E-Participation and E-Participants: solving the patent ‘crisis’

One of the major planks of some visions for E-Gov is that there is a willing participatory group who are more than happy to be involved in new forms of democracy and will be active and useful suppliers of input to e-consultation or e-participation processes. This group is different from that which goes online to the government site web and signs a petition asking the prime minister to resign. It is becoming clear, though, that the commitment to e-participation may well be there in theory, but difficult to access in practice. Further, the participation which is most welcome can frequently require training and expertise which is not widely available or there may be differences in opinion as to the point of participation. In this paper I will look to the attempts to encourage participation in the patent system. The UK is about to initiate a trial system utilising New York Law School’s Peer To Patent project, but has also attempted to involve participants in previous consultation exercises. I will use these as demonstrations of the sorts of problems which e-participation has met, and consider whether this new form of E-Gov is perhaps being oversold. The interesting question is whether participation is a growing tool which can ensure better public services from the State. My conclusion is that consultation and participatory projects can demonstrate involvement and are certainly educative but e-participatory projects are most likely incapable of achieving the goals set by their more optimistic advocates. The paper emphasises the patents field, but the lessons from it can – I suggest – be viewed as indicators having wider governance relevance. The primary point being made is that the technocratic view is always over-optimistic.

How the ship of fools was ship-wrecked - The Irish crisis and response

For a decade and half the Irish economy was the poster-boy of Europe. With substantial growth rates, an open economy, flexible labour markets and low levels of taxation, Ireland was seen as evidence of the success of neoliberal policies. Yet in the matter of a few short years Ireland has turned into a one of the peripheral black-holes (along with Greece and Portugal) that are threatening to bring down the whole Eurozone project. Given this context the paper will address two key questions. Firstly how did the much eulogised Celtic Tiger fall so far and so fast? And, secondly, what has been the government’s response to the fall and crash of the Irish economy? These two questions will be addressed through both a general historical analysis of the developments of Irish society up to the crash in 2008 and then the responses to it. Secondly by an analysis of two specific elements of that development; namely the much discussed low corporation tax rate and the failure of social housing to deliver decent affordable homes for those at the bottom of society. The third element is a review of the banking and sovereign debt crisis that led to the IMF/EU deal in November 2010 and a brief outlining of its implications for public finances, especially the question of default. The paper concludes by placing the Irish crisis in a global context.

‘Towards a Green New Deal on the Island of Ireland: from economic crisis to a new political economy of sustainability’

This article begins from the assumption (which may seem controversial to many) that anyone who thinks that our current economic crisis is a temporary blip until ‘normal service’ (i.e. a return to ‘business as usual’) is resumed, profoundly misunderstands the severity and significance of what’s happening to the global economy and its impacts on the future prosperity of the island of Ireland. The economic recession represents nothing short of a re-structuring of the global economy and the creation of a new dispensation between governments, markets and citizens. The full implications of the re-regulation of the market, with the state bailing out and part nationalising the financial sector in both jurisdictions on the island (as in other parts of the world) have yet to be seen, but what we are witnessing is the emergence of a new economic model. Those who think we can, or even ought to, return to the pre-2008 economic model, are gravely mistaken. The current economic downturn marks the end of the ‘neo-liberal’ model and the beginnings of the transition (an inevitable transition, this article will argue) towards a new low carbon, renewable, green and sustainable economy and society.

Public Administration, Science and Risk Assessment: A Case Study of the U.K. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Crisis

The bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak in the United Kingdom is regarded as one of the worst public policy crises the British government has experienced during the postwar era. In material terms, it has led to the slaughter of 3.3 million cattle and estimated economic losses of £3.7 billion. In administrative terms, the crisis brought about the dissolution of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. This article examines the istitutional context in which decisions about the scientific evidence on BSE were made. The authors argue that a centralized system in which government agencies control science for government is inherently vulnerable to alliances of experts and interest groups that undermine the credible assessment of public health and safety risks. Specific societal conditions may encourage risk-opportunistic behavior among policy makers that is conducive to delays and inaction until such time as the evidence of a health risk becomes overwhelming.

Banking in Crisis: The Rise and Fall of British Banking Stability, 1800 to the Present

Can the lessons of the past help us to prevent another banking collapse in the future? This is the first book to tell the story of the rise and fall of British banking stability in the past two centuries, and it sheds new light on why banking systems crash and the factors underpinning banking stability. John Turner shows that there were only two major banking crises in Britain during this time: the crisis of 1825–6 and the Great Crash of 2007–8. Although there were episodic bouts of instability in the interim, the banking system was crisis-free. Why was the British banking system stable for such a long time and why did the British banking system implode in 2008? In answering these questions, the book explores the long-run evolution of bank regulation, the role of the Bank of England, bank rescues and the need to hold shareholders to account.