Beyond Financialisation? Transformative Strategies for More Sustainable Financial Markets in the European Union

The global financial crisis has led many regulators and lawmakers to a rethinking about current versus optimum financial market structures and activities that include a variety and even radical ideas about delevaraging and downsizing finance. This paper focuses on the flaws and shortcomings of regulatory reforms of finance and on the necessity of and scope for more radical transformative strategies. With 'crisis economics' back, the most developed countries, including the EU member states, are still on the edge of disaster and confronted with systemic risk. Changes in financial regulation adopted in the aftermath of the financial meltdown have not been radical enough to transform the overall system of finance-driven capitalism towards a more sustainable system with a more embedded finance. The paper discusses financialisation in order to understand the development trends in finance over the past decades and examines various theories to describe the typical trends and patterns in financial regulation. By focusing on a limited number of regulatory reforms in the European Union, the limitations of current reforms and the need for additional transformative strategies necessary to overcome the finance-driven accumulation regime are explored. Finally, the regulatory space for such transformative strategies and for taming finance in times of crisis, austerity, and increased public protest potential is analysed.

Economic Ideas and the Political Construction of the Financial Crash of 2008

This article is a short introduction to a special section on economic ideas and the political construction of the financial crash. It begins by explaining why economic ideas and the politics of appeals to certain ideas are so integral to the historical significance of the crash of 2008 and the question of whether it can be considered a crash at all. The first section covers the literature on ideas and economic crisis. The second section highlights that the contribution of the special section is to engage in a stock taking exercise of the empirical and conceptual patterns concerning the politics of ideational change underway in the areas of: comparative fiscal policy; monetary policy and Euro zone debt management; capital controls; and financial and securities market regulation and standard setting. The final section outlines the structure of this special section and content of the individual articles.

Universities as Anchor Institutions

Presentation as part of the Economics Panel at the annual conference of the Anchor Institutions Task Force. The presentation highlighted the economic contribution of Queen's University to the City of Belfast, the wider region and more globally. Impact was seen as covering direct and indirect financial factors, the social and economic impact of our research, and the social and civic contribution made through our teaching and the volunteering work of students.

Regulating Digital Financial Services Agents in Developing Countries to Promote Financial Inclusion

Limited access to bank branches excludes over one billion people from accessing financial services in developing countries. Digital financial services offered by banks and mobile money providers through agents can solve this problem without the need for complex and costly physical banking infrastructures. Delivering digital financial services through agents requires a legal framework to regulate liability. This article analyses whether vicarious liability of the principal is a more efficient regulatory approach than personal liability of the agent. Agent liability in Kenya, Fiji, and Malawi is analysed to demonstrate that vicarious liability of the principal, coupled to an explicit agreement as to agent rewards and penalties, is the more efficient regulatory approach.

Global Systemic Risk and International Regulatory Coordination: Squaring Sovereignty and Financial Stability

In recent years much attention has been given to systemic risk and maintaining financial stability. Much of the focus, rightly, has been on market failures and the role of regulation in addressing them. This article looks at the role of domestic policies and government actions as sources of global instability. The global financial system is built upon global markets controlled by national financial and macroeconomic policies. In this context, regulatory asymmetries, diverging policy preferences, and government failures add a further dimension to global systemic risk not present at the national level.
Systemic risk is a result of the interplay between two independent variables: an underlying trigger event, in this analysis a domestic policy measure, and a transmission channel. The solution to systemic risk requires tackling one of these variables. In a domestic setting, the centralization of regulatory power into one single authority makes it easier to balance the delicate equilibrium between enhancing efficiency and reducing instability. However, in a global financial system in which national financial policies serve to maximize economic welfare, regulators will be confronted with difficult policy and legal tradeoffs.
We investigate the role that financial regulation plays in addressing domestic policy failures and in controlling the danger of global financial interdependence. To do so we analyse global financial interconnectedness, and explain its role in transmitting instability; we investigate the political economy dynamics at the origin of regulatory asymmetries and government failures; and we discuss the limits of regulation.

Thanking the Greeks: The Crisis of the Rule of Law in EU Enlargement Regulation

This paper showcases the weaknesses of EU enlargement law and demonstrates how one Member State – namely, Greece – is notable for abusing this weakness, for harming the candidate countries, the EU, and the institutions alike, for stripping the EU position of its predictability, and for undermining the EU Commission’s efforts. Accordingly, Greece has severely incapacitated the key procedural rule of law component of the EU’s enlargement regulation, turning it into a randomised political game and ignoring any long-term goals of stability, prosperity, and peace that the process is to stand for. Following a walk through Greece’s engagement throughout a number of enlargement rounds, the paper concludes that the duty of loyalty – which is presumably able to discipline Member States that undermine the common effort – should find a new meaning in the context of EU enlargement.