Moral Compromise

A moral compromise is a compromise on moral matters; it is agreement in the face of moral disagreement but where there is agreement on the importance of consensus – namely that it secures a morally desirable outcome. It is distinguishable from other forms of agreement, and an important distinction between moral compromise with public agreement and moral compromise with public disagreement is also made. Circumstances in which the former might be permissible are outlined, and the sense in which it is allowed all things considered to agree is made clear. The relevant discussions of Dan Brock and Mary Warnock on the role of the philosopher to public policy are critically reviewed. Finally, a brief list is offered of the considerations relevant to an estimation of whether and, if so, when such compromise is allowed.

Moral distress experienced by health care professionals who provide home-based palliative care

Health care providers regularly encounter situations of moral conflict and distress in their practice. Moral distress may result in unfavorable outcomes for both health care providers and those in their care. The purpose of this study was to examine the experience of moral distress from a broad range of health care occupations that provide home-based palliative care as the initial step of addressing the issue. A critical incident approach was used in qualitative interviews to elicit the experiences on moral distress from 18 health care providers drawn from five home visiting organizations in south central Ontario, Canada. Most participants described at least two critical incidents in their interview generating a total of 47 critical incidents. Analyses of the critical incidents revealed 11 issues that triggered moral distress which clustered into three themes, (a) the role of informal caregivers, b) challenging clinical situations and (c) service delivery issues. The findings suggest that the training and practice environments for health care providers need to be designed to recognize the moral challenges related to day-to-day practice.

Moral emotions and the envisioning of mitigating circumstances for wrongdoing

Anger may be more responsive than disgust to mitigating circumstances in judgments of wrongdoing. We tested this hypothesis in two studies where we had participants envision circumstances that could serve to mitigate an otherwise wrongful act. In Study 1, participants provided moral judgments, and ratings of anger and disgust, to a number of transgressions involving either harm or bodily purity. They were then asked to imagine and report whether there might be any circumstances that would make it all right to perform the act. Across transgression type, and controlling for covariance between anger and disgust, levels of anger were found to negatively predict the envisioning of mitigating circumstances for wrongdoing, while disgust was unrelated. Study 2 replicated and extended these findings to less serious transgressions, using a continuous measure of mitigating circumstances, and demonstrated the impact of
anger independent of deontological commitments. These findings highlight the differential relationship that anger and disgust have with the ability to envision mitigating factors.