The ‘Public Interest’ Agency of International Organizations? The case of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

This article seeks to outline and explore some of the conditions necessary for International Organizations (IOs) to perform in a public interest fashion through a case study of the Principles of corporate governance formulated by the OECD. Rather than the more commonly documented pathological and dysfunctional behavioural forms of IOs, the case of the Principles, both in their formulation by the OECD, and in their assessment by the World Bank through the ROSC process, represent an episode of IO agency protecting and promoting a wider public interest. In exercising their agency, IO staff, have made the Principles more agreeable to a wider range of interested parties, giving them a general interest orientation, in accordance with a proceduralist definition of public interest. This case should therefore encourage IPE scholars to consider carefully and systematically the sets of circumstances and conditions, which might be required for IO agency to take more socially useful forms. In the final section, three indicators are identified which might be evaluated in future research into the positive public interest agency of IOs across a range of cases.

Inclusive development? State-led land development model in New Town, Kolkata

Urban land development in India is changing under the auspices of economic liberalisation. Kolkata has been in the forefront of this transformation through development of new townships in the urban peripheries based on a distinctive state-led land development model. Within this context New Town, Kolkata (also known as Rajarhat) provides a highly illuminative case to articulate the ways in which the state is implementing its neoliberal agenda in land development. It rides on political and ideological high ground by seeking to create a ‘model development’ of state–market partnership for dual goals of fostering capitalist interest while fulfilling welfarist principles. Interesting insights have emerged that point to a policy paradox. On one hand, the process follows market principles of efficacy and efficiency; on the other hand, state’s keenness to extend control persists, thereby creating a highly uneven terrain for state–market interaction. New Town reflects a typical quasi-market condition shaped by the monopolistic state, the poorly structured role of the private sector, an absence of civic bodies, and minimal land and housing provision for the poor. In India, as internationally, the economic liberalisation market ideology is increasingly construed as good governance. In this context New Town is a step in the right direction, but the progress is patchy, uneven, and still evolving.