Do focus groups contribute anything to the contingent valuation process?

The qualitative aspects of the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) are largely ignored by (environmental) economists. This paper aims to instigate a discussion on (a) the usefulness of qualitative data to the contingent valuation process in general; and (b) the use and applicability of the focus group method in particular. We consider the range and uses of focus groups within the CVM and highlight problems with their analysis that have, to date, largely been ignored. A potential solution to circumvent the problem of non-independence of group data is suggested. While there are several distinct and worthwhile uses for qualitative data, focus groups should not automatically be taken as the only or best method to produce these insights even though they are the major one considered in this article. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Combining preference ordering and contingent valuation methods to assess non market benefit of alternative afforestation projects

The application of the contingent valuation method (CVM) in this paper incorporates a prior preference ordering of several alternative future afforestation programmes which could be implemented in Ireland over the next decade. This particular experimental design is thereby shown to reveal the potentially conflicting preferences of different groups within society. These findings are used to devise appropriate CVM scenarios to take account, not only of the efficiency gains of choosing a single policy alternative over others, but also the effects on the distribution of non market benefit between different groups within society, arising from choice between alternatives. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Private equity and entrepreneurial management in management buy-outs

Critics claim that short-term profit orientation and high deal price strategies of private equity (PE) firms can negatively affect the ability of management buyouts to initiate and sustain entrepreneurial management. This study investigates this claim by comparing effects of majority PE backed and other buy-outs at different levels of financial leverage on post buy-out increases in entrepreneurial management. We propose that PE can be used as an organizational refocusing device that simultaneously increases entrepreneurial and administrative management. We find that majority PE-backed buy-outs significantly increase entrepreneurial management practices. Furthermore, the increased financial leverage positively affects administrative management in management buy-outs. However, the effect of high financial leverage is larger for majority PE-backed buy-outs. These results support the notion that PE firms help buy-out companies develop ambidextrous organizational change: i.e. simultaneously develop entrepreneurial and administrative management practices. The findings have important implications for practitioners and policy makers.

Private equity, the minimalist organization and the quality of employment relations

This article develops a firm-level analysis of how the quality of employment relations following acquisition by private equity firms (PEFs) is contingent upon the strategic intent of those firms and the post-acquisition organizational choices they make. The efficiency gains that PEFs seek in acquired companies are expected to encourage restructuring towards a minimalist organization. However, the form such an organization takes is seen to depend on whether PEF strategy is oriented primarily towards extracting short-term value from acquired assets rather than towards renewing and developing those assets. Contrasts in the process of restructuring and in organizational form associated with these two strategies will have different implications for the quality of employment relations. The way in which PEFs restructure the companies or units they acquire is the key intervening factor between the strategic intent of PEFs and impact they have on the quality of employment relations. © The Author(s) 2010.