Realising political equality: the European Court of Human Rights and positive obligations in a democracy'

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) speaks of the importance of an “effective political democracy” in its Preamble, though it is only in Article 3 of Protocol 1 (P1-3) that we find a right to free elections. This paper discusses the role of “positive obligations” under P1-3. This paper outlines the positive obligations in P1-3 focusing on obligations where the state is required to do more than just change the law. This may mean providing resources or facilities, adopting regulatory frameworks or creating new institutions. The paper highlights specific positive obligations that need to be further developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Sometimes these can be developed by analogy with positive obligations recognised in other areas of ECtHR jurisprudence. However, beyond these cases, states should ensure that members of vulnerable and disadvantaged minorities are able to participate in the electoral process and should ensure that dominant political groups cannot abuse their political power to exclude other parties unfairly. This is necessary to realise equal political rights. The second section of this paper sketches some preliminary points about the Strasbourg institutions’ approach to P1-3. After that, the third section identifies circumstances where the ECtHR should apply a more intense scrutiny in P1-3 cases. The fourth, fifth and sixth sections look at positive obligations relating to the right to vote, the right to run for election and the regulation of political parties.

Human Dignity and judicial Interpretation of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularizing the use of 'dignity' or 'human dignity' in human rights discourse. This article argues that the use of 'dignity', beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specific, varying significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to significant judicial manipulation. increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its significant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally. highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue that the concept of 'human dignity' plays an important role in the development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication.

Human Rights in Irish Prisons

Ireland is bound by several international instruments in the area of prisoners’ rights and penal policy and the ongoing reform in the Irish prison system means that the time is opportune to consider the extent to which these legal obligations are currently met and to evaluate what needs to be done to ensure greater compliance. The aim of this article is thus to examine Ireland’s record in prisoners’ rights against international standards and to determine where reform needs to take place in order to ensure full respect for the rights of prisoners in Irish law, policy and practice.

Courts and Consociations: Human Rights versus Power-sharing

Consociations are power-sharing arrangements, increasingly used to manage ethno-nationalist, ethno-linguistic, and ethno-religious conflicts. Current examples include Belgium, Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Burundi, and Iraq. Despite their growing popularity, they have begun to be challenged before human rights courts as being incompatible with human rights norms, particularly equality and non-discrimination.

Courts and Consociations examines the use of power-sharing agreements, their legitimacy, and their compatibility with human rights law. Key questions include to what extent, if any, consociations conflict with the liberal individualist preferences of international human rights institutions, and to what extent consociational power-sharing may be justified to preserve peace and the integrity of political settlements.

In three critical cases, the European Court of Human Rights has considered equality challenges to important consociational practices, twice in Belgium and then in Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia regarding the constitution established for Bosnia Herzegovina under the Dayton Agreement. The Court's decision in Sejdic and Finci has significantly altered the approach it previously took to judicial review of consociational arrangements in Belgium. This book accounts for this change and assess its implications. The problematic aspects of the current state of law are demonstrated. Future negotiators in places riven by potential or actual bloody ethnic conflicts may now have less flexibility in reaching a workable settlement, which may unintentionally contribute to sustaining such conflicts and make it more likely that negotiators will consider excluding regional and international courts from reviewing these political settlements.

GSP+ and Human Rights::Is the EU's Approach the Right One?

Among the purposes of the EU’s GSP+ programme is to link human rights to trade incentives, with the idea of using such incentives to promote developing countries’ adoption of the values found in core human rights treaties. With the re-renewal of the GSP (and GSP+) programmes to take effect in January 2014, it is fruitful to examine their efficacy and consistency with WTO law. In this article, I argue the GSP+ programme is not only ineffective in obtaining an improvement in human rights conditions for the vast majority of the world’s population, but it is also incompatible with WTO law. A stick-based regime where human rights abuses are linked to trade sanctions is a better way to proceed. After outlining the GSP+ system, and its linkage of human rights and trade, I analyse its efficacy and WTO consistency. Having shown that it is ineffective and contrary to WTO law, I argue that trade sanctions based on a PPM distinction and/or GATT XX(a) may be the appropriate means of linking trade and human rights. The article ends with some concluding remarks on the need for the careful design of such a system.

The European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 – Ten Years On

The European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 has now been in force in Ireland for ten years. This article analyses the Act itself and the impact which it has had on the Irish courts during the first decade of its operation. The use of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Irish courts prior to the enactment of the legislation is discussed, as are the reasons for the passing of the Act. The relationship between the Act and the Irish Constitution is examined, as is the jurisprudence of the Irish courts towards the interpretative obligation found in section 2(1), and the duty placed upon organs of the State by section 3(1). The article ends with a number of observations regarding the impact which the Act has had on the Irish courts at a more general level. Comparisons will be drawn with the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 throughout the discussion.

The European Convention on Human Rights and the United Kingdom's Supreme Court

This article reviews the attitudes displayed by the UK's Supreme Court towards claims based on human rights law.

Human Rights Histories

This review article considers Samuel Moyn’s book The Last Utopia:Human Rights in History in the context of recent trends in the writing of human rights history. A central debate among historians of human rights, in seekingto account for the genesis and spread of human rights, is how far current humanrights practice demonstrates continuity or radical discontinuity with previousattempts to secure rights. Moyn’s discontinuity thesis and the controversysurrounding it exemplify this debate. Whether Moyn is correct is importantbeyond the confines of human rights historiography, with implications for theirmeaning in law, as well as their political legitimacy. This review argues that Moyn’s book ultimately fails to convince, for two broad reasons. First, a more balanced judgment would conclude that the history of human rights is both one of continuity and discontinuity. Second, and more importantly, Moyn fails to offer a convincing account of the normativity of human rights. Undertaking a history of human rights requires a deeper engagement with debates on the nature and validity of human rights than Moyn seems prepared to contemplate.

Reasoning Rights: Comparative judicial engagement

This edited book is about comparative reasoning in human rights cases, exploring the questions: How is it that notionally universal norms are reasoned by courts in such dramatically different ways? What is the shape of this reasoning? What techniques are common across the transnational jurisprudence? What techniques are diverse? With contributions by a team of world-leading human rights scholars, the book moves beyond simply addressing the institutional questions concerning courts and human rights, which too often dominate discussions of this kind. Instead, it seeks a deeper examination of the similarities and divergence in the content of reasons being developed by different courts when addressing comparable human rights questions. These differences, while partly influenced by institutional issues, cannot be attributable to them alone. The book explores the diverse and rich underlying spectrum of human rights reasoning, as a distinctive and particular form of legal reasoning, evident in the case studies across the selected jurisdictions. It is a fascinating study for all those interested in human rights law and legal reasoning.