Memory retrieval as temporal discrimination

Temporal distinctiveness models of memory retrieval claim that memories are organised partly in terms of their positions along a temporal dimension, and suggest that memory retrieval involves temporal discrimination. According to such models the retrievability of memories should be related to the discriminability of their temporal distances at the time of retrieval. This prediction is tested directly in three pairs of experiments that examine (a) memory retrieval and (b) identification of temporal durations that correspond to the temporal distances of the memories. Qualitative similarities between memory retrieval and temporal discrimination are found in probed serial recall (Experiments 1 and 2), immediate and delayed free recall (Experiments 3 and 4) and probed serial recall of grouped lists (Experiments 5 and 6). The results are interpreted as consistent with the suggestion that memory retrieval is indeed akin to temporal discrimination. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

When some is actually all: Scalar inferences in face-threatening contexts

Accounts of the scalar inference from 'some X-ed' to 'not all X-ed' are central to the debate between contemporary theories of conversational pragmatics. An important contribution to this debate is to identify contexts that decrease the endorsement rate of the inference. We suggest that the inference is endorsed less often in face-threatening contexts, i.e., when X implies a loss of face for the listener. This claim is successfully tested in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 rules out a possible confound between face-threatening contexts and lower-bound contexts. Experiment 3 shows that whilst saying 'some X-ed' when one knew for a fact that all X-ed is always perceived as an underinformative utterance, it is also seen as a nice and polite thing to do when X threatens the face of the listener. These findings are considered from the perspective of Relevance Theory as well as that of the Generalized Conversational Inference approach. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Regret as autobiographical memory

We apply all autobiographical memory framework to the Study of regret. Focusing oil the distinction between regrets for specific and general events we argue that the temporal profile of regret, usually explained in terms of the action-inaction distinction, is predicted by models of autobiographical memory. In two studies involving Participants in their sixties we demonstrate a reminiscence bump for general, but not for specific regrets. Recent regrets were more likely to be specific than general in nature. Coding regrets as actions/inactions revealed that general regrets were significantly more likely to be due to inaction while specific regrets were as likely to be clue to action as to inaction. In Study 2 we also generalised all of these findings to a group of participants in their 40s. We re-interpret existing accounts of the temporal profile of regret within the autobiographical memory framework, and Outline the practical and theoretical advantages Of Our memory-based distinction over traditional decision-making approaches to the Study of regret. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Deciding between theories of how reasoning develops is hard

Although Sloutsky agrees with our interpretation of our data, he argues that the totality of the evidence supports his claim that children make inductive generalisations on the basis of similarity. Here we take issue with his characterisation of the alternative hypotheses in his informal analysis of the data, and suggest that a thorough Bayesian analysis, although practically very difficult, is likely to result in a more finely balanced outcome than he suggests. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Do development and learning really decrease memory? On similarity and category-based induction in adults and children

In a recently published study, Sloutsky and Fisher [Sloutsky, V. M., & Fisher, A.V. (2004a). When development and learning decrease memory: Evidence against category-based induction in children. Psychological Science, 15, 553-558; Sloutsky, V. M., & Fisher, A. V. (2004b). Induction and categorization in young children: A similarity-based model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 166-188.] demonstrated that children have better memory for the items that they generalise to than do adults. On the basis of this finding, they claim that children and adults use different mechanisms for inductive generalisations;whereas adults focus on shared category membership, children project properties on the basis of perceptual similarity. Sloutsky & Fisher attribute children's enhanced recognition memory to the more detailed processing required by this similarity-based mechanism. In Experiment I we show that children look at the stimulus items for longer than adults. In Experiment 2 we demonstrate that although when given just 250 ms to inspect the items children remain capable of making accurate inferences, their subsequent memory for those items decreases significantly. These findings suggest that there are no necessary conclusions to be drawn from Sloutsky & Fisher's results about developmental differences in generalisation strategy. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

How many processes underline category-based induction? Effect of conclusion specificity and cognitive ability

Two studies investigated participants' sensitivity to the amount and diversity of the evidence when reasoning inductively about categories. Both showed that participants are more sensitive to characteristics of the evidence for arguments with general rather than specific conclusions. Both showed an association between cognitive ability and sensitivity to these evidence characteristics, particularly when the conclusion category was general. These results suggest that a simple associative process may not be sufficient to capture some key phenomena of category-based induction. They also support the claim that the need to generate a superordinate category is a complicating factor in category-based reasoning and that adults' tendency to generate such categories while reasoning has been overestimated.

Temporal concepts and episodic memory: A response to Hoerl

Hoerl claims that episodic memory is necessary for a concept of the past, and that we should consider some severely amnesic patients as lacking such a concept. I question whether this description of such patients is plausible, and whether it helps us understand lack of insight in amnesia. I finish by arguing that Hoerl's analysis of what constitutes a concept of the past raises interesting developmental issues.