Sporting Justice: An Arbitrator's Perspective

Drawing on my experience of a number of sports dispute resolution tribunals in the UK and Ireland (such as Sports Resolutions UK; Just Sport Ireland; the Football Association of Ireland’s Disciplinary Panel and the Gaelic Athletic Association’s Dispute Resolution Authority) I intend to use this paper to review the legal arguments typically made in sports-related arbitrations. These points of interest can be summarised as a series of three questions: the fairness question; the liability question; the penalty question.

In answer to the fairness question, the aim is to give a brief outline on best practice in establishing a "fair" sports disciplinary tribunal. The answer, I believe, is always twofold in nature: first, and to paraphrase Lord Steyn in R v Secretary of State For The Home Department, Ex Parte Daly [2001] UKHL 26 at [28] "in law, context is everything" – translated into the present matter, this means that in sports disciplinary cases, the more serious the charges against the individual (in terms of reputational damage, economic impact and/or length of sanction); the more tightly wrapped the procedural safeguards surrounding any subsequent disciplinary hearing must be. A fair disciplinary system will be discussed in the context of the principles laid down in Article 8 of the World Anti-Doping Code which, in effect, acts as sport’s Article 6 of the ECHR on a right to a fair trial.

Following on from the above, in the 60 or so sports arbitrations that I have heard, there are two further points of interest. First, the claim before the arbitral panel will often be framed in an argument that, for various reasons of substantive and procedural irregularity, the sanction imposed on the appellant should be quashed ("the liability"). Second, and in alternative, that the sanction imposed was wholly disproportionate ("the penalty").

The liability issue usually breaks down into two further questions. First, what is the nature of the legal duty upon a sports body in exercising its disciplinary remit? Second, to what extent does a de novo hearing on appeal cure any apparent defects in a hearing of first instance? The first issue often results in an arbitral panel debating the contra preferentum approach to the interpretation of a contested rule i.e., the sports body’s rules in question are so ambiguous that they should be interpreted in a manner to the detriment of the rule maker and in favour of the appellant. On the second matter, it now appears to be a general principle of sports law, administrative law and even human rights law that even if a violation of the principles of natural justice takes place at the first instance stage of a disciplinary process, they may be cured on de novo appeal. Authority for this approach can be found at the Court of Arbitration for Sport and in particular in CAS 2009/A/1920 FK Pobeda, Aleksandar Zabrcanec, Nikolce Zdraveski v UEFA at para 87.

The question on proportionality asks what, aside from precedent found within the decisions of the sports body in question, are the general legal principles against which a sanction by a sports disciplinary body can be benchmarked in order to ascertain whether it is disproportionate in length or even irrational in nature?

On the matter of (dis)proportionality of sanction, the debate is usually guided by the authority in Bradley v the Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 2164 (QB) and affirmed at [2005] EWCA Civ 1056. The Bradley principles on proportionality of sports-specific sanctions, recently cited with approval at the Court of Arbitration for Sport, will be examined in this presentation.

Finally, an interesting application of many of the above principles (and others such as the appropriate standard of proof in sports disciplinary procedures) can be made to recent match-fixing or corruption related hearings held by the British Horse Racing Authority, the integrity units of snooker and tennis, and at the Court of Arbitration for Sport.

The Legal, Medical and Cultural Regulation of the Body: Transformation and Transgression

The regulation of the body provides an important concern in law, medical practice and culture. This volume contributes to existing research in the area by encouraging experts from a range of related disciplines to consider the legal, cultural and medical ways in which we regulate the body, further exploring how conceptions of self, liberalism, property and harm inform and influence contentious legal and ethical questions about what we can and cannot do to or with our own bodies.

The U.N. convention on the rights of the child: Relevance and application to pediatric clinical bioethics

This article provides an overview of the relevance and import of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) to child health practice and pediatric bioethics. We discuss the four general principles of the CRC that apply to the implementation of all rights contained in the document, the right to health articulated in Article 24, and the important position ascribed to parents in fulfilling the rights of their children. We then examine how the CRC is implemented and monitored in law and practice. The CRC and associated principles of child rights provide strategies for rights-based approaches to clinical practice and health systems, as well as to policy design, professional training, and health services research. In light of the relevance of the CRC and principles of child rights to children’s health and child health practice, it follows that there is an intersection between child rights and pediatric bioethics. Pediatric bioethicists and child rights advocates should work together to define this intersection in all domains of pediatric practice.

The Council and the Court: Shared Objectives or Opposing Views on the Crime of Aggression

This paper argues that an important part of ensuring the jurisdictional basis of the crime of aggression is to secure a partnership between the UN Security Council and the ICC. Such a partnership should be conducive towards the reality of holding to account individuals that undertake an illegal use of force. This Paper puts forward guiding principles for a model that would benefit a constructive institutional relationship between the Council and the Court. It is through the application of these five guiding principles that the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute can translate into a constructive relationship between the International Criminal Court and the Security Council for the betterment of international peace and security as well as international justice. I maintain that it would be damaging to both the legitimacy and operational effectiveness of the Security Council and the ICC and detrimental to the overall institutional relationship if the final outcome proves unfavourable to international action against the crime of aggression and nothing more than dead letter law. Essentially the key to a viable cooperation regime between the Court and the Council will hinge on shared objectives regarding the crime of aggression rather than opposing views, namely combating impunity by holding individuals accountable for the illegal use of force.