Exploring the use of physical activity loyalty cards for behaviour change in public health: randomised controlled trial

Abstract
Background Physical inactivity is a major public health concern, and more innovative approaches are urgently needed to address it. The UK Government supports the use of incentives and so-called nudges to encourage healthy behaviour changes, and has encouraged business sector involvement in public health through the Public Health Responsibility Deal. To test the effectiveness of provision of incentives to encourage adults to increase their physical activity, we
recruited 406 adults from a workplace setting (office-based) to take part in an assessor-blind randomised controlled trial.
Methods
We developed the physical activity loyalty card scheme, which integrates a novel physical activity tracking system with web-based monitoring (palcard). Participants were recruited from two buildings at Northern Ireland’s main
government offices and were randomly allocated (grouped by building [n=2] to reduce contamination) to either incentive group (n=199) or no incentive group (n=207). We included participants aged 16–65 years, based at the worksite 4 days or more per week and for 6 h or more per day, and able to complete 15 min of moderate-paced walking (self-report). Exclusion criteria included having received specific advice by a general practitioner not to exercise. A statistician not involved in administration of the trial prepared a computer-generated random allocation sequence. Random assignments were placed in individually numbered, sealed envelopes by the statistician to ensure concealment of allocation. Only the assessor was masked to assignment. Sensors were placed along footpaths and the gym in the workplace. Participants scanned their loyalty card at the sensor when undertaking physical activity (eg, walking), which logged activity. Participants in the incentive group monitored their physical activity, collected points, and received rewards (retail vouchers) for minutes of physical activity completed over the 12-week intervention. Rewards were vouchers sponsored by local retailers. Participants in the no incentive group used their loyalty card to self-monitor their physical activity but were not able to earn points or receive rewards. The primary outcome was change in minutes of moderate to vigorous physical activity with the Global Physical Activity Questionnaire, measured at baseline, week 12, and 6 months. Activity was objectively measured with the tracking system over the 12-week intervention. Mann Whitney U tests were done to assess change between groups.
Findings
The mean age of participants was 43·32 years (SD 9·37), and 272 (67%) were women. We obtained follow-up data from 353 (87%) participants at week 12 and 341 (84%) at 6 months. At week 12, participants in the incentive group increased moderate to vigorous physical activity by a median of 60 min per week (IQR –10 to 120) compared with 30 min per week (–60 to 90) in the no incentive group (p=0·05). At 6 months, participants in the incentive group had
increased their moderate to vigorous physical activity by 30 min per week (–60 to 100) from baseline compared with 0 min per week (–115 to 1110) in the no incentive group (p=0·099). We noted no significant differences between groups
for use of loyalty card (p=0·18). Participants in the incentive group recorded a mean of 60·22 min (95% CI 50·90–69·55) of physical activity per week with their loyalty card on week 1 and 23·56 min (17·06–30·06) at week 12, which was similar to that for those in the no incentive group (59·74 min, 51·24–68·23, at week 1; 20·25 min, 14·45–26·06, at week 12; p=0·94 for differences between groups at week 1; p=0·45 for differences between groups at week 12).
Interpretation:
Financial incentives showed a short-term behaviour change in physical activity. This innovative study contributes to the necessary evidence base, and has important implications for physical activity promotion and business engagement in health. The optimum incentive-based approach needs to be established. Results should be interpreted with some caution as the analyses of secondary outcomes were not adjusted for multiple comparisons.

European Union Cross-Border Cooperation and Conflict Amelioration

The relevance of European Union (EU) cross-border cooperation for European border con?ict amelioration may be questioned in the contemporary global climate of threat and insecurity posed by forces of ’dark globalisation’. In any case, empirical evidence exposes the limitations of cross-border cooperation in advancing con?ict amelioration in some border regions. Nevertheless, in an enlarged EU which encompasses Central and East European member states and reaches out to neighbouring states through cross-border cooperation initiatives, the number of real and potential border con?icts with which it is concerned has risen exponentially. Fortunately, there are cases of EU ’borderscapes’ that have adopted a cross-border ’peace-building from below’ approach leading to border con?ict amelioration. Unfortunately, countervailing pressures on EU cross-border cooperation from border security regimes (principally Schengen), the Eurozone crisis, EU budgetary constraints, the conceptualisation of ’Europe as Empire’, and the possible recon?guration of the EU itself compromises this approach. Therefore, the path of European integration may well shift from one of inter-state peace-building and regional crossborder cooperation after the Second World War, to border con?ict and coercion in constituting and reconstituting state borders after the recon?guration of the EU.

Physical Activity Loyalty Cards for Behavior Change:A Quasi-Experimental Study

Background: Financial incentives have been advocated by the UK and U.S. governments to encourage adoption of healthy lifestyles. However, evidence to support the use of incentives for changing physical activity (PA) behavior is sparse.
Purpose:To investigate the effectiveness of?nancial incentives to increase PA in adults in the workplace.
Design: Two-arm quasi-experimental design.
Setting/participants: Employees (n¼406) in a workplace setting in Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK.
Intervention: Using a loyalty card to collect points and earn rewards, participants (n¼199) in the Incentive Group monitored their PA levels and received ?nancial incentives (retail vouchers) for minutes of PA completed over the course of a 12-week intervention period. Participants (n¼207) in the comparison group used their loyalty card to self-monitor their PA levels but were not able to earn points or obtain incentives (No Incentive Group).
Main outcome measures:The primary outcome was minutes of PA objectively measured using a novel PA tracking system at baseline (April 2011); Week 6 (June 2011); and Week 12 (July 2011).
Other outcomes, including a self-report measure of PA, were collected at baseline, Week 12, and 6 months (October 2011). Data were analyzed in June 2012.
Results: No signi?cant differences between groups were found for primary or secondary outcomes at the 12-week and 6-month assessments. Participants in the Incentive Group recorded 17.52 minutes of PA/week (95% CI¼12.49, 22.56) compared to 16.63 minutes/week (95% CI¼11.76, 21.51) in the No Incentive Group at Week 12 (p¼0.59). At 6 months, participants in the Incentive Group recorded 26.18 minutes of PA/week (95% CI¼20.06, 32.29) compared to 24.00 minutes/week (95% CI¼17.45, 30.54) in the No Incentive Group (p¼0.45).
Conclusions: Financial incentives did not encourage participants to undertake more PA than selfmonitoring PA. This study contributes to the evidence base and has important implications for increasing participation in physical activity and fostering links with the business sector. (Am J Prev Med 2013;45(1):56–63) © 2013 American Journal of Preventive Medicine

In Pursuit for Impeccable Veracity

I study the institution of avoiding hiring one’s own Ph.D. graduates for assistant professorships. I argue that this institution is necessary to create better incentives for researchers to incorporate new information in studies, facilitating the convergence to asymptotic learning of the studied fundamentals.

GSP+ and Human Rights::Is the EU's Approach the Right One?

Among the purposes of the EU’s GSP+ programme is to link human rights to trade incentives, with the idea of using such incentives to promote developing countries’ adoption of the values found in core human rights treaties. With the re-renewal of the GSP (and GSP+) programmes to take effect in January 2014, it is fruitful to examine their efficacy and consistency with WTO law. In this article, I argue the GSP+ programme is not only ineffective in obtaining an improvement in human rights conditions for the vast majority of the world’s population, but it is also incompatible with WTO law. A stick-based regime where human rights abuses are linked to trade sanctions is a better way to proceed. After outlining the GSP+ system, and its linkage of human rights and trade, I analyse its efficacy and WTO consistency. Having shown that it is ineffective and contrary to WTO law, I argue that trade sanctions based on a PPM distinction and/or GATT XX(a) may be the appropriate means of linking trade and human rights. The article ends with some concluding remarks on the need for the careful design of such a system.

Impact of different health systems on the burden of type 2 diabetes in two populations

Objectives: Health policy directs the management of patients with chronic disease in a country, but evaluating nationwide policies is difficult, not least because of the absence of suitable comparators. This paper examines the management of patients with type 2 diabetes in two demographically comparable populations with different health care systems to see if this represents a viable approach to evaluation.

Methods: A secondary analysis of centralized prescribing databases for 2010 was undertaken to compare the levels and costs of care of patients with type 2 diabetes in Northern Ireland’s National Health Service (NHS) (NI, n = 1.8 million) which has structured care, financial incentives related to diabetes care and an emphasis on generic prescribing, with that of the Republic of Ireland (ROI, n = 4.3 million) where management of diabetes care is guided solely by clinical and other guidelines.

Results: The prevalence of treated type 2 diabetes was 3.59% in NI and 3.09% in ROI, but there were similar and high levels of prescribing of secondary cardiovascular medications. Medication costs per person for anti-diabetic, anti-obesity and cardiovascular medication were 46% higher in ROI than NI, due to differences in levels of generic prescribing.

Conclusions: These different health care systems appear to be producing similar levels of care for patients with type 2 diabetes, although at different levels of cost. The findings question the need for financial incentives in NI and highlight the large cost savings potentially accruing from a greater shift to generic prescribing in ROI. Cross-country comparison, though not without difficulties, may prove a useful adjunct to within-country analysis of policy impact.

A lesson in business: cost-effectiveness analysis of a novel financial incentive intervention for increasing physical activity in the workplace

Background: Recently both the UK and US governments have advocated the use of financial incentives to encourage healthier lifestyle choices but evidence for the cost-effectiveness of such interventions is lacking. Our aim was to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of a quasi-experimental trial, exploring the use of financial incentives to increase employee physical activity levels, from a healthcare and employer’s perspective.

Methods: Employees used a ‘loyalty card’ to objectively monitor their physical activity at work over 12 weeks. The Incentive Group (n=199) collected points and received rewards for minutes of physical activity completed. The No Incentive Group (n=207) self-monitored their physical activity only. Quality of life (QOL) and absenteeism were assessed at baseline and 6 months follow-up. QOL scores were also converted into productivity estimates using a validated algorithm. The additional costs of the Incentive Group were divided by the additional quality adjusted life years (QALYs) or productivity gained to calculate incremental cost effectiveness ratios (ICERs). Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves (CEACs) and population expected value of perfect information (EVPI) was used to characterize and value the uncertainty in our estimates.

Results: The Incentive Group performed more physical activity over 12 weeks and by 6 months had achieved greater gains in QOL and productivity, although these mean differences were not statistically significant. The ICERs were £2,900/QALY and £2,700 per percentage increase in overall employee productivity. Whilst the confidence intervals surrounding these ICERs were wide, CEACs showed a high chance of the intervention being cost-effective at low willingness-to-pay (WTP) thresholds.

Conclusions: The Physical Activity Loyalty card (PAL) scheme is potentially cost-effective from both a healthcare and employer’s perspective but further research is warranted to reduce uncertainty in our results. It is based on a sustainable “business model” which should become more cost-effective as it is delivered to more participants and can be adapted to suit other health behaviors and settings. This comes at a time when both UK and US governments are encouraging business involvement in tackling public health challenges.

Protracted Peace processes: Policy (Un)learning and the Cyprus Debacle

The article examines why a comprehensive settlement to resolve the Cyprus problem has yet to be reached despite the existence of a positive incentive structure and the proactive involvement of regional and international organizations, including the European Union and the United Nations. To address this question, evidence from critical turning points in foreign policy decision-making in Turkey, Greece and the two communities in Cyprus is drawn on. The role of hegemonic political discourses is emphasized, and it is argued that the latter have prevented an accurate evaluation of incentives that could have set the stage for a constructive settlement. However, despite the political debacle in the Cypriot negotiations, success stories have emerged, such as the reactivation of the Committee for Missing Persons (CMP), a defunct body for almost 25 years, to become the most successful bi-communal project following Cyprus’s EU accession. Contradictory evidence in the Cypriot peace process is evaluated and policy lessons to be learned from the CMP ‘success story’ are identified.

Increasingly ‘Irrational’ Party Systems: Evidence that There Are Increasingly More Than Two at the District level

Recent work has noted an increase in the number of parties at the national level in both proportional and majoritarian electoral systems. While the conventional wisdom maintains that the incentives provided by the electoral system will prevent the number of parties at the district level from exceeding two in majoritarian systems, the evidence presented here demonstrates otherwise. I argue that this has occurred because the number of cleavages articulated by parties has increased as several third parties have begun articulating cleavages that are not well represented by the two larger parties.

Due North? Do American Theories of Legislative Committees Apply to Canada?

Several theories of legislative organisation have been proposed to explain committee selection in American legislatures, but do these theories travel outside the United States? This paper tests whether these theories apply to data from the Canadian House of Commons. It was found that the distributive and partisan models of legislative organisation explain committee composition in Canada. In many cases, committees in the House of Commons are made up of preference outliers. As predicted by partisan models, it was also found that the governing party stacks committees with its members, but this is conditional upon the strength of the governing party.

A comparison of biodegradable municipal waste (BMW) management strategies in Ireland and the Czech Republic and the lessons learned

In order to meet the recycling and recovery targets set forth by the European Union's (EU) Waste and Landfill Directives, both the Irish and Czech governments’ policy on waste management is changing to meet these pressures, with major emphasis being placed upon the management of biodegradable municipal waste (BMW). In particular, the EU Landfill Directive requires reductions in the rate of BMW going to landfill to 35% of 1995 values by 2016 and 2020 for Ireland and the Czech Republic, respectively. In this paper, the strategies of how Ireland and the Czech Republic plan to meet this challenge are compared. Ireland either landfills or exports its waste for recovery, while the Czech Republic has a relatively new waste management infrastructure. While Ireland met the first target of 75% diversion of BMW from landfill by 2010 and preliminary 2012 data indicate that Ireland is on track to meet the 2013 target, the achievement of the 2016 target remains at risk. Indicators that were developed to monitor the Czech Republic's path to meeting the targets demonstrate that it did not meet the first target that was set for 2010 and will probably not meet its 2013 target either. The evaluation reports on the implementation of Waste Management Plan of Czech Republic suggest that the currently applied strategy to divert biodegradable waste from landfill is not effective enough. For both countries, the EU Waste Framework and Landfill Directives will be a significant influence and driver of change in waste management practices and governance over the coming decade. This means that both countries will not only have to invest in infrastructure to achieve the targets, but will also have to increase awareness among the public in diverting this waste at the household level. Improving environmental education is part of increased awareness as it is imperative for citizens to understand the consequences of their actions as affluence continues to grow producing increased levels of waste.

Graphical abstract
Despite the differences in the levels of waste generation in both the Czech Republic and Ireland, each country can learn from each other in order to meet the recycling and recovery targets set by the European Union's (EU) Waste and Landfill Directives. Both countries will not only have to invest in infrastructure to achieve the targets, but will also have to increase awareness among the public in diverting this waste at the household level. In addition, there needs to be minimum safe standards when land-spreading organic agricultural and organic municipal and industrial materials on agricultural land used for food production, as well as incentives to increase BMW diversion from landfill such as the increased landfill levy implemented in Ireland and the acceptance of MBT and/or incineration as a means of treating residual waste.

Increase in the pharmacological management of Type 2 diabetes with pay-for-performance in primary care in the UK

Aims To determine whether the financial incentives for tight glycaemic control, introduced in the UK as part of a pay-for-performance scheme in 2004, increased the rate at which people with newly diagnosed Type 2 diabetes were started on anti-diabetic medication.

Methods A secondary analysis of data from the General Practice Research Database for the years 1999-2008 was performed using an interrupted time series analysis of the treatment patterns for people newly diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes (n=21 197).

Results Overall, the proportion of people with newly diagnosed diabetes managed without medication 12months after diagnosis was 47% and after 24months it was 40%. The annual rate of initiation of pharmacological treatment within 12months of diagnosis was decreasing before the introduction of the pay-for-performance scheme by 1.2% per year (95% CI -2.0, -0.5%) and increased after the introduction of the scheme by 1.9% per year (95% CI 1.1, 2.7%). The equivalent figures for treatment within 24months of diagnosis were -1.4% (95% CI -2.1, -0.8%) before the scheme was introduced and 1.6% (95% CI 0.8, 2.3%) after the scheme was introduced.

Conclusion The present study suggests that the introduction of financial incentives in 2004 has effected a change in the management of people newly diagnosed with diabetes. We conclude that a greater proportion of people with newly diagnosed diabetes are being initiated on medication within 1 and 2years of diagnosis as a result of the introduction of financial incentives for tight glycaemic control.

Domestic fridge-freezer load aggregation to support ancillary services

Grid operators and electricity retailers in Ireland manage peak demand, power system balancing and grid congestion by offering relevant incentives to consumers to reduce or shift their load. The need for active consumers in the home using smart appliances has never been greater, due to increased variable renewable generation and grid constraints. In this paper an aggregated model of a single compressor fridge-freezer population is developed. A price control strategy is examined to quantify and value demand response savings during a representative winter and summer week for Ireland in 2020. The results show an average reduction in fridge-freezer operating cost of 8.2% during winter and significantly lower during summer in Ireland. A peak reduction of at least 68% of the average winter refrigeration load is achieved consistently during the week analysed using a staggering control mode. An analysis of the current ancillary service payments confirms that these are insufficient to ensure widespread uptake by the small consumer, and new mechanisms need to be developed to make becoming an active consumer attractive. Demand response is proposed as a new ancillary service called ramping capability, as the need for this service will increase with more renewable energy penetration on the power system.

Incentive Mechanisms and Their Impact on Project Performance

Good performance characterizes project success and value for money. However, performance problems are not uncommon in project management. Incentivization is generally recognized as a strategy of addressing performance problems. This chapter aims to explore incentive mechanisms and their impact on project performance. It is mainly based on the use of incentives in construction and engineering projects. The same principles apply to project management in other industry sectors. Incentivization can be used in such performance areas as time, cost, quality, safety and environment. A client has different ways of incentivizing his contractor’s performance, e.g. (1) a single incentive or multiple incentives; and (2) incentives or disincentives or a combination of both. The establishment of incentive mechanisms proves to have a significant potential for relationship development, process enhancement and performance improvement. In order to ensure the success of incentive mechanisms, both contractors and clients need to make extra efforts. As a result, a link is developed among incentive mechanisms, project management system and project performance.