Restraing Regulatory Capture? Anglo America, Crisis Politics and Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance

A growing number of respected commentators now argue that regulatory capture of public agencies and public policy by leading banks was one of the main causal factors behind the financial crisis of 2007–2009, resulting in a permissive regulatory environment. This regulatory environment placed a faith in banks own internal risk models, contributed to pro-cyclical behaviour and turned a blind eye to excessive risk taking. The article argues that a form of ‘multi-level regulatory capture’ characterized the global financial architecture prior to the crisis. Simultaneously, regulatory capture fed off, but also nourished the financial boom, in a fashion that mirrored the life cycle of the boom itself. Minimizing future financial booms and crises will require continuous, conscious and explicit efforts to restrain financial regulatory capture now and into the future. The article assesses the extent to which this has been achieved in current global financial governance reform efforts and highlights some of the persistent difficulties that will continue to hamper efforts to restrain regulatory capture. The evidence concerning the extent to which regulatory capture is being effectively restrained is somewhat mixed, and where it is happening it is largely unintentional and accidental. Recent reforms have overlooked the political causes of the crisis and have failed to focus explicitly or systematically on regulatory capture.

The Global Financial Crisis and UK PPPs

Purpose – This paper seeks to examine how Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been affected by the global financial crisis (GFC). After briefly discussing PPPs and the GFC, the paper considers whether the latter has been a contributing factor in the declining number of projects reaching financial close.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper employs document content analysis to compare the time between notification of a project in the Official Journal of the European Union and its financial close in order to assess whether this period has increased since the beginning of the GFC. Two case studies are also presented.

Findings – Apart from a very small number of projects, the time between official project notification and financial close is lengthening, with the case studies providing some possible explanations for this.

Originality/value – Whilst Burger et al. provide some general statistics on the impact of the GFC on PPPs in a number of countries, this paper examines over 600 PPPs in the UK and supplements this analysis with two case studies, in order to assess whether the GFC has led to delays in projects reaching financial close.

E-Participation and E-Participants: solving the patent ‘crisis’

One of the major planks of some visions for E-Gov is that there is a willing participatory group who are more than happy to be involved in new forms of democracy and will be active and useful suppliers of input to e-consultation or e-participation processes. This group is different from that which goes online to the government site web and signs a petition asking the prime minister to resign. It is becoming clear, though, that the commitment to e-participation may well be there in theory, but difficult to access in practice. Further, the participation which is most welcome can frequently require training and expertise which is not widely available or there may be differences in opinion as to the point of participation. In this paper I will look to the attempts to encourage participation in the patent system. The UK is about to initiate a trial system utilising New York Law School’s Peer To Patent project, but has also attempted to involve participants in previous consultation exercises. I will use these as demonstrations of the sorts of problems which e-participation has met, and consider whether this new form of E-Gov is perhaps being oversold. The interesting question is whether participation is a growing tool which can ensure better public services from the State. My conclusion is that consultation and participatory projects can demonstrate involvement and are certainly educative but e-participatory projects are most likely incapable of achieving the goals set by their more optimistic advocates. The paper emphasises the patents field, but the lessons from it can – I suggest – be viewed as indicators having wider governance relevance. The primary point being made is that the technocratic view is always over-optimistic.

Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,

How the ship of fools was ship-wrecked - The Irish crisis and response

For a decade and half the Irish economy was the poster-boy of Europe. With substantial growth rates, an open economy, flexible labour markets and low levels of taxation, Ireland was seen as evidence of the success of neoliberal policies. Yet in the matter of a few short years Ireland has turned into a one of the peripheral black-holes (along with Greece and Portugal) that are threatening to bring down the whole Eurozone project. Given this context the paper will address two key questions. Firstly how did the much eulogised Celtic Tiger fall so far and so fast? And, secondly, what has been the government’s response to the fall and crash of the Irish economy? These two questions will be addressed through both a general historical analysis of the developments of Irish society up to the crash in 2008 and then the responses to it. Secondly by an analysis of two specific elements of that development; namely the much discussed low corporation tax rate and the failure of social housing to deliver decent affordable homes for those at the bottom of society. The third element is a review of the banking and sovereign debt crisis that led to the IMF/EU deal in November 2010 and a brief outlining of its implications for public finances, especially the question of default. The paper concludes by placing the Irish crisis in a global context.

‘Towards a Green New Deal on the Island of Ireland: from economic crisis to a new political economy of sustainability’

This article begins from the assumption (which may seem controversial to many) that anyone who thinks that our current economic crisis is a temporary blip until ‘normal service’ (i.e. a return to ‘business as usual’) is resumed, profoundly misunderstands the severity and significance of what’s happening to the global economy and its impacts on the future prosperity of the island of Ireland. The economic recession represents nothing short of a re-structuring of the global economy and the creation of a new dispensation between governments, markets and citizens. The full implications of the re-regulation of the market, with the state bailing out and part nationalising the financial sector in both jurisdictions on the island (as in other parts of the world) have yet to be seen, but what we are witnessing is the emergence of a new economic model. Those who think we can, or even ought to, return to the pre-2008 economic model, are gravely mistaken. The current economic downturn marks the end of the ‘neo-liberal’ model and the beginnings of the transition (an inevitable transition, this article will argue) towards a new low carbon, renewable, green and sustainable economy and society.

Public Administration, Science and Risk Assessment: A Case Study of the U.K. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Crisis

The bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak in the United Kingdom is regarded as one of the worst public policy crises the British government has experienced during the postwar era. In material terms, it has led to the slaughter of 3.3 million cattle and estimated economic losses of £3.7 billion. In administrative terms, the crisis brought about the dissolution of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. This article examines the istitutional context in which decisions about the scientific evidence on BSE were made. The authors argue that a centralized system in which government agencies control science for government is inherently vulnerable to alliances of experts and interest groups that undermine the credible assessment of public health and safety risks. Specific societal conditions may encourage risk-opportunistic behavior among policy makers that is conducive to delays and inaction until such time as the evidence of a health risk becomes overwhelming.