Jonathan Swift's Critique of Consequentialism?

Jonathan Swift’s Modest Proposal for preventing the children of poor people from being a burthen to their parents or country, and for making them beneficial to the public can be regarded as a critique of consequentialism, perhaps the finest and most effective that has ever been written. Swift’s argument is not explicit but his use of consequentialist reasoning shows how it is possible to rationally justify a course of action which is grotesque and barbaric. This interpretation of Swift’s pamphlet is supported by considering it in relation to works by Bernard Mandeville and William Petty. Both authors employed consequentialist reasoning and Swift is likely to have been familiar with their work.

L'indicateur EU2020 de suivi de la pauvreté et de l'exclusion: une analyse critique

The reduction of poverty and social exclusion is one of the targets of the European Union's 2020 strategy. The appropriateness and success of such a policy require the choice of relevant indicators that not only highlight poverty gaps between countries but also identify the groups of individuals in each country that need particular attention from social policies. The target retained in the European strategy combines three criteria: people living in households below the monetary poverty threshold, poor people “in terms of standard of living” who live in a situation of severe material deprivation, and those who live in households with very low or zero work intensity. We first show that neither the combination nor the intersection of these three criteria produces an adequate measure of the fight against poverty, or an objective for it. We therefore propose an alternative concept, that of “consistent poverty”, which targets people who simultaneously live below the monetary poverty threshold and above a certain level of material deprivation. The special material deprivation module of the EU-SILC 2009 database allows us to examine two versions of this notion of deprivation: the measurement of “severe” deprivation currently used by the European Union, which adopts a threshold with four items, and an alternative measure of “elementary” material deprivation with a three-item threshold. The intersection between our three-item elementary deprivation criterion and the monetary poverty criterion produces more satisfactory results than those obtained by the European Union approach, in terms of both coherency and profile of the population identified.

Labour Law as Human Rights Law: A Critique of the Use of ‘Dignity’ by Freedland and Kountouris

In their recent book, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations, Mark Freedland and Nicola Kountouris present an ambitious study of the personal scope of (what they would not want to call) ‘employment’ law. The book does this within a broader argument that calls for the reconceptualization of labour law as a whole, and it is this broader argument on which I shall focus in this chapter. Their aim, in urging us to see labour law through the lens of ‘dignity’ is to bring labour law and human rights law into closer alignment than has sometimes been the case in the past. Increasingly, dignity is seen as providing a, sometimes the, foundation of human rights law, particularly in Europe. I shall suggest that whilst the aim of constructing a new set of foundations for labour law is a worthy and increasingly urgent task, the concepts on which Freedland and Kountouris seek to build their project pose significant difficulties. In particular, their espousal of ‘dignity’ presents problems that must be addressed if their reconceptualization is not to prove a blind alley.

Realist evaluation: an immanent critique

This paper critically analyses realist evaluation, focussing on its primary analytical concepts: mechanisms, contexts, and outcomes. Noting that nursing investigators have had difficulty in operationalizing the concepts of mechanism and context, it is argued that their confusion is at least partially the result of ambiguities, inconsistencies, and contradictions in the realist evaluation model. Problematic issues include the adoption of empiricist and idealist positions, oscillation between determinism and voluntarism, subsumption of agency under structure, and categorical confusion between context and mechanism. In relation to outcomes, it is argued that realist evaluation's adoption of the fact/value distinction prevents it from taking into account the concerns of those affected by interventions. The aim of the paper is to use these immanent critiques of realist evaluation to construct an internally consistent realist approach to evaluation that is more amenable to being operationalized by nursing researchers.

After the Critique of Rights: For a Radical Democratic Theory and Practice of Human Rights

The critique of human rights has proliferated in critical legal thinking over recent years, making it clear that we can no longer uncritically approach human rights in their liberal form. In this article I assert that after the critique of rights one way human rights may be productively re-engaged in radical politics is by drawing from the radical democratic tradition. Radical democratic thought provides plausible resources to rework the shortcomings of liberal human rights, and allows human rights to be brought within the purview of a wider political project adopting a critical approach to current relations of power. Building upon previous re-engagements with rights using radical democratic thought, I return to the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to explore how human rights may be thought as an antagonistic hegemonic activity within a critical relation to power, a concept which is fundamentally futural, and may emerge as one site for work towards radical and plural democracy. I also assert, via Judith Butler's model of cultural translation, that a radical democratic practice of human rights may be advanced which resonates with and builds upon already existing activism, thereby holding possibilities to persuade those who remain sceptical as to radical re-engagements with rights.