The ‘Public Interest’ Agency of International Organizations? The case of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

This article seeks to outline and explore some of the conditions necessary for International Organizations (IOs) to perform in a public interest fashion through a case study of the Principles of corporate governance formulated by the OECD. Rather than the more commonly documented pathological and dysfunctional behavioural forms of IOs, the case of the Principles, both in their formulation by the OECD, and in their assessment by the World Bank through the ROSC process, represent an episode of IO agency protecting and promoting a wider public interest. In exercising their agency, IO staff, have made the Principles more agreeable to a wider range of interested parties, giving them a general interest orientation, in accordance with a proceduralist definition of public interest. This case should therefore encourage IPE scholars to consider carefully and systematically the sets of circumstances and conditions, which might be required for IO agency to take more socially useful forms. In the final section, three indicators are identified which might be evaluated in future research into the positive public interest agency of IOs across a range of cases.

Discourses of Corporate crime as natural disaster: the case of the Paddington Rail Crash

Drawing on the literature in criminology and media studies on the nature of social understandings of corporate crime and its representation in the media, this paper takes one small but important step in this direction by carrying out a linguistic case study on the news coverage of one sequence of events which resulted from corporate negligence – the Paddington rail crash, a sequence of news events that were important as they led to legal change as regards corporate responsibility in Britain. The paper concludes by showing that while the news coverage played an important part in leading to a change in the law regarding corporate responsibility, although this received little coverage in the press.

Substitutes for legal protection: corporate governance and dividends in Victorian Britain

Companies in Victorian Britain operated in a laissez-faire legal environment from the perspective of outside investors, implying that such investors were not protected by the legal system. This article seeks to identify the alternative mechanisms that outside shareholders used to protect themselves by examining the dividend policy and governance of over 800 publicly traded companies at the beginning of the 1880s. We assess the importance of these mechanisms by estimating their impact on Tobin's Q. Our evidence suggests that dividends and well-structured and incentivized boards of directors may have played a role in protecting the interests of outside investors.

Unfunded pension liabilities and sponsoring firm credit risk: an international analysis of corporate bond spreads

This paper tests empirically whether pension information derived by corporate pension accounting disclosures is priced in corporate bond spreads. The model represents a hybrid of more traditional accounting ratio-based models of credit risk and structural models of bond spreads initiated by Merton (1974). The model is fitted to 5 years of data from 2002 to 2006 featuring companies from the US and Europe. The paper finds that while unfunded pension liabilities are priced in the overall sample, they are not priced as aggressively as traditional leverage. Furthermore, an extended model shows that the pension–credit risk relation is most evident in the US and Germany, where unfunded pension liabilities are priced more aggressively than traditional forms of leverage. No pension–credit risk relation is found in the other countries sampled, notably the UK, Netherlands and France.

Unfunded Pension Liabilities and the Corporate CDS Market

This article examines the impact of pension deficits on default risk as measured by the premia on corporate credit default swaps (CDS). We find highly significant evidence that unfunded pension liabilities raise one- and five-year CDS premia. However, this relation is not homogeneous across countries, with the U.S. CDS market leading its European counterparts in the pricing of defined-benefit pension risk.