Holding Shareholders to Account: British Banking Stability and Contingent Capital

This chapter seeks to explain the relative stability of the British banking system in terms of its capital structure. From 1826 joint-stock banking was allowed, but shareholder liability was jointly and severally unlimited. Limited liability banks were allowed from 1857–8, but these banks issued partly paid shares with an obligation on shareholders to subscribe for uncalled capital. Contingent capital meant that shareholders and managers would suffer losses in the event of failure and this discouraged risk shifting at the expense of note-holders and depositors. Although individual banks collapsed, the failure rate of banks (in terms of number or capital) did not reach a critical level—10 per cent—beyond which the payments system might have been threatened. This chapter argues that agency problems and systemic risk rose after the abolition of contingent share capital in 1958 and the deregulation of the banking sector in the 1970s.

This Time is Different: Causes and Consequences of British Banking Instability over the Long Run

This paper addresses three questions: (1) How severe were the episodes of banking instability
experienced by the UK over the past two centuries? (2) What have been the macroeconomic
indicators of UK banking instability? and (3) What have been the consequences of UK banking
instability for the cost of credit? Using a unique dataset of bank share prices from 1830 to 2010
to assess the stability of the UK banking system, we find that banking instability has grown more
severe since the 1970s. We also find that interest rates, inflation, lending growth, and equity
prices are consistent macroeconomic indicators of UK banking instability over the long run.
Furthermore, utilising a unique dataset of corporate-bond yields for the period 1860 to 2010, we
find that there is a significant long-run relationship between banking instability and the creditrisk
premium faced by businesses.