Crucial silences: When Accountability Met PFI and Finance Capital

During recent years, a wide spectrum of research has questioned whether public services/infrastructure procurement through private finance, as exemplified by the UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI), meets minimum standards of democratic accountability. While broadly agreeing with some of these arguments, this paper suggests that this debate is flawed on two grounds. Firstly, PFI is not about effective procurement, or even about a pragmatic choice of procurement mechanisms which can potentially compromise public involvement and input; rather it is about a process where the state creates new profit opportunities at a time when the international financial system is increasingly lacking in safe investment opportunities. Secondly, because of its primary function as investment opportunity, PFI, by its very nature, prioritises the risk-return criteria of private finance over the needs of the public sector client and its stakeholders. Using two case studies of recent PFI projects, the paper illustrates some of the mechanisms through which finance capital exercises control over the PFI procurement process. The paper concludes that recent proposals aimed at “reforming” or “democratising” PFI fail to recognise the objective constraints which this type of state-finance capital nexus imposes on political process.

Accountability and Value for Money: A Framework for Exploring the Relationship in Private Finance Initiative Contracts

There is an implicit assumption in the UK Treasury’s publications on public-private partnerships (PPP) – also more commonly known in the United Kingdom as private finance initiative (PFI) - that accountability and value for money (VFM) are related concepts. While recent academic studies on PPP/PFI (from now on as PFI) have focused on VFM, there is a notable absence of studies exploring the ‘presumed’ relationships between accountability and VFM. Drawing on Dubnick’s (Dubnick and Romzek, 1991, 1993; Dubnick, 1996, 1998, 2003, 2005; Dubnick and Justice, 2002) framework for accountability and PFI literature, we develop a research framework for exploring potential relationships between accountability and VFM in PFI projects by proposing alternative accountability cultures, processes and mechanisms for PFI. The PFI accountability model is then exposed to four criteria - warrantability, tractability, measurability and feasibility. Our preliminary interviews provide us guidance in identifying some of the cultures, processes and mechanisms indicated in our model which should enable future researchers to test not only the UK Government’s claimed relationships between accountability and VFM using more specific PFI empirical data, but also a potential relationship between accountability and performance in general.

Unfunded Pension Liabilities and the Corporate CDS Market

This article examines the impact of pension deficits on default risk as measured by the premia on corporate credit default swaps (CDS). We find highly significant evidence that unfunded pension liabilities raise one- and five-year CDS premia. However, this relation is not homogeneous across countries, with the U.S. CDS market leading its European counterparts in the pricing of defined-benefit pension risk.

The Diffusion of Risks in Public Private Partnership Contracts

Purpose The UK government argues that the benefits of public private partnership (PPP) in delivering public infrastructure stem from: transferring risks to the private sector within a structure in which financiers put their own capital at risk; and, the performance based payment mechanism, reinforced by the due diligence requirements imposed by the lenders financing the projects (HM Treasury, 2010). Prior studies of risk in PPPs have investigated ‘what’ risks are allocated and to ‘whom’, that is to the public or the private sector. The purpose of this study is to examine ‘how’ and ‘why’ PPP risks are diffused by their financiers. Design/methodology/approach This study focuses on the financial structure of PPPs and on their financiers. Empirical evidence comes from interviews conducted with equity and debt financiers. Findings The findings show that the financial structure of the deals generates risk aversion in both debt and equity financiers and that the need to attract affordable finance leads to risk diffusion through a network of companies using various means that include contractual mitigation through insurance, performance support guarantees, interest rate swaps and inflation hedges. Because of the complexity this process generates, both procurers and suppliers need expensive expert advice. The risk aversion and diffusion and the consequent need for advice add cost to the projects impacting on the government’s economic argument for risk transfer. Limitations and implications The empirical work covers the private finance initiative (PFI) type of PPP arrangements and therefore the risk diffusion mechanisms may not be generalisable to other forms of PPP, especially those that do not involve the use of high leverage or private finance. Moreover, the scope of this research is limited to exploring the diffusion of risk in the private sector. Further research is needed on how risk is diffused in other settings and on the value for money implication of risk diffusion in PPP contracts. Originality/value The expectation inherent in PPP is that the private sector will better manage those risks allocated to it and because private capital is at risk, financiers will perform due diligence with the ultimate outcome that only viable projects will proceed. This paper presents empirical evidence that raises questions about these expectations. Key words: public private partnership, risk management, diffusion, private finance initiative, financiers

'Mining money': science, legal technologies & working the borderlands of global finance

This paper explores the roles of science and market devices in the commodification of ‘nature’ and the configuration of flows of speculative capital. It focuses on mineral prospecting and the market for shares in ‘junior’ mining companies. In recent years these companies have expanded the reach of their exploration activities overseas, taking advantage of innovations in exploration methodologies and the liberalisation of fiscal and property regimes in ‘emerging’ mineral rich developing countries. Recent literature has explored how the reconfiguration of notions of ‘risk’ has structured the uneven distribution of rents. It is increasingly evident that neoliberal framing of environmental, political, social and economic risks has set in motion overflows that multinational mining capital had not bargained for (e.g. nationalisation, violence and political resistance). However, the role of ‘geological risk’ in animating flows of mining finance is often assumed as a ‘technical’ given. Yet geological knowledge claims, translated locally, designed to travel globally, assemble heterogeneous elements within distanciated regimes of metrology, valuation and commodity production. This paper explores how knowledge of nature is enrolled within systems of property relations, focusing on the genealogy of the knowledge practices that animate contemporary circuits of speculative mining finance. It argues that the financing of mineral prospecting mobilises pragmatic and situated forms of knowledge rather than actuarially driven calculations that promise predictability. A Canadian public enquiry struck in the wake of scandal associated with Bre-X’s prospecting activities in Indonesia is used to glean insights into the ways in which the construction of a system of public warrant to underpin financial speculation is predicated upon particular subjectivities and the outworking of everyday practices and struggles over ‘value’. Reflection on practical investments in processes of standardisation, rituals of verification and systems of accreditation reveal much about how the materiality of things shape the ways in which regional and global financial circuits are integrated, selectively transforming existing social relations and forms of knowledge production.

'Trusting the numbers': mineral prospecting, raising finance and the governance of knowledge

Mineral prospecting and raising finance for ‘junior’ mining firms has historically been regarded as a speculative activity. For the regulators of securities markets upon which ‘junior’ mining companies seek to raise capital, a perennial problem has been handling not only the indeterminacy of scientific claims, but also the social basis of epistemic practices. This paper examines the production of a system of public warrant and associated knowledge practices intended to enable investors to differentiate between ‘destructive’ and ‘productive’ varieties of financial speculation. It traces the use of the notion of ‘disclosure’ in constructing and legitimizing the ‘juniors’ market in Canada. It argues that though the work of ‘economics’ may be necessary in the construction of markets, it is by no means sufficient. Attention must also be given to the ways in which legal models of ‘the free-market’ can be translated and constantly re-worked across the sites and spaces of regulatory practice, animating the geographies of markets.

Econometric Methods and their Applications in Finance, Macro and Related Fields

The volume aims at providing an outlet for some of the best papers presented at the 15th Annual Conference of the African Econometric Society, which is one of the “chapters” of the International Econometric Society. Many of these papers represent the state of the art in financial econometrics and applied econometric modeling, and some also provide useful simulations that shed light on the models' ability to generate meaningful scenarios for forecasting and policy analysis.

Cyber Security Research: a vision for the UK: Finance challenges

Invited talk, representing the Royal Society

Top incomes under finance-driven capitalism, 1990-2010: power resources and regulatory orders

This article examines the impact of financialisation on the income shares of the top 1% from 1990-2010, through a panel analysis of 14 OECD countries. Drawing together literatures stressing the dependence of income inequality on the structural bargaining power of capital relative to labour, and of the dependence of accumulation on underlying institutionalised modes of state regulation, it shows that financialisation has significantly enhanced top income shares net of underlying controls. Whilst the income shares of the top 1% appear responsive to variables typical of wider studies of personal income inequality, we emphasise distinctive mechanisms of top income growth linked to the rising dominance of financial instruments and actors, facilitated by a historically specific regulatory order. These conditions were key to the emergence of a state of ‘asymmetric bargaining’ which disproportionately enhanced the fortunes of the wealthy. Results thus emphasise the importance of class-biased power resources and underlying regulatory structures, as determinants both of income concentration and of the distribution of economic rewards beyond growth capacity alone.