70 resultados para legal studies
Resumo:
Drastic increases in the use of imprisonment; the introduction of ‘three strikes’ laws and mandatory sentences; restrictions on parole - all of these developments appear to signify a new, harsher era or ‘punitive turn’. Yet these features of criminal justice are not universally present in all Western countries. Drawing on empirical data, Hamilton examines the prevalence of harsher penal policies in Ireland, Scotland and New Zealand, thereby demonstrating the utility of viewing criminal justice from the perspective of smaller jurisdictions.
This highly innovative book is thoroughly critical of the way in which punitiveness is currently measured by leading criminologists. It is essential reading for students and scholars of criminology, penology, criminal justice and socio-legal studies, as well as criminal lawyers and practitioners.
Resumo:
Some commentators worry that a plurinational constitutional order can only ever be an inherently unstable modus vivendi. They fear that the accommodation of sub-state nationalism will tend to undermine the viability of constitutional democracies. This article enlists Ronald Dworkin’s theory of ‘law as integrity’ to show how these concerns might be assuaged. My central claim is that the expressive value of integrity can drive a divided society in the direction of an eventual community of principle, even in the absence of a common political identity. I argue that this model of political community is a more plausible prescription for divided societies than the theory that competing nationalisms might be superseded by constitutional patriotism. I go on to explain, however, that integrity has a better chance of realizing this potential if the generally judge-centric focus of Dworkin’s theory is expanded to make greater room for non-judicial interpretative responsibility. Occasional references are made to the example of Northern Ireland to illustrate my points.
Resumo:
This article explores the construction of victimhood in transitional societies. Drawn from fieldwork in a dozen jurisdictions as well as elements of criminological, feminist, sociological, philosophical and postcolonial literature, the article focuses in particular on how victimhood is interpreted and acted upon in transitional contexts. It explores the ways in which victims’ voice and agency are realised, impeded or in some cases co-opted in transitional justice. It also examines the role of blame in the construction of victimhood. In particular, it focuses upon the ways in which the importance of blame may render victimhood contingent upon ‘blamelessness’, encourage hierarchies between deserving and undeserving victims and require the reification of blameworthy perpetrators. The article concludes by suggesting that the increased voice and agency associated with the deployment of rights discourses by victims comes at a price – a willingness to acknowledge the rights and humanity of the ‘other’ and to be subject to the same respectful critical inquiry as other social and political actors in a post-conflict society.
Resumo:
In an article recently published in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, the legal scholar Helen Reece argues that the prevalence and effects of rape myths have been overstated and the designation of certain beliefs and attitudes as myths is simply wrong. Feminist researchers, she argues, are engaged 'in a process of creating myths about myths' in a way that serves to close down and limit productive debate in this 'vexed' area. In this article we argue that Reece's analysis is methodologically flawed, crudely reductionist and rhetorically unyielding. We locate Reece's analysis within the wider theoretical field to show how her failure to engage with feminist literature on rape other than in the narrowest, most exclusionary terms, yields an approach which impedes rather than advances public understanding and panders to a kind of simplistic thinking which cannot begin to grapple with the complexity of the phenomenon that is rape. We conclude by emphasizing the continuing commitment of feminist researchers carefully to theorizing and (re)mapping the fraught field of progressive legal strategizing in order to identify and counter the kinds of risks and shortcomings of political activism with which Reece is rightly concerned.
Resumo:
The European desire to ensure that bearers of EU rights are adequately compensated for any infringement of these rights, particularly in cases where the harm is widely diffused, and perhaps not even noticed by those affected by it, collides with another desire: to avoid the perceived excesses of an American-style system of class actions. The excesses of these American class actions are in European discourse presented as a sort of bogeyman, which is a source of irrational fear, often presented by parental or other authority figures. But when looked at critically, the bogeyman disappears. In this paper, I examine the European (and UK) proposals for collective action. I compare them to the American regime. The flaws and purported excesses of the American regime, I argue, are exaggerated. A close, objective examination of the American regime shows this. I conclude that it is not the mythical bogeyman of a US class action that is the barrier to effective collective redress; rather, the barriers to effective, wide-ranging group actions lie within European legal culture and traditions, particularly those mandating individual control over litigation.
Resumo:
There is limited binding international law specifically covering the provision of humanitarian assistance in response to natural and human-made disasters. Yet a variety of authoritative soft law texts have been developed in the past 20 years, including the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the Red Cross Red Crescent Code of Conduct and the Sphere Project’s Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. While such ‘non-binding normative standards’ do not carry the weight of international law, they play an essential role in the provision of humanitarian assistance albeit subject to their limited enforceability vis-à-vis intended beneficiaries and to their voluntary application by humanitarian actors. Notwithstanding a lack of legal compulsion, certain non-binding normative standards may directly influence the actions of States and non-State actors, and so obtain a strongly persuasive character. Analysis of texts that influence the practice of humanitarian assistance advances our understanding of humanitarian principles and performance standards for disaster response. As the International Law Commission debates draft articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, such non-binding normative standards are crucial to the development of an internationally accepted legal framework to protect victims of disasters.
Resumo:
This chapter explores how the EU is a largely overlooked exporter of normative power through its facilitation and use of clinical trials data produced abroad for the marketing of safe pharmaceuticals at home; a move that helps to foster the growing resort to pharmaceuticals as a fix for public health problems. This is made possible by the EU’s (de)selection of international ethical frameworks in preference to the international technical standards it co-authors with other global regulators. Clinical trials abroad underscore how ethics are contingent and revisable in light of market needs, producing weak protections for the vulnerable subjects of EU law. I argue that these components and effects of the regime are ultimately about that which undergirds, shapes and directs regulatory design. That is, I point to the use, infiltration, perpetuation and extension of market-oriented ideas, values and rationalities into formally non-market domains like biomedical knowledge production and public health. I explain how these are central to efforts at producing and legitimating the EU, its related imagined socio-political order based on a more innovative, profitable and competitive pharmaceutical sector in order to foster economic growth, jobs and prosperity, and with them the project of European integration. ‘Bioethics as risk’ is highlighted as a way to reshape and redirect the regulatory regime in ways that are more consistent with the spirit and letter of the ethical standards (and through them the human rights) the EU claims to uphold.
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This book addresses the viability of the EU economic and social model within and after the global economic crisis. It identifies four key issues which warrant further discussion: (1) the asymmetry of the legal and policy framework of the euro and potential recalibration; (2) substantive tensions between the EU 'economic constitution' and its normative aim of social justice and impacts on national policy; (3) the role of civil society, including the two sides of industry in overcoming these tensions and (4) the EU's global aspirations towards the creation of a viable socio-economic model. Its chapters offer two perspectives on each of the four main issues. In drawing these debates together, the book provides a broad understanding as well as starting points for future research. Bringing together different disciplinary approaches, ranging from legal studies to political economy, sociology and macroeconomics, it is a valuable contribution to the debate on the European social model and introduces new insights by focusing on legal and political tensions, the impact of the financial crisis and other economic contexts as well as global dimensions.
Resumo:
The title of this short (about 4500 words) intervention translates to "To Nail a Jellyfish? Finding a progressive agenda for EU anti-discrimination law". I engage with those criticising EU anti-discrimination law as yet another emanation of the EU's "neo-liberal" nature which fails to establish a viable social policy regime. I criticise this in two directions. First, I take issue with the theory that anti-discrimination law and policy has to be part of social policy. Actually, the field has a mission which differs from social policy, in that it addresses disadvantage resulting from othering, combating stereotypes as well as promoting accomodation of difference. Second, I show how the critique of judicialisation of policy is not unique to anti-discrimination law and policy. The so called turn to rights based employment law has been criticised under this mantra by those who fear that collective labour law mechanisms will become less prevalent. Further, those who have engaged with anti-discrimination law for a much longer time than those criticising it have also devised means to overcome the individualistic tendencies of rights adjudication. They have (partly successfully) argued in favour of establishing equality bodies and creating positive obligations. Thus, the critique neglects the field it takes on, and does not accept the fact that anti-discrimination law and policy must be considered a field in its own right instead of the servant of social law and policy.
Now, this is more a summary than an abstract - since I realise that not everyone reads German.
Resumo:
This analysis of Article 23 CFREU (Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European Union) argues that this provision can promote a more progressive understanding of gender equality then promoted by the European Court of Justice, in that it requires actual change in gender relations. It also finds shortcomings in that the EU conceptualises gender equality by relating women to men, thus falling short of providing a basis for women's rights.
Resumo:
This review article considers Samuel Moyn’s book The Last Utopia:Human Rights in History in the context of recent trends in the writing of human rights history. A central debate among historians of human rights, in seekingto account for the genesis and spread of human rights, is how far current humanrights practice demonstrates continuity or radical discontinuity with previousattempts to secure rights. Moyn’s discontinuity thesis and the controversysurrounding it exemplify this debate. Whether Moyn is correct is importantbeyond the confines of human rights historiography, with implications for theirmeaning in law, as well as their political legitimacy. This review argues that Moyn’s book ultimately fails to convince, for two broad reasons. First, a more balanced judgment would conclude that the history of human rights is both one of continuity and discontinuity. Second, and more importantly, Moyn fails to offer a convincing account of the normativity of human rights. Undertaking a history of human rights requires a deeper engagement with debates on the nature and validity of human rights than Moyn seems prepared to contemplate.