Annotation of Case C-272/94, Criminal proceedings against Michel Guiot and Climatec SA, ECR 1996 I-1905

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Sticks, Stones and Words: Emotional Harm and the English Criminal Law

This article discusses the rule that criminal liability does not normally attach for the causing of emotional harm or mental distress in the absence of proof of a 'recognised psychiatric injury'. It considers what is involved in the diagnosis of psychiatric injury, and to what extent the difference between such injury and 'ordinary' mental distress is one of degree rather than one of kind. It reviews the situations in which the law already criminalises the infliction of emotional harm without proof of psychiatric injury, and assesses the policy arguments for drawing the distinction in the normal case. The article concludes that the law can and should adopt a more flexible approach to cases of this sort.

From Counter-terrorism to Criminal Justice: Transformation or Business as Usual?

The article explores the extent to which criminal justice in Northern Ireland has been reconstructed over the past fifteen years. The focus is on the framework provided in the Good Friday Agreement (1998) and the range of transition processes that followed. Post-Agreement Inquiries are reviewed and the findings demonstrate the institutional rigidities facing the transformation of criminal justice. While the ideologies and practices of counter-terrorism no longer dominate the business of criminal justice, the extent of change in terms of social representativeness, scale and expenditure is variable, with the prison service proving the least changed.

Judicial Rehabilitation and the ‘Clean Bill of Health’ in Criminal Justice.

Drawing on an important survey of European and Australian policies toward ‘judicial rehabilitation,’ this article makes the following arguments. First, the rehabilitation movement should return to the origins of the word ‘rehabilitation’ and focus at least as much on efforts to remove and relieve ex-prisoner stigma as on treatment and reform efforts. There will be no ‘rehabilitation revolution’ without this. Second, these efforts should involve active, not passive redemption. Rehabilitation processes that require almost a decade or more of ‘crime-free’ behaviour before forgiving an individual for his or her crimes are just and fair, but they miss the point of rehabilitation. Policies should encourage, support and facilitate good behaviour and not just reward it in retrospect. Third, rehabilitation should not just be done, but be ‘seen to be done,’ ideally in a ritualised format. This sends an important message to the individual and wider society. Finally, I argue that it may be better to forgive than forget past crimes. That is, rather than burying past crimes as if they never happened, states should instead acknowledge and formally recognise that people can change, that good people can do bad things, and that all individuals should be able to move on from past convictions.