and the consequent need for advice add cost to the projects impacting on the government’s economic argument for risk transfer. Limitations and implications The empirical work covers the private finance initiative (PFI) type of PPP arrangements and therefore the risk diffusion mechanisms may not be generalisable to other forms of PPP, especially those that do not involve the use of high leverage or private finance. Moreover, the scope of this research is limited to exploring the diffusion of risk in the private sector. Further research is needed on how risk is diffused in other settings and on the value for money implication of risk diffusion in PPP contracts. Originality/value The expectation inherent in PPP is that the private sector will better manage those risks allocated to it and because private capital is at risk, financiers will perform due diligence with the ultimate outcome that only viable projects will proceed. This paper presents empirical evidence that raises questions about these expectations. Key words: public private partnership, risk management, diffusion, private finance initiative, financiers

Women's History Review:Special Issue: Family, Private Life and Sexuality

A collection of essays based on the conference of the International Federation for Research in Women's History which was held in Queen's University Belfast in August 2003.

Private equity and entrepreneurial management in management buy-outs

Critics claim that short-term profit orientation and high deal price strategies of private equity (PE) firms can negatively affect the ability of management buyouts to initiate and sustain entrepreneurial management. This study investigates this claim by comparing effects of majority PE backed and other buy-outs at different levels of financial leverage on post buy-out increases in entrepreneurial management. We propose that PE can be used as an organizational refocusing device that simultaneously increases entrepreneurial and administrative management. We find that majority PE-backed buy-outs significantly increase entrepreneurial management practices. Furthermore, the increased financial leverage positively affects administrative management in management buy-outs. However, the effect of high financial leverage is larger for majority PE-backed buy-outs. These results support the notion that PE firms help buy-out companies develop ambidextrous organizational change: i.e. simultaneously develop entrepreneurial and administrative management practices. The findings have important implications for practitioners and policy makers.

Private equity, the minimalist organization and the quality of employment relations

This article develops a firm-level analysis of how the quality of employment relations following acquisition by private equity firms (PEFs) is contingent upon the strategic intent of those firms and the post-acquisition organizational choices they make. The efficiency gains that PEFs seek in acquired companies are expected to encourage restructuring towards a minimalist organization. However, the form such an organization takes is seen to depend on whether PEF strategy is oriented primarily towards extracting short-term value from acquired assets rather than towards renewing and developing those assets. Contrasts in the process of restructuring and in organizational form associated with these two strategies will have different implications for the quality of employment relations. The way in which PEFs restructure the companies or units they acquire is the key intervening factor between the strategic intent of PEFs and impact they have on the quality of employment relations. © The Author(s) 2010.