'Trusting the numbers': mineral prospecting, raising finance and the governance of knowledge

Mineral prospecting and raising finance for ‘junior’ mining firms has historically been regarded as a speculative activity. For the regulators of securities markets upon which ‘junior’ mining companies seek to raise capital, a perennial problem has been handling not only the indeterminacy of scientific claims, but also the social basis of epistemic practices. This paper examines the production of a system of public warrant and associated knowledge practices intended to enable investors to differentiate between ‘destructive’ and ‘productive’ varieties of financial speculation. It traces the use of the notion of ‘disclosure’ in constructing and legitimizing the ‘juniors’ market in Canada. It argues that though the work of ‘economics’ may be necessary in the construction of markets, it is by no means sufficient. Attention must also be given to the ways in which legal models of ‘the free-market’ can be translated and constantly re-worked across the sites and spaces of regulatory practice, animating the geographies of markets.

Accountability for Responsibility: An assessment of the Transnational Capitalist Class' role in driving a Global CSR Agenda

Globalisation has led to the establishment of a new hierarchy of leadership. At the helm is the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC) , which oversees the direction of Multi National Corporations (MNCs) at a global level. Can the TCC, as leaders in the governance agenda, drive a global CSR agenda, or, perhaps, the question should be: do they want to drive a CSR agenda?
The hypothesis of this article is that, as the structure of global leadership and governance has changed, so too has the potential for aligning national CSR agendas to a globally accepted standard. This is unlikely due to systematic limitations inherent in a transitional structural realignment of global leadership. Whereas the design of global leadership has changed due to processes of globalization, the bodies that can regulate this leadership have not developed at the same pace. Regulation on issues such as CSR remains at national, federal and supra-­-national levels suggesting that TCCs have a free reign in dictating agenda. This new class (TCC) may bear a responsibility for CSR but there is a lack of accountability if it is not fulfilled.

Managing for Legitimacy: Agency Governance in its “Deep” Constitutional Context

Recent literature on bureaucratic structure has gone further than studying discretions given to bureaucrats in policy making, and much attention is now paid to understanding how bureaucratic agencies are managed. This article proposes that the way in which executive governments manage their agencies varies according to their constitutional setting and that this relationship is driven by considerations of the executive’s governing legitimacy. Inspired by Tilly (1984), we compare patterns of agency governance in Hong Kong and Ireland, in particular configurations of assigned decision-making autonomies and control mechanisms. This comparison shows that in governing their agencies the elected government of Ireland’s parliamentary democracy pays more attention to input (i.e. democratic) legitimacy while the executive government of Hong Kong’s administrative state favors output (i.e. performance) legitimacy. These different forms of autonomy and control mechanism reflect different constitutional models of how political executives acquire and sustain their governing legitimacy.

Reforming the Westminster Model of Agency Governance: Britain and Ireland after the Crisis

Conventional understandings of what the Westminster model implies anticipate reliance on a top-down, hierarchical approach to budgetary accountability, reinforced by a post–New Public Management emphasis on recentralizing administrative capacity. This article, based on a comparative analysis of the experiences of Britain and Ireland, argues that the Westminster model of bureaucratic control and oversight itself has been evolving, hastened in large part due to the global financial crisis. Governments have gained stronger controls over the structures and practices of agencies, but agencies are also key players in securing better governance outcomes. The implication is that the crisis has not seen a return to the archetypal command-and-control model, nor a wholly new implementation of negotiated European-type practices, but rather a new accountability balance between elements of the Westminster system itself that have not previously been well understood.

Economic Stability and Economic Governance in the Euro Area:What the European Crisis Can Teach on the Limits of Economic Integration

The recent European economic crisis has dramatically exposed the failures of
the various institutional mechanisms in place to maintain economic stability
in Europe, and has unveiled the difficulty in achieving international coordination
on fiscal and financial stability policies. Drawing on the European
experience, this article analyzes the concept of economic stability in international
law and highlights the peculiar problems connected to its maintenance
or promotion. First, we demonstrate that policies that safeguard and
protect economic stability are largely regulated and managed at the national
level, due to their inextricable relationship with the exercise of national political
power. Until recently, more limited levels of pan-European integration
did not make the coordination of economic stability policies seem necessary.
However, a much deeper level of economic integration makes it very difficult
to tackle an international economic crisis through national responses. If EU
Member states wish to maintain and deepen economic integration, they
must accept an erosion of sovereignty over their economic stability policies.
This will not only deprive states of a fundamental anchor of political power,
but also create a challenge for the maintenance of democratic control over
economic policies. Second, this article argues that soft law approaches are
likely ineffective in enforcing the regulatory disciplines required to ensure
economic stability.