Why is housing tenure associated with a lower risk of admission to a nursing or residential home? Wealth, health and the incentive to keep 'my home'

Background Previous research has shown that home ownership is associated with a reduced risk of admission to institutional care. The extent to which this reflects associations between wealth and health, between wealth and ability to buy in care or increased motivation to avoid admission related to policies on charging is unclear. Taking account of the value of the home, as well as housing tenure, may provide some clarification as to the relative importance of these factors.
Aims To analyse the probability of admission to residential and nursing home care according to housing tenure and house value.
Methods Cox regression was used to examine the association between home ownership, house value and risk of care home admissions over 6 years of follow-up among a cohort of 51 619 people aged 65 years or older drawn from the Northern Ireland Longitudinal Study, a representative sample of approximate to 28% of the population of Northern Ireland.
Results 4% of the cohort (2138) was admitted during follow-up. Homeowners were less likely than those who rented to be admitted to care homes (HR 0.77, 95% CI 0.70 to 0.85, after adjusting for age, sex, health, living arrangement and urban/rural differences). There was a strong association between house value/tenure and health with those in the highest valued houses having the lowest odds of less than good health or limiting long-term illness. However, there was no difference in probability of admission according to house value; HRs of 0.78 (95% CI 0.67 to 0.90) and 0.81 (95% CI 0.70 to 0.95), respectively, for the lowest and highest value houses compared with renters.
Conclusions The requirement for people in the UK with capital resources to contribute to their care is a significant disincentive to institutional admission. This may place an additional burden on carers.

More equitable systems for allocating general practice deprivation payments:financial consequences

The allocation of general practitioner (GP) deprivation payments has been a controversial topic since they were first proposed. It has recently been suggested that the current system could be made more equitable if the payments were allocated at enumeration districts and if there was a more graded relationship between Jarman score and funding. However, the implications of these changes on the distribution of deprivation payments have not been worked out.

China’s National Security Review: a tit-for-tat response?

China is gradually taking its place as a major regulator, exercising concurrent jurisdiction of the national security review along with the US and EU over high-profile cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The National Security Review (NSR) regulatory regime of foreign acquisitions has attracted significant attention recently with the establishment of China's counterpart to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Due to the intensified activities of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) that are closely linked with states, CFIUS's broad discretion to deal with China's SWF-based investment may have a far-reaching impact on China's implementation of the newly enacted NSR regime. It is essential to design a mechanism that allows SWFs to maximise their positive attributes while safeguarding the apolitical integrity of the marketplace. Any disproportionate use of the NSR regime would inevitably bring about more unintended consequences, such as tit-for-tat protectionism. This represents an imminent threat to the tenuous recovery from the recent economic crisis, largely because of the increasingly intertwined and interdependent nature of the global financial markets. It is of utmost significance to evaluate the extent to which the updated legislation strikes a reasonable balance between preserving genuine national security interests and maintaining an open environment for investment.

Interlocking directorates and conflicts of interest: The Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging, Müller & Co. and the Dutch financial crisis of the 1920s

How can interlocking directorates cause financial instability for universal banks? A detailed history of the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeninging in the 1920s answers this question in a case study. This large commercial bank adopted a new German-style universal banking business model from the early 1910s, sharing directors with the firms it financed as a means of controlling its interests. Then, in 1924, it required assistance from the Dutch state in order to survive a bank run brought on by public concerns over its close ties with Müller & Co., a trading conglomerate that suffered badly in the economic downturn of the early 1920s. Using a new narrative history combined with an interpretive model, this article shows how the interlocking directorates between the bank and this major client, and in particular the direction of influence of these interlocks, resulted in a conflict of interest that could not be easily overcome.