Inhuman and Degrading Punishment, Dignity, and the Limits of Retribution

The recent judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Vinter and others v United Kingdom provides a much needed clarification of the parameters of the prohibition on inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as it applies to whole life orders of imprisonment under mandatory life sentences – essentially, life imprisonment without parole. The Grand Chamber’s judgment refines Strasbourg doctrine on life imprisonment and the prospect of release and illuminates key principles concerning inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the ECHR. This article considers the judgment’s profound significance in relation to both human rights and penology.

Crime, Punishment and Article 3 ECHR: Puzzles and Prospects of Applying an Absolute Right in a Penal Context

Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which provides that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, is considered to enshrine an absolute right. Yet it contains an under-explored element: inhuman and degrading punishment. While torture has been the subject of extensive academic commentary, and inhuman and degrading treatment has been examined to some extent, the prohibition of inhuman and degrading punishment has not been explored in significant depth, in spite of its considerable potential to alter the penal landscape.

This paper elucidates the key doctrinal elements of inhuman and degrading punishment ‘and treatment associated with it’, in the words of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It addresses a number of ‘puzzles’ or problems which arise in applying the absolute right enshrined in Article 3 of the ECHR to sentencing and imprisonment, clarifies ECtHR doctrine and highlights some of its key implications. Bringing a theoretically informed understanding to bear on the application of Article 3 of the ECHR in a penal context, the paper provides clarity and coherence to a complex and crucial intersection between human rights and penology.

Reva Siegel and the Role of Religion in Constructing the Meaning of ‘Human Dignity

The “religious understanding” of dignity is a topic of considerable complexity and is the subject of extensive scholarship. In this paper, I consider understandings of dignity that are currently under discussion in Roman Catholic circles, not least because Catholic discussions of dignity are often seen as influential in public policy and legal interpretation, directly and indirectly. I shall focus on one relatively neglected issue in legal scholarship: how scholars go about the task of identifying what a particular religion’s understanding of human dignity involves.
To illustrate the methodological problems that such an enterprise raises, I shall take one attempt by a scholar writing in the field of secular legal scholarship to describe Catholic understandings of dignity in the context of abortion and same-sex marriage. The discussion is that of Reva Siegel, an academic lawyer at Yale University; her recent analysis of differing understandings of dignity illustrates some of the issues that arise when the secular scholarly community addresses religious understandings of dignity.

PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF AMATEURS: THE CONTEXT OF SPORTS COACHING

The developing intersection between the law of negligence and sports coaching in the UK provides a profoundly distinctive context, as compared to that of the more traditional learned professions, in which to critically examine the issue of professional liability. More specifically, detailed consideration of the Bolam test in the context of sports coaching, where the majority of coaches are volunteers, reinforces the Bolam doctrine as a control mechanism designed to protect both claimants and defendants alike. Importantly, a fuller analysis of related jurisprudence, even in instances where defendant coaches lack a formal qualification, and/or may not have engaged in considered and reasoned decision-making, reveals the potential for the Bolam test to operate as a quasi-defence, thereby safeguarding coaches from negligence liability. Nonetheless, in discharging this heightened standard of care incumbent upon them, coaches must ensure that the coaching practices adopted are regular, approved, and capable of withstanding robust and logical scrutiny. Ultimately, this article’s analysis of the principles of professional liability, in the specific circumstances of sports coaching, should prove to be of appreciably wider interest and utility for practitioners specialising in personal injury law.