Does the UK Local Finance Improvement Trust (Lift) Initiative Improve Risk Management in Public-Private Procurement?

The UK government introduced the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and, latterly, the Local Improvement Finance Trust (LIFT) in an attempt to improve public service provision. As a variant of PFI, LIFT seeks to create a framework for the effective provision of primary care facilities. Like conventional PFI procurement, LIFT projects involve long-term contracts, complex multi-party interactions and thus create various risks to public sector clients. This paper investigates the advantages and disadvantages of LIFT with a focus on how this approach facilitates or impedes risk management from the public sector client perspective. Our paper concludes that LIFT has a potential for creating additional problems, including the further reduction of public sector control, conflicts of interest, the inappropriate use of enabling funds, and higher than market rental costs affecting the uptake of space in the buildings by local health care providers. However, there is also evidence that LIFT has facilitated new investment and that Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) have themselves started addressing some of the weaknesses of this procurement format through the bundling of projects and other forms of regional co-operation.

UK Public Private Partnerships and the Credit Crunch: A Case of Risk Contagion?

During the past twenty years, the UK has relied heavily on Public Private Partnerships (PPP) and especially the Private Finance Initiative in the procurement of infrastructure and services. Discussing the causes of the credit crunch and its effects on PPP, this paper notes that the provision of new public sector infrastructure and related services has been adversely affected by the impact of the credit crunch on Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs). These problems have arisen primarily from the unwillingness of commercial banks to replace collapsed PFI bond financing unless new PFI contracts reduce financial risks; which, in turn, is likely to increase the cost of these projects to the public sector. Additional financial strains have arisen for the UK government from the need to bail out collapsed PFI projects. Overall we find evidence that the UK commitment to PFI has not only increased immediate fiscal pressures on the UK when these have become least palatable, but has also created fiscal vulnerabilities at local and national levels which are likely to hamper the country’s ability to launch counter-cyclical responses to the ongoing crisis.

Bank Failures of the 1990s::An Exploratory Analysis

Past research has frequently attributed the incidence of bank failures to macroeconomic cycles and/or downturns in the regional economy. More recent analyses have suggested that the incidence and severity of bank failures can be linked to governance failures, which may be preventable through more stringent disclosure and auditing requirements. Using data on bank failures during the years 1991 to 1997, for the US, Canada, the UK and Germany, this study examines the relationship between institutional characteristics of national legal and auditing systems and the incidence of bank failures. In the second part of our analysis we then examined the relationship between the same institutional variables and the severity of bank failures.
The first part of our study notes a significant correlation between the law and order tradition (‘rule of law’) of a national legal system and the incidence of bank failures. Nations which were assigned high 'rule of law’ scores by country risk guides appear to have been less likely to experience bank failures. Another variable which appears to impact on bank failure rates is the ‘risk of contract repudiation’. Countries with a greater ‘risk of contract repudiation’ appear to be more likely to experience bank failures. We suggest that this may be due to a greater ex ante protection of stakeholders in countries where contract enforcement is more stringent.
The results of the second part of our study are less clear cut. However, there appears to be a significant correlation between the amount paid out by national deposit insurers (our proxy for the severity of bank failures) and the macroeconomic variable 'GDP change'. Here our findings follow the conventional wisdom; with greater amounts of deposit insurance funds being paid during economic downturns (i.e. low or negative GDP 'growth' correlates with high amounts of deposit insurance being paid out). A less pronounced relationship with the severity of bank failures can also be established for the institutional variables ' accounting standards' as well as 'risk of contract repudiation'. Countries with more stringent ‘accounting standards’ and a low ‘risk of contract repudiation’ appear to have been less prone to severe bank failures.