The demand for labor: An analysis using matched employer-employee data from the German LIAB. Will the high unskilled worker own-wage elasticity please stand up?

This paper uses matched employee-employer LIAB data to provide panel estimates of the structure of labor demand in western Germany, 1993-2002, distinguishing between highly skilled, skilled, and unskilled labor and between the manufacturing and service sectors. Reflecting current preoccupations, our demand analysis seeks also to accommodate the impact of technology and trade in addition to wages. The bottom-line interests are to provide elasticities of the demand for unskilled (and other) labor that should assist in short-run policy design and to identify the extent of skill biases or otherwise in trade and technology.

Dynamic pricing model and algorithm for perishable products with fuzzy demand (ABS 2* Journal)

This paper studies the dynamic pricing problem of selling fixed stock of perishable items over a finite horizon, where the decision maker does not have the necessary historic data to estimate the distribution of uncertain demand, but has imprecise information about the quantity demand. We model this uncertainty using fuzzy variables. The dynamic pricing problem based on credibility theory is formulated using three fuzzy programming models, viz.: the fuzzy expected revenue maximization model, a-optimistic revenue maximization model, and credibility maximization model. Fuzzy simulations for functions with fuzzy parameters are given and embedded into a genetic algorithm to design a hybrid intelligent algorithm to solve these three models. Finally, a real-world example is presented to highlight the effectiveness of the developed model and algorithm.

Why do people non-demand reveal in hypothetical double referenda for public goods?

Hypothetical contingent valuation surveys used to elicit values for environmental and other public goods often employ variants of the referendum mechanism due to the cognitive simplicity and familiarity of respondents with this voting format. One variant, the double referendum mechanism, requires respondents to state twice how they would vote for a given policy proposal given their cost of the good. Data from these surveys often exhibit anomalies inconsistent with standard economic models of consumer preferences. There are a number of published explanations for these anomalies, mostly focusing on problems with the second vote. This article investigates which aspects of the hypothetical task affect the degree of nondemand revelation and takes an individual-based approach to identifying people most likely to non-demand reveal. A clear profile emerges from our model of a person who faces a negative surplus i.e. a net loss in the second vote and invokes non self-interested, non financial motivations during the decision process.

Necessary conditions for demand revelation in double referenda

This paper demonstrates a set of necessary conditions that should generate unbiased, internally consistent estimates of willingness to pay (WTP) from a double referendum mechanism. These conditions are also sufficient for demand revelation in an experimental laboratory environment. However, the control over the mechanism achieved in the lab may not be transferrable to the field and WTP estimates derived from field surveys may remain biased. (c) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.