The death blow to unlimited liability in Victorian Britain: The City of Glasgow failure

In 1878, one of Britain's largest banks, the City of Glasgow Bank, collapsed, leaving a huge deficit between its assets and liabilities. As this bank, similar to many other contemporary British banks, had unlimited liability, its failure was accompanied by the bankruptcy of the vast majority of its stockholders. It is generally believed that the collapse of this depository institution revealed the extent to which ownership in large joint-stock banks had been diffused to investors of very modest means. It is also believed that the failure resulted in bank shareholders dumping their shares unto the market. Our evidence, garnered from ownership records, trading data, and stock prices, offers no support for these widely held beliefs. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Failure of Local Realism Revealed by Extremely-Coarse-Grained Measurements

We show that failure of local realism can be revealed to observers for whom only extremely-coarse-grained measurements are available. In our instances, Bell's inequality is violated even up to the maximum limit while both the local measurements and the initial local states under scrutiny approach the classical limit. Furthermore, we can observe failure of local realism when an inequality enforced by nonlocal realistic theories is satisfied. This suggests that locality alone may be violated while realism cannot be excluded for specific observables and states. Small-scale experimental demonstration of our examples may be possible in the foreseeable future.

High tech start-ups in University Science Park incubators: The relationship between the start-up’s lifecycle progression and use of the incubator’s resources

University Science Park incubators (USIs) have emerged as a means by which Government, academia and business can develop high technology business firms (spin out HTBFs) from initial conception through to becoming established small firms, which are ready to move beyond the Science Park confines. Although there is considerable literature on how USIs can be improved and developed there is a paucity of studies, which explore how lifecycle development within HTBFs in USIs can affect how they use the unique resources and opportunities of the USI. Moreover, there is a focus on single point in time studies, which do not adequately investigate the longitudinal dynamics of HTBF lifecycle development within USIs. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to explore the longitudinal use of the unique resources of the USI by HTBFs at different lifecycle stages. The research methodology involved 18 HTBFs within two separate USIs. A series of longitudinal interviews and focus groups were conducted with HTBFs and USI staff over a 36-month period. NUD*IST software was used in developing the coding and analysis of transcripts. The results show that a HTBF's propensity to make effective use of the USI's resources and support increases as the lifecycle stage of the company increases and the small-firm searches for independence and autonomy. Therefore, further research is required to investigate the following two outstanding questions; firstly, which usage pattern is associated with the HTBF's ultimate success or failure in the marketplace? And secondly, are there any services missing from the observed array that the USI could provide to enhance the HTBF's degree of ultimate success? © 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Assessing the Transaction Costs of Firms in the EU ETS: Lessons form Ireland

Until now, there has been little empirical evidence that EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) transaction costs are incurred at firm level. The transaction costs (internal costs, capital costs, consultancy and trading costs) incurred by Irish firms under the EU ETS during its pilot phase (2005-2007) were measured and analysed. Evidence for the sources of transaction costs, their magnitude and the distribution of costs shows that these were mainly administrative in nature. Considerable variation in costs was found due to economies of scale, as the costs per tonne of CO2 were lower for participants with larger allocations. For the largest firms - accounting for over half the emissions - average transaction costs were €0.05 per tonne. However, for small firms, average transaction costs were €2.02 - over 18% of the current allowance price. This supports the concerns that transaction costs are excessive for smaller participants. The immediate policy implication is that additional attention will be needed to address different sizes of firms, number of installations per firm, and the size of the initial allocations.