Belief Updating and Learning in Semi-Qualitative Probabilistic Networks

This paper explores semi-qualitative probabilistic networks (SQPNs) that combine numeric and qualitative information. We first show that exact inferences with SQPNs are NPPP-Complete. We then show that existing qualitative relations in SQPNs (plus probabilistic logic and imprecise assessments) can be dealt effectively through multilinear programming. We then discuss learning: we consider a maximum likelihood method that generates point estimates given a SQPN and empirical data, and we describe a Bayesian-minded method that employs the Imprecise Dirichlet Model to generate set-valued estimates.

On the Merit of Selecting Different Belief Merging Operators

Belief merging operators combine multiple belief bases (a profile) into a collective one. When the conjunction of belief bases is consistent, all the operators agree on the result. However, if the conjunction of belief bases is inconsistent, the results vary between operators. There is no formal manner to measure the results and decide on which operator to select. So, in this paper we propose to evaluate the result of merging operators by using three ordering relations (fairness, satisfaction and strength) over operators for a given profile. Moreover, a relation of conformity over operators is introduced in order to classify how well the operator conforms to the definition of a merging operator. By using the four proposed relations we provide a comparison of some classical merging operators and evaluate the results for some specific profiles.

A belief revision framework for revising epistemic states with partial epistemic states

Belief revision performs belief change on an agent’s beliefs when new evidence (either of the form of a propositional formula or of the form of a total pre-order on a set of interpretations) is received. Jeffrey’s rule is commonly used for revising probabilistic epistemic states when new information is probabilistically uncertain. In this paper, we propose a general epistemic revision framework where new evidence is of the form of a partial epistemic state. Our framework extends Jeffrey’s rule with uncertain inputs and covers well-known existing frameworks such as ordinal conditional function (OCF) or possibility theory. We then define a set of postulates that such revision operators shall satisfy and establish representation theorems to characterize those postulates. We show that these postulates reveal common characteristics of various existing revision strategies and are satisfied by OCF conditionalization, Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning and possibility conditionalization. Furthermore, when reducing to the belief revision situation, our postulates can induce Darwiche and Pearl’s postulates C1 and C2.

“How Can a Woman Who Has Been Raped Be Believed?”: Andrea Dworkin, Sexual Violence and the Ethics of Belief

In June 2000, Andrea Dworkin, an American feminist activist and author, published an account of being raped in a Paris hotel room a year earlier. The story was met with widespread disbelief, including from feminist readers. This article explores the reasons for this disbelief, asking how and why narratives of rape are granted – or denied – truth status by their readers. The article argues for understanding the conferral of belief as a narrative transaction involving the actions of both narrator and reader. It posits that Dworkin was widely seen as an unreliable narrator but argues that for ideologically charged narratives such as rape narratives judgements of reliability and belief inevitably draw upon the normative standpoint of the reader. I suggest that there are opposing criteria for establishing the truth of rape narratives; a ‘factual’ or legal model, which sees rape narratives as requiring scrutiny, and an ‘experiential’ model, located within certain strands of feminist politics, which emphasises the ethical importance of believing women’s narratives. The article finishes with a consideration of the place of belief within an ethics of reading and reception of rape narratives.

Rational Partial Choice Functions and Their Application to Belief Revision.

Necessary and sufficient conditions for choice functions to be rational have been intensively studied in the past. However, in these attempts, a choice function is completely specified. That is, given any subset of options, called an issue, the best option over that issue is always known, whilst in real-world scenarios, it is very often that only a few choices are known instead of all. In this paper, we study partial choice functions and investigate necessary and sufficient rationality conditions for situations where only a few choices are known. We prove that our necessary and sufficient condition for partial choice functions boils down to the necessary and sufficient conditions for complete choice functions proposed in the literature. Choice functions have been instrumental in belief revision theory. That is, in most approaches to belief revision, the problem studied can simply be described as the choice of possible worlds compatible with the input information, given an agent’s prior belief state. The main effort has been to devise strategies in order to infer the agents revised belief state. Our study considers the converse problem: given a collection of input information items and their corresponding revision results (as provided by an agent), does there exist a rational revision operation used by the agent and a consistent belief state that may explain the observed results?