Discriminating Taxonomic Categories and Domains in Mental Simulations of Concepts of Varying Concreteness

Most studies of conceptual knowledge in the brain focus on a narrow range of concrete conceptual categories, rely on the researchers' intuitions about which object belongs to these categories, and assume a broadly taxonomic organization of knowledge. In this fMRI study, we focus on concepts with a variety of concreteness levels; we use a state of the art lexical resource (WordNet 3.1) as the source for a relatively large number of category distinctions and compare a taxonomic style of organization with a domain-based model (associating concepts with scenarios). Participants mentally simulated situations associated with concepts when cued by text stimuli. Using multivariate pattern analysis, we find evidence that all Taxonomic categories and Domains can be distinguished from fMRI data and also observe a clear concreteness effect: Tools and Locations can be reliably predicted for unseen participants, but less concrete categories (e.g., Attributes, Communications, Events, Social Roles) can only be reliably discriminated within participants. A second concreteness effect relates to the interaction of Domain and Taxonomic category membership: Domain (e.g., relation to Law vs. Music) can be better predicted for less concrete categories. We repeated the analysis within anatomical regions, observing discrimination between all/most categories in the left middle occipital and temporal gyri, and more specialized discrimination for concrete categories Tool and Location in the left precentral and fusiform gyri, respectively. Highly concrete/abstract Taxonomic categories and Domain were segregated in frontal regions. We conclude that both Taxonomic and Domain class distinctions are relevant for interpreting neural structuring of concrete and abstract concepts.

Autoecological Approaches to Resolve Subjective Taxonomic Divisions within Arcellacea

Arcellacea (testate lobose amoebae) are important lacustrine environmental indicators that have been used in paleoclimatic reconstructions, assessing the effectiveness of mine tailings pond reclamation projects and for studying the effects of land use change in rural, industrial and urban settings. Recognition of ecophenotypically significant infra-specific ‘strains’ within arcellacean assemblages has the potential to enhance the utility of the group in characterizing contemporary and paleoenvironments. We present a novel approach which employs statistical tools to investigate the environmental and taxonomic significance of proposed strains. We test this approach on two identified strains: Difflugia protaeiformis Lamarck strain ‘acuminata’ (DPA), characterized by fine grained agglutination, and Difflugia protaeiformis Lamarck strain ‘claviformis’ (DPC), characterized by coarse grained agglutination. Redundancy analysis indicated that both organisms are associated with similar environmental variables. No relationship was observed between substrate particle size and abundance of DPC, indicating that DPC has a size preference for xenosomes during test construction. Thus DPC should not be designated as a distinct strain but rather form a species complex with DPA. This study elucidates the need to justify the designation of strains based on their autecology in addition to morphological stability.

The Absolute Configuration for Inthomycin C: Revision of Previously Published Work with a Reinstatement of the (3R)-Configuration for (-)-Inthomycin C

Abstract Image

Stereochemical evidence is presented to demonstrate that (−)-inthomycin C has (3R)- and not (3S)-stereochemistry. Careful reappraisal of the previously published work2−5 now indicates that the Hatakeyama, Hale, Ryu, and Taylor teams all have synthesized (−)-(3R)-inthomycin C. The newly measured [α]D of pure (−)-(3R)-inthomycin C (98% ee) is −7.9 (c 0.33, CHCl3) and not −41.5 (c 0.1, CHCl3) as was previously reported in 2012.

A belief revision framework for revising epistemic states with partial epistemic states

Belief revision performs belief change on an agent’s beliefs when new evidence (either of the form of a propositional formula or of the form of a total pre-order on a set of interpretations) is received. Jeffrey’s rule is commonly used for revising probabilistic epistemic states when new information is probabilistically uncertain. In this paper, we propose a general epistemic revision framework where new evidence is of the form of a partial epistemic state. Our framework extends Jeffrey’s rule with uncertain inputs and covers well-known existing frameworks such as ordinal conditional function (OCF) or possibility theory. We then define a set of postulates that such revision operators shall satisfy and establish representation theorems to characterize those postulates. We show that these postulates reveal common characteristics of various existing revision strategies and are satisfied by OCF conditionalization, Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning and possibility conditionalization. Furthermore, when reducing to the belief revision situation, our postulates can induce Darwiche and Pearl’s postulates C1 and C2.

Revising Partial Pre-Orders with Partial Pre-Orders: A Unit-Based Revision Framework

Belief revision studies strategies about how agents revise their belief states when receiving new evidence. Both in classical belief revision and in epistemic revision, a new input is either in the form of a (weighted) propositional formula or a total
pre-order (where the total pre-order is considered as a whole).
However, in some real-world applications, a new input can be a partial pre-order where each unit that constitutes the partial pre-order is important and should be considered individually. To address this issue, in this paper, we study how a partial preorder representing the prior epistemic state can be revised by another partial pre-order (the new input) from a different perspective, where the revision is conducted recursively on the individual units of partial pre-orders. We propose different revision operators (rules), dubbed the extension, match, inner and outer revision operators, from different revision points of view. We also analyze several properties for these operators.

Revision over Partial Pre-orders: A Postulational Study

Belief revision is the process that incorporates, in a consistent way,
a new piece of information, called input, into a belief base. When both belief
bases and inputs are propositional formulas, a set of natural and rational properties, known as AGM postulates, have been proposed to define genuine revision operations. This paper addresses the following important issue : How to revise a partially pre-ordered information (representing initial beliefs) with a new partially pre-ordered information (representing inputs) while preserving AGM postulates? We first provide a particular representation of partial pre-orders (called units) using the concept of closed sets of units. Then we restate AGM postulates in this framework by defining counterparts of the notions of logical entailment and logical consistency. In the second part of the paper, we provide some examples of revision operations that respect our set of postulates. We also prove that our revision methods extend well-known lexicographic revision and natural revision for both cases where the input is either a single propositional formula or a total pre-order.

Revision rules in the theory of evidence

Combination rules proposed so far in the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, especially Dempster rule, rely on a basic assumption, that is, pieces of evidence being combined are considered to be on a par, i.e. play the same role. When a source of evidence is less reliable than another, it is possible to discount it and then a symmetric combination operation is still used. In the case of revision, the idea is to let prior knowledge of an agent be altered by some input information. The change problem is thus intrinsically asymmetric. Assuming the input information is reliable, it should be retained whilst the prior information should
be changed minimally to that effect. Although belief revision is already an important subfield of artificial intelligence, so far, it has been little addressed in evidence theory. In this paper, we define the notion of revision for the theory of evidence and propose several different revision rules, called the inner and outer
revisions, and a modified adaptive outer revision, which better corresponds to the idea of revision. Properties of these revision rules are also investigated.