The police officer's terrorist dilemma: Trust resilience following fatal errors

Suicide attacks have raised the stakes for officers deciding whether or not to shoot a suspect ('Police Officer's Terrorist Dilemma'). Despite high-profile errors we know little about how trust in the police is affected by their response to the terrorist threat. Building on a conceptualisation of lay observers as intuitive signal detection theorists, a general population sample (N= 1153) were presented with scenarios manipulated in terms of suspect status (Armed/Unarmed), officer decision (Shoot/Not Shoot) and outcome severity (e.g. suspect armed with Bomb/Knife; police shoot suspect/ suspect plus child bystander). Supporting predictions, people showed higher trust in officers who made correct decisions. reflecting good discrimination ability and who decided to shoot, reflecting an 'appropriate' response bias given the relative costs and benefits. This latter effect was moderated by (a) outcome severity, suggesting it did not simply reflect a preference for a particular type of action, and (b) preferences for a tough stance towards terrorism indexed by Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). Despite loss of civilian life, failure to prevent minor terror attacks resulted in no loss of trust amongst people low in RWA. whereas among people high in RWA trust was positive when police erroneously shot all unarmed suspect. Relations to alternative definitions of trust and procedural justice research are discussed. Copyright (C),. 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Alternative antecedents, probabilities, and the suppression of fallacies in Wason's selection task

Three experiments examined the influence of a second rule on the pattern of card selections on Wason's selection task. In Experiment 1 participants received a version of the task with a single test rule or one of two versions of the task with the same original test rule together with a second rule. The probability of q was manipulated in the two-rules conditions by varying the size of the antecedent set in the second rule. The results showed a significant suppression of q card and not-p card selections in the alternative-rule conditions, but no difference as a function of antecedent set size. In Experiment 2 the size of the antecendent set in the two-rules conditions was manipulated using the context of a computer printing double-sided cards. The results showed a significant reduction of q card selections in the two-rules conditions, but no effect of p set size. In Experiment 3 the scenario accompanying the rule was manipulated, and it specified a single alternative antecedent or a number of alternative antecedents. The q card selection rates were not affected by the scenario manipulation but again were suppressed by the presence of a second rule. Our results suggest that people make inferences about the unseen side of the cards when engaging with the task and that these inferences are systematically influenced by the presence of a second rule, but are not influenced by the probabilistic characteristics of this rule. These findings are discussed in the context of decision theoretic views of selection task performance (Oaksford Chater, 1994).