The Development of Regret and Relief About the Outcomes of Risky Decisions

Although a number of studies have examined the developmental emergence of counterfactual emotions of regret and relief, none of these have used tasks that resemble those used with adolescents and adults, which typically involve risky decision making. We examined the development of the counterfactual emotions of regret and relief in two experiments using a task in which children chose between one of two gambles that varied in risk. In regret trials they always received the best prize from that gamble but were then shown that they would have obtained a better prize had they chosen the alternative gamble, whereas in relief trials the other prize was worse. We compared two methods of measuring regret and relief based on children’s reported emotion on discovering the outcome of the alternative gamble, one in which children judged whether they now felt the same, happier, or sadder on seeing the other prize and one in which children made emotion ratings on a 7-point scale after the other prize was revealed. On both these methods, we found that 6- to 7-year-olds’ and 8- to 9-year-olds’ emotions varied appropriately depending on whether the alternative outcome was better or worse than the prize they had actually obtained, although the former method was more sensitive. Our findings indicate that by at least 6-7 years, children experience the same sorts of counterfactual emotions as adults in risky decision making tasks, and also suggest that such emotions are best measured by asking children to make comparative emotion judgments.

Intentionality, morality, and the incest taboo in Madagascar

In a recent article (Astuti & Bloch, 2015), cognitive anthropologists Rita Astuti and Maurice Bloch claim that the Malagasy are ambivalent as to whether considerations of intentionality are relevant to moral judgments concerning incest and its presumed catastrophic consequences: when making moral judgments about those who commit incest, the Malagasy take into account whether the incest is intentional or not, but, when making moral judgments relating to incest’s catastrophic consequences, they do not take intentionality into account. Astuti & Bloch explain the irrelevance of intentionality in terms of incest entailing such a fundamental attack on the transcendental social order that the Malagasy become dumbfounded and leave aside considerations of intentionality. Finally, they claim that a similar dumbfound reaction is what is involved in the moral dumbfounding concerning incest that social psychologist Jonathan Haidt has found in the US. In this article, we argue that (i) Astuti & Bloch are unclear about many aspects of their claims (in particular, about the moral judgments at stake), (ii) they do not provide sufficient evidence that considerations of intentionality are deemed irrelevant to moral judgments relating to incest’s presumed catastrophic consequences (and hence for the claim that the Malagasy are ambivalent), (iii) their hypothesis that conceiving of incest as an attack on the transcendental social renders considerations of intentionality irrelevant lacks coherence, and (iv) the extension of their explanatory account to the moral dumfounding of American students in Haidt’s well-known scenario of intentional incest is unwarranted.

‘Harmonising the precaution out of the precautionary principle? The need for maintaining flexibility and an interpretative role’

The precautionary principle has the potential to act as a valuable tool in food law. It operates in areas of scientific uncertainty, calling for protective measures where there are potential threats to human health (or the environment). However, the manner of the principle’s incorporation and implementation within legislation are key to its effectiveness and general legitimacy. Specific considerations include the role and nature of risk assessments, assessors, sources of evidence, divergent opinions, risk communication, other legitimate factors and the weighting of interests. However, more fundamentally, the crystallisation of approaches and removal of all flexibility would undermine the principle’s central tenets. Firstly, principles crucially play a guiding and interpretative role. Secondly, reflexive modernisation and continuing scientific uncertainty call for the precautionary principle’s continued application – precautionary measures do not end the precautionary principle’s relevance. This can be partially achieved through the legislation so as to facilitate later precautionary measures, e.g. through temporary authorisations, derogations and safeguard clauses. However, crucially, it requires that the legislation also be interpreted in light of the precautionary principle. This paper investigates the logic behind the Court of Justice of the EU’s judgments and the circumstances that enable or deter the Court in taking, or permitting, stronger precautionary approaches. Although apparently inconsistent, a number of contextual factors including the legislative provisions and actors involved influence the judgments substantially. The analysis provides insight into improving the principle’s incorporation to facilitate its continued application and maintenance of flexibility, whilst bearing in mind the general desirability of objectivity and legal certainty.