Environmental shareholder value. Economic success with corporate environmental management

The links between corporate environmental protection and economic success have been analysed vigorously in several theoretical and empirical studies. Most studies are based on the hypothesis that the amount of environmental protection is somehow - negatively or positively - correlated with the economic success of the company. We argue that the amount of corporate environmental protection per se neither spurs nor reduces shareholder value, which is maybe the most important measure of economic success at present. Moreover, the effect environmental protection exerts on shareholder value is determined by the manner in which corporate environmental management is practised. Referring to the value drivers of shareholder value, we discuss the characteristics necessary to increase shareholder value, or at least to contain any reduction as effectively as possible.

Perceptions and reality: Economic voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections

One of the most influential explanations of voting behaviour is based on economic factors: when the economy is doing well, voters reward the incumbent government and when the economy is doing badly, voters punish the incumbent. This reward-punishment model is thought to be particularly appropriate at second order contests such as European Parliament elections. Yet operationalising this economic voting model using citizens' perceptions of economic performance may suffer from endogeneity problems if citizens' perceptions are in fact a function of their party preferences rather than being a cause of their party preferences. Thus, this article models a 'strict' version of economic voting in which they purge citizens' economic perceptions of partisan effects and only use as a predictor of voting that portion of citizens' economic perceptions that is caused by the real world economy. Using data on voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections for 23 European Union electorates, the article finds some, but limited, evidence for economic voting that is dependent on both voter sophistication and clarity of responsibility for the economy within any country. First, only politically sophisticated voters' subjective economic assessments are in fact grounded in economic reality. Second, the portion of subjective economic assessments that is a function of the real world economy is a significant predictor of voting only in single party government contexts where there can be a clear attribution of responsibility. For coalition government contexts, the article finds essentially no impact of the real economy via economic perceptions on vote choice, at least at European Parliament elections.