After Housing Policy: Housing and the UK General Election 2001

This paper describes the results of a review of the housing content of UK General Election 2001 manifestos. Housing policy was of little importance during the election campaign. The main British political parties had, essentially, a shared housing agenda - to promote and facilitate home ownership, support area and community regeneration, tackle homelessness, improve the private rented sector, and prevent building on greenfield sites. Many issues of importance to housing specialists received little or no attention, most notably that of low demand. Some policy variations within the UK were evident, for example in attitudes towards greenfield development, home ownership and stock transfer. The paper concludes that differences in housing policy are emerging within the UK as part of a new politics of devolution and that the days of a single housing policy approach for the UK are over.

Devolving Housing Policy and Practice in Northern Ireland 1998 - 2002

This paper reviews the effect of devolution on housing policy and practice in Northern Ireland. It outlines the history and context of devolution and housing policy in Northern Ireland, including the legacy and persistence of intense social conflict. Current devolution arrangements are reviewed, including the implications of enforced coalition for policy governance. The paper focuses on three dimensions of housing and housing-related policy development and implementation: social housing, especially the distinctive history and changing organisation of social housing provision; policies affecting the housing market, including the changing regime for spatial planning; and, regeneration and tenant participation. The paper argues that housing policy has tended to converge with policies in England, rather than moving towards a distinctively local agenda. Local political agendas remain dominated by disagreements over constitutional status, thus policy formulation is determined more by officials than by elected politicians.

Benchmark Status in Fixed-Income Asset Markets

What is a benchmark bond? We provide a formal theoretical treatment of this concept that relates endogenously determined benchmark status to the location of price discovery and we derive its implications. We describe a rich but little used econometric technique for identifying the benchmark that is congruent with our theoretical framework. We apply this in the context of the US corporate bond market and to the natural experiment that occurred when benchmark status was contested in the European sovereign bond markets after the introduction of the Euro. We show that France provides the benchmark at most maturities in the Euro-denominated sovereign bond market and that IBM provides the benchmark in the 10 year maturity in the US corporate bond market.

Transparency Proposals for European Sovereign Bond Markets

The debate over the possible extension of transparency regulation in Europe to include sovereign bonds has opened up a number of other issues in need of serious consideration. One such issue is the appropriateness of the entire infrastructure supporting the trading of European sovereign bonds. In recent years sovereign issuers have supported the development of an electronic inter-dealer market but have remained unconcerned with the opacity of dealer-to-customer trading. The degree of segmentation in this market is high relative to what exists in nearly all other financial markets. This paper explores why European sovereign bond markets have developed in such a segmented way and considers how this structure could be altered to improve transparency without adversely affecting liquidity, efficiency or the benefits enjoyed by primary dealers and issuers. It is suggested that the structure of the market could be improved greatly if the largest and most active investors were permitted access to the inter-dealer electronic trading platforms. This would solve a number of market imperfections and increase the proportion of market activity that is conducted in a transparent way. The paper argues that sovereign issuers in Europe have the means to provide incentives that would influence dealers to support reduced segmentation. Some practical examples of how this could be achieved are provided and the potential benefits are outlined.