Polynomial Functions and the Riesz Interpolation Property

Building on a proof by D. Handelman of a generalisation of an example due to L. Fuchs, we show that the space of real-valued polynomials on a non-empty set X of reals has the Riesz Interpolation Property if and only if X is bounded.

ARTICLE: Property and the Definition of Slavery

Currently there is no clear understanding of the meaning of ‘slavery’ in modern international law. While generally it is accepted that the
authoritative definition of slavery is provided by Article 1 of the Slavery Convention 1926, in recent times slavery has been understood in such a wide variety of ways that effectively it is a meaningless term. This paper reflects on this interpretation problem and aims to redress this balance by reclaiming the core meaning of the legal definition. It applies property law perspectives to explain the conception of ownership invoked by Article 1, to argue that it remains relevant and to explore how it might be applied in identifying modern cases of slavery.

The City as Laboratory and the Urban-Rural Divide: the Revival of Private Property and its Limits in Post-Mao China

This paper focuses on the revival of private property and its limits in urban China. It explores the emergence of urban property markets; urban property-holding in relation to the complexity of urban governance; “minor property rights apartments” that form a de facto real estate market and cross over the urban-rural divide; the “grey areas” of blurring legal and administrative boundaries in modern China; and recent changes to the rural land system and the rural-urban divide. The conclusion flags the theme of the city as laboratory with regard to the blurring legal and governmental urban-rural distinction.

Possession Taken by Theft and the Original Acquisition of Personal Property Rights

This paper queries the soundness of the view that wrongful possession (eg a thief’s possession of goods he has stolen) should be protected by the standard actions for interference with goods. It uses close historical analysis of the development of the relevant concepts through the cases to argue that this is not a proposition that is compelled on the authorities, nor one demanded as a matter of principle. It then abstracts to consider the implications of this argument at a theoretical level, exposing great need for development in the common law’s basic principles of possessory protection. It argues innovatively that the objects of the law might be better served by the creation of a more limited form of possessory protection, achieved through the possessor’s acquisition of a personal right, and correlatively that the values that underpin and justify our basic rules of possessory protection entail a more nuanced response to matters of property acquisition.