Network formation under mutual consent and costly communication

We consider two different approaches to describe the formation of social networks under mutual consent and costly communication. First, we consider a network-based approach; in particular Jackson–Wolinsky’s concept of pairwise stability. Next, we discuss a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach, through a refinement of the Nash equilibria of Myerson’s consent game. This refinement, denoted as monadic stability, describes myopically forward looking behavior of the players. We show through an equivalence that the class of monadically stable networks is a strict subset of the class of pairwise stable networks that can be characterized fully by modifications of the properties defining pairwise stability.

Ambiguity, social opinion and the use of common property resources

In this paper we argue that ambiguity, combined with social opinion formation, can be used as the foundation of a game-theoretic equilibrium concept that transcends the standard Nash equilibrium concept, applied to a model of the tragedy of the commons. Our approach sheds light on the international environmental crisis and the relevant ongoing international negotiations. We conclude that social opinion formation in most cases has a significant impact on equilibrium common property resource usage.

Strategic behavior under partial cooperation

We investigate how a group of players might cooperate with each other within the setting of a non-cooperative game. We pursue two notions of partial cooperative equilibria that follow a modification of Nash's best response rationality rather than a core-like approach. Partial cooperative Nash equilibrium treats non-cooperative players and the coalition of cooperators symmetrically, while the notion of partial cooperative leadership equilibrium assumes that the group of cooperators has a first-mover advantage. We prove existence theorems for both types of equilibria. We look at three well-known applications under partial cooperation. In a game of voluntary provision of a public good we show that our two new equilibrium notions of partial cooperation coincide. In a modified Cournot oligopoly, we identify multiple equilibria of each type and show that a non-cooperator may have a higher payoff than a cooperator. In contrast, under partial cooperation in a symmetric Salop City game, a cooperator enjoys a higher return.

Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent

We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness.

Management of Bartholin's gland carcinoma using high-dose-rate interstitial brachytherapy boost

To describe the patterns of use, clinical outcomes, and dose-volume histogram parameters of high-dose-rate interstitial brachytherapy (HDR-ISBT) in the management of Bartholin's gland cancer.

Regulation of TGF-β1-Driven Differentiation of Human Lung Fibroblasts: Emerging Roles of Cathepsin B and Cystatin C

Lung matrix homeostasis partly depends on the fine regulation of proteolytic activities. We examined the expression of human cysteine cathepsins (Cats) and their relative contribution to TGF-β1-induced fibroblast differentiation into myofibroblasts. Assays were conducted using both primary fibroblasts obtained from patients with idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (IPF) and human lung CCD-19Lu fibroblasts. Pharmacological inhibition and genetic silencing of Cat B diminished α-smooth muscle actin expression, delayed fibroblast differentiation and led to an accumulation of intracellular 50-kDa TGF-β1. Moreover addition of Cat B generated 25-kDa mature form of TGF-β1 in Cat B siRNA-pretreated lysates. Inhibition of Cat B decreased Smad 2/3 phosphorylation, but had no effect on p38 MAPK and JNK phosphorylation indicating that Cat B mostly disturbs TGF-β1-driven canonical Smad signaling pathway. While mRNA expression of cystatin C was stable, its secretion, which was inhibited by brefeldin A, increased during TGF-β1-induced differentiation of IPF and CCD-19Lu fibroblasts. In addition cystatin C participated in the control of extracellular Cats, since its gene silencing restored their proteolytic activities. These data support the notion that Cat B participates in lung myofibrogenesis as suggested for stellate cells during liver fibrosis. Moreover, we propose that TGF-β1 promotes fibrosis by driving the effective cystatin C-dependent inhibition of extracellular matrix-degrading Cats.